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Publisher’s Note
The 2020 Brigham Young University Prelaw Review (Journal),
continues to demonstrate Brigham Young University’s commitment
to excellence in scholarship and student development. Throughout
this past year, it has been a privilege to work with ambitious students
who want to produce the best possible undergraduate legal journal.
Continuing the vision of the Journal, this year’s staff has worked
arduously to present professional and current legal scholarship.
As undergraduates, the depth and breadth of the addressed topics
required that these students do much more than just edit. The authors
and editors researched to find court cases and law review articles
to support their arguments. During the year, as new information
became available, authors and editors continually updated and refocused their arguments to provide timely discussions of the current
issues. Consequently, each of these articles reflects the latest decisions from the courts and scholarship from the legal community.
The goal is always to produce a reputable legal journal. However, this experience also provides the opportunity for the staff to
prepare themselves as members for future professional scholarship
and work in the legal field. Each student has become proficient in
the Bluebook system of legal citations and all have spent countless
hours editing and source checking each other’s legal articles. The
students have also learned to analyze pressing issues, incorporate
legal citations, and present cogent legal arguments, all while receiving training in journal publishing. These students leave the 2019 edition of this Journal possessing the ability to excel in law and other
professional pursuits.
We continue to be grateful for the endowment from the Rawlinson Family Foundation that funds the Journal and the support of
Brigham Young University’s resources to create and print this publication. As you read the topics addressed in this Journal, I’m sure
that you will agree that this is an impressive work produced by these
v

BYU undergraduate authors and editors. It continues to be a pleasure
to work with such fine individuals and students on a daily basis.
Kris Tina Carlston, JD, MBA
Director—Pre-Professional Advisement Center
Prelaw Advisor
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Editor in Chief & Managing Editor’s Note
We are both honored and humbled by the privilege to oversee the
publication of the 2020 edition of the Brigham Young University
Prelaw Review. As new legal issues arise each year, we feel it is
essential for students to understand and add their voices to these
important issues and debates. We believe the 2020 Prelaw Review
staff have met this goal through their hard work and commitment.
We feel the innovative claims in each article are capable of enlightening and broadening the reader’s perspective. They add to relevant
conversations on legal topics ranging from education to gender reassignment in prison, from labor law to contracts.
Authors and editors for this year’s Prelaw Review were selected
in July of 2019. In their applications authors submitted drafts and
abstracts with proposed arguments in their relevant areas of research.
They were later paired with an editor to assist them in the writing
process. Then, with the help of their editors, authors spent the next
several months researching, writing, refining arguments. Throughout this process each partnership overcame numerous challenges as
their worked to improve their arguments. The result is truly a tribute
to their desires and vision.
Each team sought the guidance of legal professionals and professors to better understand and address their topics. We wish to
extend our heartfelt thanks to everyone who took the time to help
lift this journal to a higher plane of quality. We wish to thank Taylor
Peterson and Neal Hillam for their invaluable efforts in bringing this
all together as well as the week by week support of editing, reading
and revising. We are extremely grateful to Kris Tina Carlston for
her time and effort in behalf of this journal as well has her excellent
sense of humor. Finally, we wish to thank Laura Bean for formatting
each paper prior to publication.
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It is with great pleasure we present the 2020 edition of the
Brigham Young University Prelaw Review. We wish all those
involved the best of luck in their future endeavors and goals.
Holly Castleton				Samuel Gustafson
Editor in Chief				
Managing Editor
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Evaluating the Classification of Gender
Confirmation Surgery as a Medical Necessity
for Inmates
Alexis J. Watson1
In 2012, Mason Edmo pleaded guilty to the sexual abuse of a fifteenyear-old boy and was sentenced to ten years in prison. While in
prison, Edmo announced that she identified as a female and changed
her name to Adree. Edmo went on to request gender confirmation
surgery (also known as “sex reassignment surgery”) while still in
prison. Initially, Edmo was not granted the surgery by the Idaho
Department of Corrections, and went on to self-harm and attempt
self-castration twice. In 2017, Edmo filed suit against the Idaho State
Department of Corrections (IDOC) and won. The IDOC disagreed
with the decision, filing an appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court, but in
August of 2019, the appeal was denied and Edmo was granted the
surgery in Edmo v. Corizon.2 This was the first time a circuit court
had granted an inmate’s request for gender confirmation surgery.3

1

Alexis is a Sophomore studying Finance and English at Brigham Young
University. She would like to recognize and thank Landon Hooley, a
student at Brigham Young University studying Political Science, for his
diligence and insight as an editor.

2

Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019).

3

Santiago, Ellyn. Adree Edmo: 5 Fast Facts You Need to Know. (Aug. 25,
2019), Heavy., https://heavy.com/news/2019/08/adree-edmo/.
1

2
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Public response to the Edmo v. Corizon decision has been very
polarized.4 Some people are pleased with the decision because they
believe the surgery to be a medical necessity, and should be provided
to avoid discrimination against transgender individuals. Others disagree, believing that gender confirmation surgery should not be
granted to inmates while there are law-abiding citizens who desire
the surgery but cannot afford it. Still, others are upset by the decision
because they believe the surgery to be beyond the range of care that
inmates ought to be provided with, regardless of circumstance.
The surgery was granted to Edmo under the Eighth Amendment, which states that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be
inflicted upon prisoners.5 In the context of prison healthcare, this has
been interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean that correctional
facilities must provide prisoners with medically necessary healthcare to avoid administering cruel and unusual punishment.6 For
example, if an inmate were to experience severe blood loss without
being treated for it, the correctional facility would be in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. Although this may seem like a straightforward interpretation of the law, opinions have differed regarding what
exactly constitutes a medically necessary procedure. Was the Ninth
Circuit Court correct in classifying gender confirmation surgery as
a medically necessary procedure in Edmo v. Corizon? This question
is important because correctly identifying which medical treatments
are necessary is key to ensuring that our correctional institutions
remain constitutional and free from cruel and unusual punishment.
This paper seeks to answer this question by first examining
precedent set by the court regarding medical care for inmates, and
second, examining state law that defines a “medically necessary”
procedure. A solution will then be proposed as to how correctional
4

Lateshia Beachum, Idaho must pay for an inmate’s gender confirmation surgery, a court says. The governor is fighting it, Washington Post
(Aug. 27, 2019, 4:14 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-mdva/2019/08/27/idaho-must-pay-an-inmates-gender-confirmation-surgerycourt-says-governor-is-fighting-it/.

5

U.S. Const. amend. VIII, § 1.

6

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1973).
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institutions and courts might better accommodate transgender
inmates while remaining within the bounds of medically necessary
care as established by the Eighth Amendment.

I. Background
To understand the problems with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Edmo, it is necessary to understand (a) the experience of inmates
with gender dysphoria, (b) the history and current research surrounding gender confirmation surgery, and (c) inmates’ use of the
Eighth Amendment to request said surgery.
A. Gender Dysphoria
According to the American Psychological Association (APA), gender dysphoria manifests itself in a variety of ways, and is generally recognized through symptoms of intense discomfort with
one’s assigned birth sex and a strong preference for another gender
identity.7 Gender dysphoria affects only a small portion of inmates
(the exact number is unknown), as the total number of transgender
inmates is estimated to be about 750,8 and the transgender population of the United States is estimated at only 1 million.9 However, the
minority of inmates that do suffer from gender dysphoria often feel
discriminated against by other inmates, prison officials, and medical
officials.10 They may experience psychological turmoil so strong as
7

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 302.6 (5th ed
2013) (DSM-5).

8

George R. Brown, Everett McDuffie, Health Care Policies Addressing
Transgender Inmates in Prison Systems in the United States, 15 J. of Correctional Health Care, 280, 280-291 (2009).

9

Esther L. Meerwijk & Jae M. Sevelius, Transgender Population Size in
the United States: A Meta-Regression of Population-Based Probability
Samples, 107 Am. J. of Pub. Health, e1, e5 (2017).

10

Erin McCauley et al. Exploring Healthcare Experiences for Incarcerated
Individuals Who Identify as Transgender in a Southern Jail, 3 Transgender Health, 34-41 (2018).

4
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to lead to self-harm, which, in extreme cases, has included attempts
at self-castration.11
B. Gender Confirmation Surgery (GCS)
Gender confirmation surgery (abbreviated throughout the rest of this
paper as GCS) is a cosmetic surgery by which a transgender person’s
physical appearance is altered to resemble that of the gender with
which they identify. GCS usually requires a combination of several
surgical procedures that differ in purpose depending on the desires
of the patient and which gender the individual is transitioning to. The
APA recognizes GCS as a treatment for gender dysphoria, although
very little research exists that evaluates the effects of GCS, especially in the long-term.
Not all inmates who experience gender dysphoria request GCS.
The APA recommends a variety of treatment options for gender dysphoria, including access to clothing of the preferred gender, counselling, and/or hormone therapy. Despite the variety of treatment
options, some inmates still request GCS after having received these
other treatments, believing that GCS is necessary to alleviate significant psychological stress.
C. Using the Eighth Amendment to Request GCS
In the past, inmates have requested GCS under the Eighth Amendment, arguing that GCS constitutes a medically necessary treatment,
and that by not providing the surgery, prisons administer a form of
cruel and unusual punishment. Two circuit court cases, Gibson v.
Collier12 and Kosilek v. Spencer13 ruled against obligating prisons
to provide GCS. Until the Edmo v. Idaho decision, no inmate had
11

Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019); Lesley F. Roberts
et al. A Passion for Castration: Characterizing Men Who Are Fascinated
with Castration, but Have Not Been Castrated, 5 The J. of Sexual Med.,
1669, 1670 (2008).

12

Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2019).

13

Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014).
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ever been granted GCS on the grounds that the surgery was not considered a medical necessity. In Edmo v. Corizon, the surgery was
granted on the basis that the correctional facility’s healthcare team
acted in deliberate indifference14 towards Adree Edmo’s suffering
and that, for Edmo, GCS was a medically necessary procedure.15
This paper argues that a correctional facility’s refusal to grant
gender confirmation surgery does not constitute a violation of the
Eighth Amendment, and that the Ninth Circuit Court in Edmo v.
Idaho misapplied the term “medically necessary.” By subjecting
inmates to a procedure that is, at this time, not proven to provide
long-term benefit, inmates are subject to a form of experimentation,
which might be classified as a form of cruel and unusual punishment. However, this paper recognizes that there is an urgent need
for reform in the way that the prison system treats individuals with
gender dysphoria, consequently proposing that the best way in which
to do this is to increase the amount of valid research pertaining to
gender confirmation surgery and its long-term effects, so that the
surgery might one day be classified as either medically necessary or
not medically necessary.

II. Why Edmo Got it Wrong
The landmark Supreme Court decision, Estelle v. Gamble states that
“the Eighth Amendment “proscribes only medical care so unconscionable as to fall below society’s minimum standards of decency.”16
This means that medically necessary care is medical care which
ought to be denied unless denying it is considered below society’s
minimum standards of decency. Another Supreme Court decision,
U.S. v. DeCologero, affirms that adequate medical care for prisoners consists of “services at a level reasonably commensurate with
modern medical science and of a quality acceptable within prudent

14

Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1366 (7th Cir. Ill. 1997).

15

Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019).

16

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1973).
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professional standards.”17 Thus, medically necessary care is that
which, if denied, goes against the standards of healthcare for society
as a whole. It is also healthcare which is in accordance with modern
medical science and acceptable within prudent professional standards. This precedent creates a high bar for any medical procedure,
especially a controversial one such as gender confirmation surgery.
According to this precedent, GCS ought to be denied unless denying the surgery is considered below society’s minimum standards
of decency. In order to be granted to prisoners, GCS must also be
considered modern medical science and acceptable within prudent
professional standards. Due to the controversial nature of the procedure, both in public and professional circles, there are serious differences of opinion regarding the authority of the standards by which
GCS is evaluated. Fortunately, Idaho State Law offers a definition of
“medically necessary” that adheres to the precedent established by
the Supreme Court while being somewhat less abstract.
Because Adree Edmo is under Idaho state jurisdiction, and
because the prison in which she is being held is covered by an insurance plan, the definition of “medically necessary” as found in the
Idaho State Code applies to her situation.18 In the context of correctional facilities, this law tells us that the definition of “medically necessary” provided in the insurance health benefit plan for the prison
is the main source of authority when determining if a medical procedure is legal. The Idaho State Correctional Facility has a contract
with the private insurance provider Corizon that covers healthcare
costs for each inmate. Corizon does not consider GCS to be a medically necessary procedure and thus denied coverage to Edmo.19
Should the State of Idaho then be required to fund GCS because
Corizon will not? Idaho State law answers this question by providing its own definition of the term “medically necessary” that applies
should the insurance provider fail to provide a definition.20 First, the
17

U.S. v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 1987).

18

Idaho Code Ann. § 41-5903 (West).

19

Supra Edmo, 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019).

20

Idaho State Code (Ann. § 41-5903).
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code requires that medical procedures be recommended by a physician or other health care provider and that the procedure meets the
subsequent four requirements ((a) through (d)). So, even if a physician recommended GCS for an inmate, under Idaho State Law the
procedure must also meet all of the other requirements.
The first of these other requirements (requirement (a)) is that the
procedure be in accordance with generally accepted standards of
medical practice. The problem comes in determining what exactly
those generally accepted standards are and who must accept them.
Court opinion on this matter differs throughout the nation. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals accepts WPATH’s (World Professional Association for Transgender Health) Standards of Care published in 2011 as their standard of care in Edmo v. Corizon, as do
some other courts in cases dealing with transgender healthcare.21
Under the WPATH standards, GCS would be considered medically
necessary for Edmo. So, if the court was correct in considering the
WPATH standards to be generally accepted standards of medical
practice, then the decision in Edmo v. Corizon was correct under
requirement (a) of Idaho State Code. But, can WPATH’s standards of
care be extended to be considered “generally accepted standards of
medical care?” Some courts, like those that denied GCS to inmates,
have said that they cannot.22 The Supreme Court has explained that
professional judgement, “creates only a “presumption” of correctness; welcome or not, the final responsibility belongs to the courts.”
23
By applying WPATH’s standards of care alone to Edmo v. Corizon
to determine whether GCS is a medically necessary procedure, the
21

De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 522–23 (4th Cir. 2013); Keohane v.
Jones, 328 F. Supp. 3d 1288, 1294 (N.D. Fla. 2018), appeal filed, (11th
Cir. 2018); Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1170 (N.D. Cal.),
appeal dismissed & remanded, 802 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2015); Soneeya v.
Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 231–32 (D. Mass. 2012).

22

Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 221 (5th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he WPATH
Standards of Care reflect not consensus, but merely one side in a sharply
contested medical debate over [GCS].”); Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d at
76–79 (recounting testimony questioning the WPATH Standards of Care).

23

Cameron v Tomes referencing Youngberg, 457 U. S. Reports 323, 102
S.Ct. 2462.
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Ninth Circuit Court erred, as the Supreme Court has determined that
medical standards cannot be established by a single professional,
group of professionals, or organization, like WPATH. Instead, medical standards must be considered more broadly by courts, “encompassing institutional concerns as well as individual welfare [for]
nothing in the Constitution mechanically gives controlling weight to
one set of professional judgments.”24
WPATH classifies GCS as an “effective and medically necessary procedure,” yet it makes this conclusion based upon retrospective observational studies consisting of mostly self-reported patient
data that cannot be used to determine cause and effect.25 Additionally, the WPATH Standards reference several studies that show a
decline in patient well-being and say regarding these studies: “These
findings do emphasize the need to have good long-term psychological and psychiatric care available for this population. More studies
are needed that focus on the outcomes of current assessment and
treatment approaches for gender dysphoria.” WPATH acknowledges
the need for a broader consideration of GCS than they provide by
emphasizing the need for good long-term care for post-GCS patients
and calling for more studies on the effects of GCS. By calling for
more studies, WPATH highlights the uncertainty of their previous
research and draws skepticism toward their claim that GCS is “undeniably beneficial.”26
Requirement (b) of the Idaho State Code states that a medically necessary procedure must be “Clinically appropriate, in terms
of type, frequency, extent, site and duration, and considered effective for the covered person’s illness, injury or disease.” Once again,
the question must be asked: by who must the procedure be deemed
appropriate? As discussed previously, the standards by which a procedure is deemed appropriate cannot be determined by the WPATH

24

Id.

25

World Professional Association for Transgender Health, Standards
of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender Nonconforming People 113 (7th ed., 2012).

26

Id. at 107.
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alone. Thus, whether or not GCS meets requirement (b) depends on
the standards referred to in requirement (a).
Requirement (c) of the Idaho State Code states that a medically
necessary procedure must be, “Not primarily for the convenience
of the covered person, physician or other health care provider.” Of
all the requirements, this requirement is the one that GCS is most
likely to meet in the case of severe gender dysphoria. As in the case
of Adree Edmo, the effects of her severe gender dysphoria resulted
in dangerous behavior such as attempted self-castration. Because of
this, we know that some type of treatment is not only convenient,
but potentially life-saving for people like Adree Edmo. However, the
question remains as to whether or not that treatment should be GCS.
GCS also fails requirement (d) in the Idaho State Code. Requirement (d) states that a medically necessary procedure must not be
“more costly than an alternative service or sequence of services or
supply, and at least as likely to produce equivalent therapeutic or
diagnostic results as to the diagnosis or treatment of the covered
person’s illness, injury or disease.”27 The more common treatment
for individuals with gender dysphoria is hormone therapy, which is
much less costly than GCS. Hormone therapy alone costs anywhere
from $300 to $2400 per year. The additional cost of GCS “can range
from about $15,000 for just reconstruction of the genitals to about
$25,000 for operations on the genitals and chest to $50,000 or more
for procedures that include operations to make facial features more
masculine or feminine.”28 And, this cost does not include the cost of
the additional post-GCS medical care that will be required for the
rest of the patient’s life in order to detect and prevent complications
that often arise as a result of the surgery.29

27

Idaho Code Ann. § 41-5903 (West).

28

Sex Reassignment Surgery Cost, Cost Helper Health, https://health.
costhelper.com/sex-reassignment-surgery.html.

29

S. Cristofari, et al., Postoperative complications of male to female sex

reassignment surgery: A 10-year French retrospective study, 64 Annales
de

Chirurgie Platique Esthetique 24-32 (2019).
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Yet, according to the Idaho code, GCS could still be considered
medically necessary even though it is more costly, as long as it has
been proven to produce better therapeutic or diagnostic results.30
However, GCS has not been proven to produce better results than
hormone therapy alone. Although WPATH, as mentioned earlier,
has claimed that GCS in conjunction with hormone therapy can be
more effective at treating gender dysphoria for some individuals,31
this claim is itself weak because it is based mostly upon self-reported
patient surveys.32 And, as established earlier in this paper, the standards of WPATH alone are not enough to determine whether GCS is
a medically necessary procedure and ought to be proscribed under
the Eighth Amendment. There is the possibility that GCS does
indeed produce better results than hormone therapy alone, but there
is also the possibility that GCS could be less beneficial in the longrun than hormone therapy alone. Because of the higher cost and this
uncertainty regarding the long-term effects of GCS, the surgery fails
to meet requirement (d) of the Idaho State Code.
As mentioned previously, WPATH’s claim that GCS may be
the most effective form of treatment for certain individuals is weak
because this claim is based mostly upon self-reported patient surveys. Self-reported patient surveys have considerably less validity
than concrete, empirical research due to inaccuracies that arise as
a result of response bias,33 which is the tendency for individuals to
respond inaccurately or falsely to questions.34 When responding to
self-reported surveys, individuals tend to inflate well-being, which

30

Idaho Code Ann. § 41-5903 (West).

31

World Professional Association for Transgender Health, Standards
of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender Nonconforming People 8 (7th ed., 2012).

32

Id. at 107.

33

Robert Rosenman, Measuring bias in self-reported data, 2 Int’l j. of
Behav. & Healthcare Res. 320-322 (2011).

34

Paul J. Lavrakas, Response Bias, Encyclopedia of Survey Research Methods, 1 Thousand Oaks, Ca: Sage Publications, Inc. (2008).
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means that those who have received GCS are likely to self-report
that they are doing better than they actually are.35
Unfortunately, there remains a dearth of information on the subject of GCS. The most recent empirical study on the long-term effects
of GCS took place in 2011 in Sweden. 36 This study concluded that
“Persons with transsexualism, after sex reassignment, have considerably higher risks for mortality, suicidal behaviour, and psychiatric
morbidity than the general population.” While this conclusion may
seem to place GCS in an especially bad light, it compared people
who received the surgery with the general population, which is not
the most appropriate control group. What would have been preferable would have been a comparison to individuals who had in the past
experienced severe gender dysphoria, but who had not received GCS
and instead opted for another type of treatment or no treatment at all.
This would help determine whether GCS causes increased mortality
or whether mortality is increased for transsexuals regardless of the
type of procedure or lack thereof. As this study does not do this, it
can only be considered partially valid like the self-reported surveys
used by WPATH, and thus GCS cannot be deemed not medically
necessary according to this study.
Because the research surrounding the long-term effects of GCS
is so unreliable and conflicting, it is not surprising that the medical community has had a difficult time coming to a consensus on
whether GCS is the most effective form of treatment for certain
individuals with gender dysphoria. The research that WPATH references supports GCS as being the most effective treatment, while
other research, like the Swedish study, seems to support the opposite
conclusion. As established earlier in the paper, this lack of consensus
means that GCS cannot at present be considered a medically necessary
procedure, and thus should not have been granted in Edmo v. Idaho.
35

S. P. Wojcik & P. H. Ditto, Motivated Happiness: Self-Enhancement
Inflates Self-Reported Subjective Well-Being, 5 Soc. Psychol. & Personality Sci. 825-834 (2014).

36

Cecilia Dhejne, et al., Long-Term Follow-Up of Transsexual Persons
Undergoing Sex Reassignment Surgery: Cohort Study in Sweden, 6, Plos
One, e16885 (2011).
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This conclusion does not change the fact that there are transgender inmates who suffer from severe gender dysphoria and desperately
need the most effective form of treatment available. Consequently,
this paper proposes further study of the long-term effects of GCS, as
an increased amount of reliable research will help establish consensus in the medical community by determining whether or not GCS
can be classified as the most effective form of treatment for severe
gender dysphoria. By doing this, courts will know what forms of
treatment can be considered medically necessary and thus constitutional to grant to inmates.

III. Correcting Edmo: Working Towards a Medical
Consensus
How exactly might increasing the amount of valid research aid in
deciding cases like Edmo v. Corizon? Suppose that, five years down
the road, three studies were produced that objectively measured the
long-term effects of GCS. And then, suppose that these studies indicated that GCS was a more effective treatment in the long-run for
individuals with gender dysphoria than hormone therapy alone, or
any other known treatment. In that case, the efficacy of GCS has been
strengthened and Edmo has a stronger case for being granted the
surgery. However, the increased amount of studies may not indicate
that GCS is more beneficial in the long-term than other treatments.
If they conclude the opposite, Edmo would not be granted the surgery because it could not be considered “medically necessary” under
Idaho State Law or precedent. In this case, the increased research
is especially beneficial because it would be preventing unnecessary
suffering in the long-term on the part of inmates.
The greatest legal consequence of providing a potentially unnecessary surgery is a violation of the Eighth Amendment. In Gibson v.
Collier, Judge Ho highlighted this when he said, “it cannot be cruel
and unusual to deny treatment that no other prison has ever provided—to the contrary, it would only be unusual if a prison decided
not to deny such treatment.”37 By granting Edmo GCS, the Ninth
37

Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2019).
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Circuit Court is not preventing cruel and unusual punishment, but is
in fact providing it in the form of allowing an inmate to voluntarily
subject themselves to an unproven treatment that might even be considered a form of experimentation.
Going forward, the questions to ask are (a) who will conduct
the additional research? (b) How will the research be funded? And,
(c) what should be done in the meantime to reduce the suffering of
inmates experiencing gender dysphoria?
A. Who will conduct the research?
Due to the controversial nature of the matter, research will need to
be conducted by an objective organization, or organizations, that
have less bias in their research methods and purposes. Thus, medical centers that specialize in treatment for transgender individuals should not conduct the studies, as they would have economic
incentive to produce studies that point to the conclusion that GCS is
medically necessary. On the other hand, organizations that are traditionally against the surgery should also not oversee the research. For
other unproven treatments, the best organization to conduct research
may be the government, but due to the political nature of GCS, the
government may or may not be objective in their research depending upon who is in power, and thus should not be charged with the
research.
In the past, non-profit research organizations have been used by
the government, corporations, and other private entities to provide
non-biased research on important issues. Such non-profit organizations include “RAND Corporation,” “RTI International,” and the
“Howard Hughes Medical Institute.” Because these organizations
have no profit incentive, they would likely be able to provide research
on the long-term effects of GCS that is objective.
B. How will the research be funded?
Funding for GCS is another area of controversy that must be
addressed. A large portion of the public feels that it is a misuse of
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tax dollars.38 Although researching GCS is not equivalent to providing the surgery, providing funding for research through taxation is
likely to be controversial due to differing religious, moral, and cultural beliefs throughout the nation.
Despite the controversy, allocating tax dollars away from another
area may be the best way to fund additional research because, in
the long run, it will reduce the cost of treating gender dysphoria by
reducing costs associated with court proceedings. Additionally, tax
dollars will not be spent on treatments that are more costly, but less
effective, because the new research will have provided more knowledge and consensus on whether GCS is the most effective way to
treat severe gender dysphoria.
C. What should be done in the meantime?
Because prisons house inmates based on their biological sex, a prisoner that is dressing and/or acting in opposition to their biological
sex is likely to experience both physical and psychological abuse
at the hands of other prisoners. This abuse may exacerbate a transgender prisoner’s gender dysphoria, which is why it is so important
to reach a consensus regarding the most effective way to treat gender dysphoria among inmates. However, research takes time, which
means that consensus is not likely to be reached in the near future.
Because of this, prisons should be doing what they can to prevent the
abuse of transgender inmates in the interim.
In Kosilek v. Spencer, the court debates the merits of assigning the transgender inmate to either isolated housing or women’s
housing to avoid continued abuse, although there are drawbacks
to both options. Isolated housing is not a good long-term solution
38
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due to the psychological damage it may impose, and women’s housing (or housing based on the gender with which the inmate identifies) is not ideal because it may cause safety concerns regarding
other inmates.39 Because of this, prisons ought to house transgender
inmates on a case-by-case basis according to the characteristics of
the individual and the unique dynamic within each facility. Some
transgender inmates may pose too great of a risk to be housed with
other inmates of the gender with which they identify. Or, the other
inmates within the facility may be too hostile toward the transgender inmate. It follows that housing transgender inmates on a caseby-case basis will allow the prison to determine the best possible
housing arrangement for the circumstances, so that the unnecessary
suffering of these individuals might be minimalized.

IV. Conclusion
Gender confirmation surgery should not currently be classified as
a “medically necessary” procedure because it does not fulfill all
requirements set forth by Idaho State code and precedent cases such
as Estelle v. Gamble and U.S. v. DeCologero. GCS is (a) not generally accepted by society as the most effective method of treatment,
and is (b) more costly than other methods of treatment proven to
be equally effective. Because GCS cannot be classified as a medically necessary procedure, courts violate the Eighth Amendment by
granting the surgery to an inmate.
The best way to reduce unnecessary suffering among inmates
experiencing gender dysphoria is to determine whether GCS is or
is not medically necessary. Currently, opinions on the matter differ greatly due to the lack of research. Thus, randomized controlled
research on the long-term effects of GCS should be conducted so that
the public and medical community may know more fully whether or
not GCS is the most effect method of treatment for certain individuals suffering from gender dysphoria. The surgery can then be classified under Idaho State Law and Supreme Court precedent. Following
appropriate classification, courts and correctional facilities will be
39
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able to provide transgender inmates with the safest and most effective
care while remaining constitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
This will help to reduce unnecessary suffering caused by healthcarerelated discrimination towards transgender inmates within correctional facilities. Simultaneously, this solution will reduce the burden
on tax payers as resources will be used for only those procedures
that have been proven to be medically necessary.

Flunked Out: A Comparative Look at State
Educational Code, Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act, and Slavery Education
Emory French-Folsom1 and Maryn Rolfson2
In 2017, a mock slave auction was held in a 5th grade classroom at
South Orange Elementary School in New Jersey, which included the
‘sale’ of a black child by white students.3 A few weeks after this incident, students from another elementary school in the same district
made posters advertising the sale of African American slaves, which
were displayed in school hallways.4 Wisconsin 4th graders in 2018
were given a homework assignment which asked them to explain
“three good reasons for slavery.”5 Members of the Texas Board of
Education stood by their social studies curriculum which minimized
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the role of slavery in the Civil War and did not make mention of the
Klu Klux Klan.6 This final incident occurred in 2015, which commemorates 150 years since the ratification of the 13th amendment. It
is evident that the passage of time has not brought a unified stance in
the world of education on how slavery is best taught.
There are no federally mandated curricula on slavery education,
and state mandated curricula are uncommon. Consequentially, students across the United States learn about slavery in diverse, and
at times inadequate, ways. Often provided few guidelines, teachers
decide curriculum and assignments that they deem most appropriate.
This contributes to giving K-12 students lessons, activities or homework assignments that can subtlety or overtly discriminate based
on race. Administrators and teachers in every American classroom
make choices about the textbooks they buy, the homework assignments they give and the facets of slavery that they focus on. By doing
so, they must choose to subscribe to a particular narrative about the
history of slavery. States can assist teachers in this difficult task by
creating both code and curriculum that will best serve students and
educators.
Considering that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act (CRA) of 1964
prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in
programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance, it is in
states’ best interest to create airtight educational code that ensures
compliance with Title VI.7 By doing so, states can protect against
potential discrimination stemming from selective curriculum, textbook inaccuracy, variable teaching, and administrative practices.
These legal changes will give students, parents, teachers, and school
districts the tools they need to prevent potential litigation.
In this paper, we will briefly overview the history of federally
mandated educational code and the means used to teach slavery,
including curriculum, classroom activities, and textbooks. We will
6
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discuss examples of state code failure resulting in race-related discrimination in the American education system. Next, we will review
the merits and pitfalls of California state code. Finally, legal solutions involving the implementation of California state code in other
states will be outlined.

I. Background
The Tenth Amendment of the Constitution asserts that “the powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”8 Historically, this has always included education. While the
Department of Education (DOE) has existed since 1867, it was only
in 1980 that Congress established the Department as a Cabinet level
agency. The DOE contributes roughly eight percent of national school
funding, the rest being provided by the states themselves. Because
schools are primarily funded on a state-level and it has always been
within states’ power to create school curricula, it follows that many
feel that federal interference is neither wanted nor warranted. This is
in part, according to Historian of Education Diane Ravitch, “because
of justifiable fear that a federal agency might threaten to cut off federal funding to states that refuse to accept its mandates.”9 Federalism is also a partisan-issue so while some presidents in the past
have attempted to create federal educational requirements, all have
failed to do so. Therefore, while some may argue that this issue of
slavery education and anti-discriminatory educational code should
be addressed on a federal level, it simply is not feasible at this point
in time.
The Southern outcry against desegregation under Brown vs Board
of Education was in part due to a perceived encroachment of the
federal government on states’ rights to make legislation regarding
8
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schools. Not surprisingly, federalism of schools or school districts
continues to be a hot button topic. This in part explains why the
DOE, arguably, has always been a popular political punching bag for
Republican politicians who disagree with federalism. Kosar claims
that “President Andrew Johnson” who signed the Department of
Education Act in 1867, did so reluctantly, “after he had been assured
it was harmless. It was a meek agency.”10 In an article for The Conversation, Ph.D. student Dustin Hornbreck explains that “Ronald
Reagan advocated to dismantle the department [DOE] while campaigning for his presidency.”11 The 1996 Republican platform was
also in favor of eliminating the department saying; “the federal government,” it stated, “has no constitutional authority to be involved in
school curricula or to control jobs in the marketplace. This is why we
will abolish the Department of Education.”12
Last March, Trump attempted to cut the DOE’s budget by 8.5
million dollars, demonstrating that even now the department’s political popularity has not improved. Trump is quoted as saying “a lot of
people believe the Department of Education should just be eliminated. Get rid of it. If we don’t eliminate it completely, we certainly
need to cut its power and reach.”13 The DOE is hotly contested as
overstepping state devolved powers. As mentioned previously, if a
federal approach to standardized education requirements were possible, it could remedy the problems outlined. However, since the
power to change educational standards lies with state governments,
state code is the obvious choice for making lasting change. Addition10
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ally, because the DOE seems to be in constant peril of being dismantled, it is not feasible for the Department to enforce such legislation.
To demonstrate how federalism in education relates to discrimination, we must revisit the historic Brown v. Board of Education case. This demonstrated to the American public that racial
unity and integration is a priority in the refinement of our legal system.14 This case arose out of a desire for the integration of public
schools, due to the evidently poorer quality of education offered at
African American scholastic institutions. In his opinion statement
of the aforementioned case, Justice Warren stated that the Post-Civil
War Amendments (13th through 15th inclusive) intended to remove
“all legal distinctions among ‘all persons born or naturalized in the
United States.’.” 15 Title VI works to uphold the egalitarian goal of the
Post-Civil War Amendments by protecting all citizens against discrimination. In schools, there must be state code in place to protect
students against discrimination.
Title VI was enacted as part of the landmark Civil Rights Act
of 1964.16 It prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, and
national origin in programs or activities receiving federal financial
assistance. President John F. Kennedy said in 1963, “Simple justice
requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races [colors,
and national origins] contribute, not be spent in any fashion which
encourages, entrenches, subsidizes or results in racial [color or
national origin] discrimination.”17 Today, Title VI protects students
K-12 in public schools from a myriad of things, including racial
harassment, school segregation, and denial of language services to
English learners.
Federal funding, as regulated by the DOE and Title VI, work
together on a state level to protect against the aforementioned discrimination. The mission statement of the DOE is “to promote student
14
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achievement and preparation for global competitiveness by fostering educational excellence and ensuring equal access.”18 To receive
funding, schools must also strive for “equal access.” If a recipient
of federal assistance is found to have discriminated and voluntary
compliance cannot be achieved, the federal agency providing the
assistance should either initiate fund termination proceedings or
refer the matter to the Department of Justice for appropriate legal
action. Aggrieved individuals may file administrative complaints
with the federal agency that provides funds to a recipient, in this
case, the DOE, or the individuals may file suit for appropriate relief
in federal court. Title VI itself prohibits intentional discrimination.
It must be acknowledged that even with every law in place to prevent discrimination, there will always be ignorance on the part of
teachers, administrators and governing officials. This does not mean
these laws are unnecessary, but rather some may still be unaware of
what Title VI actually means. The Office for Civil Rights in the DOE
is responsible for enforcing Title VI as it applies to programs and
activities funded by federal funds.
Educational institutions receive federal funding; however, state
codes and curriculum are determined autonomously state by state.
Individual teachers each approach state-mandated curricula by
creating lesson plans; however, admittedly with their own biases.
Additionally, racial discrimination among students is an ongoing
problem, which can exacerbate insensitive teaching practices.19 Colleges have Title IX to protect students from racial discrimination,
but K-12 schools depend on both the DOE to enforce Title VI and
state legislators to enforce individual state codes.
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II. Proof of Claim
A. Curriculum
Teaching Hard History, a chapter of the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), states that “most students leave high school without an
adequate understanding of the role slavery played in the development of the United States—or how its legacies still influence us
today.”20 According to the SPLC, 8% of high school seniors surveyed
identified slavery as the primary cause of the Civil War.21 Additionally, two-thirds of students surveyed do not know that slavery did
not end until a constitutional amendment was ratified, and less than
1 in 4 students can properly identify the slavery-supportive provisions in the original Constitution. Not only do the students lack basic
knowledge about slavery, the Constitution and the Civil War, but
40% of teachers believe that their state provides “insufficient support for teaching about slavery.”22 Student knowledge can in part be
attributed to a lack of state-mandated resources for slavery education
in public schools.
Curriculum that covers the breadth and depth of American history is necessary in order to adequately inform students. Slavery is
directly addressed in history, government, and geography classes;
however, racial and historical bias must be controlled for in all classrooms. The economic and literary history of the United States were
also impacted by the plantation system.23 For example, an economics
teacher might acknowledge the implications of slavery in a capitalist
system, as seen in 18th century America. Classrooms of all subjects

20
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should be sensitive to the impact that curriculum choices have on the
holistic student understanding of slavery and historic race relations.
In Grimes By & Through Grimes v. Sobol, several New Yorker
parents and teachers came forward seeking a curriculum that more
fully recognizes the contributions of Africans and African Americans. The plaintiffs explained that they sought legal redress because
“they have no place else to go where they can find relief… [N]early
everyone else who can bring about change in the education system
is worried about a job or a vote.”24 They allege that the New York
curriculum as it stood had “a disparate impact on African Americans’ self-esteem and ability to learn.”25 This is claimed based on
the alleged discriminatory nature of the curriculum as outlined by
Title VI. Instead, the plaintiffs sought a revised curriculum to be
produced by the defendants that outlined historically accurate contributions of African Americans and other people of color. The
defendants maintained the claim that the state statutes relied upon
by the plaintiffs we not grounds for legal recompense, and that the
claims did not meet the standard for Title VI violation. This defense
was upheld by the courts, and the claims were dismissed. It is clear
that when state educational code does not provide a vehicle by which
students, parents, and educators can seek reform and retribution for
discrimination within the education system, the federal system is
often insufficient to provide same due to the high standard of discrimination as defined by Title VI. While states should implement
airtight educational code based on the existence of this discrepancy
alone, the potential for removal of federal funding if a case were to
show violation of Title VI should also motive states to bridge this gap.
Acosta v. Huppenthal also demonstrates this chasm between
inadequate state educational code and the reach of federal power.26
24
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In this Arizona case, plaintiffs brought forth action against several
state officials, seeking to challenge the constitutionality of a state
statute that limits the school districts’ race-related curricula.27 Their
motion was denied, with one exception. In the judicial opinion, the
judge states,
“The Court’s rulings stem in large part from the considerable deference that federal courts owe to the State’s authority
to regulate public school education. The Court recognizes
that, in certain instances, Defendants’ actions may be seen
as evincing a misunderstanding of the purpose and value of
ethnic studies courses. Equally problematic is evidence suggesting an insensitivity to the challenges faced by minority
communities in the United States. Nevertheless, these concerns do not meet the high threshold needed to establish a
constitutional violation, with one exception. Instead, they
are issues that must be left to the State of Arizona and its
citizens to address through the democratic process.”28
The court is clearly of the opinion that protecting against discrimination in the classroom, and thus upholding Title VI, falls into state
jurisdiction. It is in the state’s interest to implement code that will
close the gap identified in the judicial opinion, which is that the challenges faced by minority communities must be extremely severe in
order to meet the federal bar of constitutional violation. State code
must protect against discrimination that does not reach this standard,
but nonetheless injures minority groups. Furthermore, it is in the
state’s best interest to protect against all discrimination that may violate Title VI in order to maintain their federal funding based on same.
B. Classroom Activities
The idea that racial tensions persist in American schools today is
supported by many events in the last decade. A racial slur is spray
painted in a middle-school Wisconsin bathroom, parents in Minnesota
27
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sue a lily-white school district for not protecting their children from
racism.29 No part of the country, it seems, is immune from racial
tensions but schools have a legal responsibility to protect students
from racial discrimination. These incidents always result in parental outrage and yet they persist year after year. Teaching slavery is
always an incendiary topic, so it is perplexing that neither on a state
or federal level are teachers given a strict curriculum to avoid further
incidents or even potential lawsuits.
Consider the previously cited instances of attempt at teaching
slavery gone awry, including the mock slave auction and the classroom assignment to identify “three good reasons for slavery.”30 Title
VI protects all Americans from racial discrimination. However, the
scope and specificity of this protection is limited, and may not be
prosecutable in the case of discriminatory classroom activities or
homework assignments. Thus, the onus to provide specific protection
from racial discrimination in classroom activities falls on the state.
In the case of Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist. in Tempe,
Arizona, the parents of an African American student filed suit on
her behalf against the school district.31 They claimed that they had
violated the student’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause and
Title VI by requiring reading materials that contained the repeated
use of racially derogatory terminology.32 The literature in question
included “The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn” by Mark Twain
and “A Rose for Emily” by William Faulkner; both works frequent
29
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the use of the term ‘n*gger.’33 According to the American Library
Association, “The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn” is both one of
the nation’s most beloved and most banned books.34 Kathy Monteiro,
the mother of the plaintiff, argued that not only were these works
adjunct to Freshman English curriculum, but that the exclusion of
any literature using derogatory language that was aimed at races
other than African Americans demonstrated racial bias. Monteiro
expressed allegations of psychological distress and a hostile racial
environment as a direct result of classroom readings and discussions
of said literature. This included the loss of educational opportunities,
as the only alternative to studying the literature was to be absent
from class. In concurrence with the study of the literature, Monteiro alleged that use of this derogatory term in the school increased
dramatically. She claimed that instance of verbal discrimination and
derogatory graffiti increased after her daughter’s class studied these
literary works.35 She also claimed that the school board was made
aware of these discriminatory instances; however, no action was
taken. On the basis of threat to the First Amendment, the courts
reserved the school board’s right to select reading materials. However, the second claim that the school district failed to adequately
address this racial harassment under Title VI was upheld. The first
claim, which sought a mandate for curriculum sensitive to some classic literature’s potential to be racially discriminatory, was dismissed
because Arizona state code did not outline provisions to explicitly
uphold Title VI in the classroom, while protecting the state’s right to
curriculum choice in education.

33
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C. Textbooks
A textbook used by a Texas public charter school chain in the 2000s
taught: “While there were cruel masters who maimed or even killed
their slaves (although killing and maiming were against the law in
every state), there were also kind and generous owners … Many
[enslaved people] may not have even been terribly unhappy with
their lot, for they knew no other.”36 The Southern Poverty Law Center reports that fifty-eight percent of teachers find their textbooks
inadequate.37 Hevin Robertson reviewed three textbooks, one each
from McGraw-Hill, McDougal Littell (owned by Houghton Mifflin
Company), and Prentice Hall (owned by Pearson Plc.). These textbook companies are the largest academic publishers in the United
States. The Prentice Hall textbook claims that “during the 1780s,
Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and George Washington hoped
that slavery would gradually fade away” while not acknowledging
that all three owned slaves, neither providing a historical basis for
this claim. McDougal Littell calls slaves “workers” in their textbook and McGraw-Hill calls them “planters.” These instances point
towards a larger problem; considering that historical biases exist in
textbooks, how could this not permeate in classrooms?38
Textbook content can be addressed in state code. California educational code states, “the state board and any governing board shall
not adopt any textbooks or other instructional materials for use in
the public schools that contain any matter reflecting adversely upon
persons on the basis of race or ethnicity, gender, religion, disability,
nationality, or sexual orientation, or because of a characteristic listed

36

Annabelle Timsit & Annalisa Merelli, For 10 years, students in Texas
have used a history textbook that says not all slaves were unhappy,
Quartz, May 11 2018.

37

Kate Shuster, Teaching Hard History, Southern Poverty Law Center,
2018 at 9.

38

Robertson, Hevin N., “Taking Offense: An Exploration of Racist, Misleading, and Problematic Language in Textbooks” (2018). Honors Senior
Theses/Projects. 181. https://digitalcommons.wou.edu/honors_theses/181)

Flunked Out: A Comparative Look at State Educational Code,
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, and Slavery Education

29

in Section 220.”39 The specificity of this code also protects future
K-12 students by preventing state and governing boards from adopting discriminatory textbooks. In this way, the California state code
protect students from possible changing ideology in the future or
differing political climates by defining what human characteristics
are protected.

III. California State Code
Many states adopt Title VI into their own state codes and statutes to
be the primary enforcers of this legislation. Federal funding is at risk
for non-compliance and it is in a state’s best interest to make very
specific educational codes to prevent racial discrimination, segregation or faculty misconduct. For example, Arkansas outlines that:
“It shall be unlawful for any member of the board of directors, administrator, or employee of a public school to knowingly authorize the participation of students in an event or
activity held at a location where some students would be
excluded or not given equal treatment because of the student’s race, national origin, or ethnic background”40
This code outlines that even extracurricular activities cannot have
discrimination. While Title VI is broader in its legal implications of
discrimination, occasionally states will use a more specific code, to
ensure compliance. The clearer a code can be, the more legal protection against discrimination for students, and hopefully, the more
likely a state’s schools are to continue to receive federal assistance.
California is a great example of a state who leaves no stone
unturned when it comes to protecting K-12 students from racial discrimination. For example, in California’s state code it expresses that
“it is the policy of the State of California to afford all persons in public schools, regardless of their disability, gender,
gender identity, gender expression, nationality, race or
39

EDC § 51501.

40
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ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, or any other characteristic that is contained in the definition of hate crimes set
forth in Section 422.55 of the Penal Code, including immigration status, equal rights, and opportunities in the educational institutions of the state. The purpose of this chapter is
to prohibit acts that are contrary to that policy and to provide
remedies therefor.”41
This law goes into even more detail of what happens when this
code is broken, how to rectify and prevent further discrimination.
While other states have similar codes to this, California specifically addresses the classroom and classroom activities in code, “a
teacher shall not give instruction and a school district shall not sponsor any activity that promotes a discriminatory bias on the basis of
race or ethnicity, gender, religion, disability, nationality, or sexual
orientation, or because of a characteristic listed in Section 220.”42
Again, teachers are fallible humans who often might not even be
aware of discriminatory actions. Yet, it is still vital that states mandate through educational codes what exactly students are protected
from so that individual school districts and schools must comply.
The more specific a code-- the more protected a student.
Some may argue that California is also not immune from
instances of discrimination in the classroom. Only last December
in Palmdale, California did students report a teacher for saying
Mexicans should “go back to their country” and we should “bring
back slavery.”43 However, Palmdale Assistant Superintendent put the
teacher on leave saying “regardless of whether it was a joke or not,
comments are comments, and racial comments are unacceptable in
any way, shape or form” and he is well within California state educational code to fire this teacher for misconduct. While state code
41
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may not prevent further incidents, it does create the ability for legal
recourse for when these incidents occur.

IV. Conclusion
States have a legal obligation to write and enforce educational
codes that protect students from racial discrimination in the classroom. As society progresses and previously unheard history is made
increasingly available to all, schools will need to update both code
and curriculum. If states choose to ignore this issue because it is
politicized or for any other reason, they will then be vulnerable to
future litigation. By adopting the specific educational codes of California, states and school districts will leave little for the imagination when it comes to curricula, classroom conduct, and textbooks.
While acknowledging that teachers are individuals who will continue to make mistakes, it is still important for state legislators to
protect students as much as they can.

Evolving Standards of Decency: A View of
8th Amendment Jurisprudence and The Death
Penalty
Jared Lockhart1 and Madeline Hill2
In July 1997, Kenneth Foster was indicted on capital murder charges
and sentenced to death even though he had only committed robbery.3 On August 14, 1996, Kenneth Foster and his friends, Mauriceo Brown, DeWayne Dillard, and Julius Steen, rented a car and
drove to downtown San Antonio, Texas. Later that night, Brown
suggested that the men rob a few people in order to make up for the
money they had lost while partying. After their second robbery that
evening, Foster did not want to continue breaking the law, according to Dillard’s courtroom testimony four years later. Dismissing
his request, the four persisted in their crime and began to follow a
car they believed was headed towards a party. When a woman–later
identified as Mary Patrick–stepped out of her car, Brown approached
her, asking for her number. Shortly after Brown exited the car, Foster
heard gunshots. Confused and scared, he drove away quickly. Foster soon learned that Brown had shot and killed Patrick’s boyfriend,
Michael LaHood Jr. Within the hour, police arrested Foster, Dillard,
Steen, and Brown.
Although Steen bargained a plea deal in exchange for a life sentence and Dillard was never tried for this crime, Foster was tried for
1
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murder alongside Brown, the man who actually pulled the trigger.
And, prosecutors sought the death penalty for both men. According
to a unique Texas statute, the Law of Parties, the jury did not have
to find that Foster had participated or even had any intention to kill
or harm LaHood; the jurors simply needed to conclude that Foster
may have been aware that Brown’s action would result in murder.
In the end, the jury found Foster guilty of capital murder under the
terms of the Law of Parties and claimed that Foster should have been
able to predict that Brown would shoot and kill LaHood.4 The life
of an individual–criminal or not–is not an arbitrary matter, yet Foster’s case is just one of many unsettling examples of capriciously
prescribing the death penalty and further illustrates why lawmakers
should revisit the death penalty as a fair punishment.
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, which simply
states that “cruel and unusual punishments [shall not be] afflicted,”
is the most debated aspect of the Eighth Amendment, and perhaps
one of the most controversial parts of the Constitution.5 As our society grows and progresses, lawmakers must consistently reevaluate
the standard by which we allow our government to punish those who
break the law. In Trop v. Dulles (1958), the Supreme Court established the precedent that “evolving standards of decency,” must
be considered in jurisprudence related to the Eighth Amendment.6
In other words, for a punishment to not be considered “cruel and
unusual,” it must coincide with contemporary societal conventions
of morality, which frequently evolve. This standard has since been
employed in a variety of Supreme Court decisions dealing with the
Eighth Amendment, beginning with Robinson v. California (1962),
which ruled that it is “cruel and unusual” to imprison people for narcotic addictions. “Evolving standards of decency” has been an especially decisive factor in cases regarding capital punishment, creating
a non-static standard that can vary with the composition of who sits
on the bench.
4
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This paper explores how the main purposes of punishment are
retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. Using these lenses, the
paper explains how the high cost of the death penalty, racial and
socioeconomic biases in the judicial system, and psychological
impacts on death row prisoners contribute to why the Supreme Court
should halt the prescription of the death penalty according to modern
“standards of decency.”

I. Background
In the phrase “cruel and unusual,” one way to define a “cruel” punishment is one motivated by cruel intent. However, a magnified look at
Parliamentary debates and early American case law reveals that the
Founding Fathers would have interpreted “cruel” as being an unjust
punishment, regardless of intention.7 “Unusual,” on the other hand
is more ambiguous and has largely been ignored by the Supreme
Court. However, legal scholars generally agree that “unusual” modifies “cruel”; thus, an “usual punishment” is not considered cruel if it
was the norm in previous related decisions.8
Despite this interpretation, in Trop v. Dulles, the Supreme Court
established a non-static view of “cruel,” meaning punishments previously deemed “usual” can be abolished. In this case, the Court
analyzed how Albert Trop, an Army private that deserted his post
in Morocco during World War II, was unable to receive a passport
because he had lost his citizenship under the Nationality Act of 1940.
The Court’s question was whether taking away Trop’s citizenship
was cruel and unusual according to the Eighth Amendment. In the
majority opinion, Justice Warren rules in favor of Trop, acknowledging that the Court never had a good chance to define “cruel and
unusual punishments.” He argues that “the basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is the dignity of man” and that “the
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
7
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decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”9 The term
“evolving standards of decency” remains in play today as the norm
for determining whether a punishment is “cruel and unusual.”
The principle of “evolving standards of decency” did not intersect with capital punishment until Furman v. Georgia. In this case,
the Supreme Court debated if it was constitutional, under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments, to have a jury decide if a defendant
should receive the death penalty.10 In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled
that the death penalty, as practiced at the time, qualified as a cruel
and unusual punishment. However, each justice in the majority decision wrote a separate opinion, with three claiming that inherent
racial bias in death penalty sentencing was itself cruel and unusual,
while two justices argued that the death penalty in general violates
the Eighth Amendment.
In response, many states adopted a bifurcated trial approach–
where the court first holds proceedings to determine the defendant’s
guilt, and afterwards carries out an additional trial to determine
the punishment based on other factors. This practice was upheld
in Gregg v. Georgia (1976), which allowed states to reincorporate
capital punishment if they used bifurcated trials and created objective guidelines to limit capital punishment sentencing.11 The Gregg
decision claims that the death penalty is aligned with “evolving
standards of decency,” arguing that “legislative measures adopted
by the people’s chosen representatives weigh heavily in ascertaining
contemporary standards of decency.” In other words, because states
such as Georgia legislated new processes for implementing capital
punishment after Furman, it must have been in the public’s interest
to maintain the death penalty and, therefore, does not violate the
standards of decency currently held by the public.
Since the Gregg decision, the Supreme Court has revised the
death penalty according to the “evolving standards of decency”
precedent several times. They have determined that it is cruel and
9
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unusual to execute rapists12, child rapists13, minors14, and the mentally disabled15. Twenty-one states have abolished the death penalty
and four have placed moratoria as of 2020. To this day, the death
penalty remains an open topic for Supreme Court interpretation.

II. Retributivism and Deterrence
In Harmelin v. Michigan (1991), the Supreme Court highlighted
that for a punishment to not be considered “cruel and unusual,” it
should follow at least one of three criteria: rehabilitation, retribution,
or deterrence.16 Rehabilitation refers to a punishment’s capability to
change a convicted criminal. In the Harmelin majority opinion, Justice Scalia highlights that the death penalty is unique in that it rejects
rehabilitation of the convict as a purpose of criminal justice, given
that a death row prisoner never returns to society. Thus, the justification for capital punishment balances on retributivism and deterrence. Retributivism refers to a punishment’s ability to bring justice
to the victims, while deterrence is the idea that the punishment will
prevent future crime.
In the Gregg decision, Justice Stewart acknowledged that retribution is not “the dominant objective of criminal law,” but claims
that “the instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and
channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal justice
serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society
12
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16
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governed by law.”17 His idea is that the death penalty provides retribution for both a victim of capital crime’s family and the community, given that it permanently removes the most heinous criminals
from society. However, this factor loses credibility when the docket
includes cases such as Kennedy v. Louisiana where a man was convicted for raping his eight-year-old stepdaughter. The court ruled
that a “national consensus,” or data that represents society’s evolving standards of decency, agreed that it is a disproportionate punishment “no matter how young the child, no matter how many times the
child is raped, no matter how many children the perpetrator rapes,
no matter how sadistic the crime, no matter how much physical or
psychological trauma is inflicted, and no matter how heinous the
perpetrator’s prior criminal record may be.”18 With this decision the
Court essentially claims that no harm, other than the loss of human
life, is sufficient to require capital punishment. This, however, is not
reconciled with the doctrine of retribution for the victim and their
family. A rape victim must overcome monumental trauma, which
can be compounded by the knowledge that the offender is still alive.
Additionally, the convicted rapist is not punished in the same manner, or anywhere close in gravity to the act they committed. Thus,
the Court’s interpretation of contemporary law is not to administer
an equally retributive sentence to the crime committed, nor is it to
execute the most odious criminals, but rather to remove them from
society to establish order and justice. In order to be consistent under
the 14th Amendment, the Supreme Court should ensure the equal
protection of all convicted criminals, even murderers.19
Furthermore, retribution through the death penalty represents a
great cost to society that perhaps outweighs its aggregate desire for
vengeance. The standard supplement for capital sentences is life in
prison without parole. It is estimated that in Florida, the true cost
of each execution is $3.2 million, which is approximately six times
more expensive than keeping a convict imprisoned for life without
17
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parole.20 Similar numbers are seen in Texas and other states that prescribe capital punishment. A study in California found that, since the
Gregg decision in 1976, Californian taxpayers have spent more than
$5 billion or about $184 million per year, on death row inmates.21
Of the $5 billion, only $1 billion constitutes the cost of incarceration. This means that, had the inmates been sentenced to life without
parole, the financial burden would have been about one-fifth of the
cost incurred on Californians. In fact, researchers found that a death
row inmate costs about $1.12 million more, on average, than prisoners serving a life sentence when totaling the cost of trials, appeals,
incarceration, and execution.22 In addition, the California inmates (of
whom only 13 were executed) still would have been isolated from
their communities. The counterargument to this data is that the
high cost of capital punishment comes from frivolous habeas corpus
appeals. But, there is already a precedent in place to discern between
superfluous and constitution-based petitions through Title I of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which prohibits prisoners who have already sought habeas relief from filing a
subsequent appeal without approval from an appellate panel.23 Also,
the appeals process is necessary to ensure due process and prevent
unjust execution. Researchers at Stanford University estimated that,
in spite of the possibility to appeal, about 1 in every 25 inmates
that are executed is innocent.24 Thus, retribution by means of the
death penalty is not beneficial for society because of the high cost
it imposes, despite the fact that the alternative, life imprisonment,
imposes a substantially smaller cost.
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The remaining justification for the death penalty, deterrence,
lacks supporting evidence to prove that the threat and likelihood of
capital punishment does in fact deter individuals from committing
such crimes. In Gregg, Justice Marshall dissents that: “it is generally
agreed between the retentionists and abolitionists, whatever their
opinions about the validity of comparative studies of deterrence,
that the data which now exist show no correlation between the existence of capital punishment and lower rates of capital crime.”25 Even
though this argument was made in 1976, it holds true today that there
exists no evidence to prove that capital punishment has any influence
to stop someone from committing murder. The deterrence argument
ignores two facts about capital crimes. The first is that a long prison
sentence, whether for life or shorter, is not a desirable outcome and
for some people is worse than execution. Second, due to the arbitrariness of capital sentencing and relative rarity of executions, many
criminals find it unlikely that they will be executed. Furthermore,
data analyses prove that the death penalty has no influence on the
crime rate. Researchers at Stanford looked at statistics from Hong
Kong, which abolished the death penalty in the 1990s, and Singapore, which increased the use of capital punishment around the same
time. They found no statistically significant differences in crime rate
initially or over a 20-year period.26 Then, they conducted the same
research in Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, which eliminated the death penalty for all crimes in the 1980s. Murder rates
per capita have remained relatively stagnant in all 3 states. After,
they looked at homicide rates per capita and executions per capita
by region to see if there was a correlation between the two factors.
According to the data, the South executes people 11 times more frequently than the rest of the country yet has maintained a murder
rate of 6.8 murders per 100,000 people compared to the 4.9 national
average. These numbers reveal that there is no evidence to support
capital punishment as a deterrent for murder. Even for premeditated
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homicides, life imprisonment is an undesirable outcome and therefore disincentivizes potential killers.
Additionally, there is more evidence to support a brutalization
effect, which denotes a correlation between the death penalty and
an increase in murder rates. A criminology study found that after
every execution in New York, there were two additional homicides
committed in the following month, and one additional homicide two
months after.27 Although this report uses older data and a specific
region, it is one of the most reliable studies due to its comprehensive
approach of including myriad other potential factors in the data set.
Also, the data does not seem contrived when compared to similar
trends that occur following publicized suicides or mass murders.
A more recent report found that one execution per year in a state
leads to a significant increase in capital crimes.28 The data illustrates
that the likelihood that deterrence occurs increases as the number
of executions increases. The study concludes that it would take
around nine executions per year for a state to have a potential deterrent effect and that only six states (South Carolina, Florida, Texas,
Georgia, Delaware, and Nevada) show evidence of possibly having
a deterrent effect. In the other twenty-one states that have executed
prisoners since the Gregg decision, there is evidence of either no
impact or a brutalization effect, where the normalization of killing
vis a vis the death penalty leads to more violent crime. Thus, in order
to potentially reach a deterrent effect, states would have to impose
a death penalty quota, an idea that is objectively unconstitutional
according to the guidelines of Gregg.29
The death penalty fails to manifest its purported duties of retribution and deterrence. Additionally, executing inmates in a safe,
constitutional manner is about six times the cost of housing a prisoner for life. Thus, the question should be reframed from whether it
27
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is just to kill capital criminals to whether the supposed justifications
for the death penalty are met in accordance with modern standards
of decency.

III. Racial and Socioeconomic Discrimination
Historically, the prescription of the death penalty has conveyed an
innate tendency to discriminate against racial and socioeconomic
minorities. This was the topic of debate in McCleskey v. Kemp
(1987), when the petitioner attempted to use a study that showed
black defendants were more likely to be sentenced with execution
than any other ethnic group, and were even more likely to receive
the death penalty when the victim was white.30 The Supreme Court
ruled that statistical evidence was not enough to prove intended
racial prejudice, and was thus invalid. However, this issue has
become increasingly gray, given that most Americans would avoid
showing signs of racism, making it difficult to confirm intentional
racial bias with today’s standards of decency. Additionally, there are
many safeguards to prevent racism within the judicial system. For
one, if a juror is thought to hold racial biases against a defendant, the
defense attorney can propose that they be excluded from the jury.31
Also, once a juror votes to execute a criminal, they are required to
sign a document claiming that race, color, and other factors did not
influence their decision. But, as racism has become rightfully taboo,
very few people consider themselves racist, whether they discriminate or not.
A study conducted at the University of Denver proved that Colorado, which is generally viewed as a progressive state, assigned the

30
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death penalty in a discriminatory fashion.32 Prosecutors in the state
boasted that they only attempted to charge 4% of 1st degree murderers with capital punishment, arguing that this was evidence of their
judicial cautiousness. However, researchers found that minorities
committed 66% of murders from 1999-2010, yet 91% of capital murder defendants were minorities. This data is much too statistically
significant to represent a colorblind system. Unfortunately, these
numbers are not an anomaly, but are the norm in other states. Therefore, in spite of current safeguards, there is still significant evidence
of racial disparity in capital punishment sentencing, regardless of
whether courts carry out discrimination on purpose or not. Instead
of accepting racial discrimination as an unfortunate reality, the system should be fixed. Eliminating capital punishment outright would
assure that neither a disproportionate number of minorities or the
majority population are killed.
Furthermore, the system disfavors the lower class, who cannot afford to pay for adequate defense attorneys. Public defenders
receive a set salary and do not get paid for working overtime. In
Harris County, Texas, which executes more people alone than any
state except Texas, public defenders submitted briefs full of “gibberish. unintelligible arguments, flawed grammar, and even a complaint
that [they] would run out of paper.”33 In addition, there were three
cases in which the defense attorney fell asleep during the trial and in
all three situations, the defendant was later executed. Approximately
ninety percent of people on death row could not afford an attorney of
their choice.34 This is not to say that wealthier people shouldn’t have
the right to pay for better defense, but that someone’s right to live or
die should not balance on their material resources.
32
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IV. Psychological Effect
Another important factor that is considered in this argument is the
evolution of psychological and mental standards in the United States.
For prisoners sentenced to death row, they may experience “Death
Row Phenomenon,” which refers to the “destructive consequences of
long-term solitary confinement” that come from the constant feeling
of awaiting one’s death.35 These conditions can eventually augment
to “Death Row Syndrome” which is classified as a “severe psychological illness.”. Solitary confinement generally isolates inmates for
23 hours every day, an environment that provokes psychosis, delusions, paranoia, and self-harming behavior.
Although neither Death Row Syndrome nor Death Row Phenomenon has been formally recognized by the American Psychiatric
Association, Death Row Syndrome gained recognition internationally in 1989. In the extradition proceedings of Jens Soering–a German citizen arrested in England for committing murder in the United
States and fleeing to Europe–he argued that if England were to send
him back to the United States, he would be forced into inhumane
and degrading treatment–the death penalty. Because of the inhumane treatment of prisoners on death row, Soering’s defense argued
that extradition would be a violation of Article 3 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms; the European Court of Human Rights agreed. The Court
elucidated the following: “the condemned prisoner has to endure for
many years the conditions on death row and the anguish and mountain tension of living in the ever-present shadow of death.” Therefore,
the Court determined that extraditing Soering back to the United
States would violate the protections set forth against “inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.” Although Soering was extradited to the United States, he was sent back on the grounds that he
would not receive the death penalty. This case is important because
it highlights that England, a western, civilized country similar
35
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to the United States, was compelled to intervene in United States
proceedings because of the inhumane circumstances of death row.
Although the European Court of Human Rights arbitrated this decision, it should serve as an example to the United States for modern
“standards of decency” related to punishment in the Western world.

V. Conclusion
Opposition to capital punishment is not revolutionary or new.
Cesare di Beccaria first expressed aversion to the death penalty in
1764, claiming “laws designed to temper human conduct should
not embrace a savage example which is all the more baneful when
the legally sanctioned death is inflicted deliberately and ceremoniously. To me it is an absurdity that the law which expresses the common will and detests and punishes homicide should itself commit
one.”36 The United States is the only developed western democracy
that practices capital punishment. The only countries that execute
more people are China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Pakistan, Egypt,
and Somalia—all countries with which the United States is rarely
aligned ideologically.37 The 142 nations that have abolished the death
penalty in law or practice don’t condone murder or sympathize with
murderers, rather they have chosen more humane routes to address
capital crime.
The death penalty is not rehabilitative, retributive, or deterring,
which are the three requisite standards for a punishment to not be
considered cruel and unusual. Capital punishment is not intended
to rehabilitate simply because the criminal is executed. It does not
serve as just retribution because there is no other crime for which
the perpetrator receives a punishment proportionate to their offense.
There is no evidence that the death penalty prevents future crime in
the way it is currently administered, and some evidence indicates
that it even galvanizes violent crime.
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Furthermore, capital punishment does not adhere to current
standards of decency due to its capricious administration and harmful effect on American minority groups. The original issue with the
death penalty in Furman v. Georgia (1972) was that its arbitrary use
often marginalized minority groups. Despite revisions from Gregg
(1976), evidence continues to show that minorities are much more
likely to be executed, especially if the victim is white. Beyond this,
once a prisoner awaits murder on death row, they endure solitary
confinement accompanied by high levels of stress and uncertainty
that cause permanent medical disorders. According to contemporary
western standards of decency, capital punishment should be considered “cruel and unusual.”

Underlying Racism within the Opioid Epidemic
Hannah Wilson1
Within the past century, the United States attempted different legal
avenues to address drug abuse. Some of these efforts made access
to drugs punishable and illegal. Others encouraged research to look
at underlying issues of drug abuse and implement those findings.
Within the past fifty years, these laws tended to treat drug addicts
as criminals instead of as persons suffering from a health crisis.
According to the FBI and Uniform Crime Reports, from the 1980’s
to the 2000’s, drug arrests rose by 1.5 million per year, while drug
usage rates stayed the same.2 The severe increase in the criminalization and incarceration surrounding drug exploited underprivileged
minorities, specifically persons of color. Lawsuits and lobbying
brought attention to these injustices. However, a heavy bias in drugrelated crime still persists. The penalization of drug crime historically has been a vehicle for implicit and explicit racism.
In the past three years, significant attention has been given
to opioid abuse branding it as the “Opioid Crisis” or “Opioid Epidemic”. To address the opioid crisis, an Executive Order 13784 was
implemented by the Trump Administration.3 This order brought
the Department of Justice, the Office of National Drug Control
Policy, and the Department of Health and Human Services together
1

Hannah Wilson is a Senior at Brigham Young University studying Biostatistics with a minor in International Diplomacy. She is preparing to attend
law school fall of 2021. Hannah would especially like to thank her editor
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Uniform Crime Reports FBI, Drugs and Crime Facts Bureau of Justice
Statistics (BJS), https://www.bjs.gov/content/dcf/tables/arrtot.cfm.
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to address the opioid epidemic.4 Executive Order 13784 increased
penalties against illicit-drug users, and measures to provide rehabilitative support to the opioid user, but failed to provide the same
resources for all drug users. The order does not address the same
protection nor medical support that is long overdue for all illicit drug
abuse. As opioid prevalence increased significantly in white communities, usage stayed at low levels within communities of color; therefore, Order 13784 had a predominantly white audience. The order
provides funding, legislation, and protections for opioid users. In
contrast, a criminalizing approach in addressing marijuana, crack/
cocaine, and other drug-related crimes has been largely associated
with communities of color. Emphasizing healthy opioid recovery
has led to an institutionalized bias, and implicit racism. I request an
expansion of the public health approach including research, rehabilitative services, and furthered legislation to support the aforementioned order and include all illicit drugs, not just opioids.
This article establishes the history and relevance of the relationship between racism and drug crime, and explores this recent
association in relation to Executive Order 13784 and the opioid epidemic. Then, it will walk through suggested legislative expansions
to approach all drug addictions as a public health issue, instead of a
criminal justice issue.

I. Background
A. Racial Implications of the War on Drugs
President Nixon declared the War on Drugs in the 1970’s. With this
movement, incarceration rates have grown over 500%.5 Different
approaches to address illegal drugs included drug courts and rehabilitation treatment. Despite these efforts, alternatives to incarceration
4

Tracking Federal Funding to Combat the Opioid Crisis Bipartisan Policy
Center (2019) [hereinafter , Tracking Federal Funds] https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Tracking-Federal-Funding-toCombat-the-Opioid-Crisis.pdf.

5

Lauren Carrol, How the war on drugs affected incarceration rates
(Politifact, 2016).
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were, and continue to be, limited and when available, weak. As a
result, mass incarceration spurred other social problems such as
latent discrimination against those of lower socioeconomic status,
racial minorities, and other societal minorities, particularly blacks.
This article will look solely at the racism resulting from this mass
incarceration in relation to non-violent drug crimes.
During the war on drugs, the nature of the Rockefeller Laws
in New York City revealed existing racism within the criminal justice system. These laws included minimum sentencing starting at 15
years in prison for two ounces of marijuana.6 Shortly after New York
passed this legislation, Michigan followed and mandatory minimum
sentences became widespread for non-violent drug crime throughout the US.7 After these laws were passed, 90% of drug felons in
prison were black and Hispanic.8 These laws were initiated by politicians who wanted to appear hard on crime, and may not have been
intentionally mandated with a racist agenda. However, they heavily/
disproportionately impacted minorities who were the main users of
these drugs. In 2009 this implicit racism in the Rockefeller laws was
exploited. The laws became recognized as “new Jim Crow laws” and
were changed.
Meanwhile, significant racial biases surfaced in the sentence
incongruencies between crimes involving cocaine vs coke. Starting
in 1986, the sentences for five grams of crack and for 500 grams
of powder cocaine were the same. This came to be known as the
100:1 crack/powder cocaine disparity. Chemically, the two drugs
are almost identical. The largest difference comes as a result of the
production of the drugs; crack cocaine is significantly cheaper than
See Annual Message from Gov. Nelson Rockefeller to the Legislature of
the State of New
York (Jan. 3, 1973), in 1973 N.Y. Laws 2309, 2317.
6

7

William H. Pryor Jr. et al., Mandatory Minimum Penalties for Drug
Offenses in the Federal Criminal Justice 19-22 (U. S. Sentencing
Comm’n, 2017). https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/researchand-publications/research-publications/2017/20171025_Drug-Mand-Min.
pdf#page=19.
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Gabriel Sayegh, Background on New York’s Draconian Rockefeller Drug
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powder cocaine. As a result, socioeconomic and racial disparities
exist amongst users of the two drugs. Black communities commonly
used crack cocaine and white upper class communities to use powder cocaine. The steep difference in usage did not decrease until
2010 when the disparity of reduced from 100:1 to 18:1. A study done
by Drug Alcohol Depend, found that blacks were at an increased risk
for being users of crack, and for being arrested for drug use when
compared with whites using either crack or powder cocaine.9 In the
study they found that high socioeconomic status and being white
were inversely correlated with prison time.10 Whites tended to be
users of powder cocaine, not crack cocaine, and were significantly
less likely to be arrested for their drug use. As almost 25% of blacks
within the US live under the poverty line, socioeconomic differences
are inseparable from racial differences. Given this history, racism
has deep roots in the relationship of incarceration and drug laws during the War on Drugs.
B. Brief History of the Opioid Epidemic
Physicians began prescribing opioids as pain medication in the early
twentieth century. It wasn’t until the late 1990s and early 2000s when
prescribing opioids for pain became the norm. Hospitals and pharmaceutical companies heavily backed this movement. The addictive
nature of the drugs was often masked and health care providers and
patients alike were misled in their understanding of the drugs. Opioid addiction grew rampantly, sparking growth of illicit opioid distribution. Quickly, the US realized the vast spread of this epidemic
which has continued through today. A recent study revealed as many
as two million Americans are patients of opioid dependency.11 In
9

Joseph J. Palamar, Shelby Davies, and Michael Weitzman Powder Cocaine and Crack Use in the United States: An Examination of Risk for
Arrest and Socioeconomic Disparities in Use (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/pmc/articles/PMC4533860/).

10

Id. p 16.

11

See Genetics Home Reference: Opioids Addiction (U. S. National Library
of Medicine 2017).
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2017, opioids accounted for over half of the deaths due to drug overdoses.12 This issue plagued both the Obama and the Trump presidential administrations.
In recent years, the opioid epidemic worsened and brought attention to the futile efforts of the war on drugs. In 2017, the Trump
Administration issued the Executive Order 13784 declaring a public
health emergency to address “the scourge of drug abuse, addiction,
and overdose”.13 In this order, the opioid crisis was declared and a
commission was established to research and make recommendations to lighten the societal burden of “drug addiction, and the opioid
crisis.”14 In the two years after this order was made, recommendations regarding the opioid epidemic were implemented and funding was provided. Public health initiatives to assist opioid users in
recovery continue to grow, resulting in a lessened criminalization of
opioid user abuse.
C. The Executive Order 1378—Shifting the Lens
On March 29, 2017, the Trump Administration published Executive
Order 13784,15 The order created a commission to research drug
addiction and the opioid crisis with regards to healthcare, education,
addiction prevention and treatment, overdose prevention, and overdose reversal.16 It was also established in the order that the committee make recommendations for improving all these areas.17 Funding
was also granted for the research and implementation of the research
findings.18 The order established preliminary research to be completed in six months after the publishing of the order. In October

12

Id.

13

Exec. Order No. 13784, C. F. R. (2017).

14

Id.

15

Exec. Order No. 13784, C. F. R. (2017).

16

Exec. Order No. 13784, C. F. R. § 2, 3, 4 (2017).

17

Exec. Order No. 13784, C. F. R. § 4. (2017).

18

Exec. Order No. 13784, C. F. R. § 5, 6 (2017).
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2017, President Trump declared the opioid crisis a “public health
emergency”.19
As established, drug offenses were historically painted as a
criminal offense and directly treated in an aggressive manner as evident in the branding of the “War on Drugs”. This legislation rebrands
the formerly called “War on Drugs”, to an “epidemic” when pertaining to opioid specific drugs. Now, instead of a criminal crisis,
opioid overuse is a public health crisis. Addressing drug problems
through a health lens is a more appropriate way to handle the situation. While black drug crime continues to exceed white drug crime,
white drug related offenses resulting in incarceration grew 27%
between the years of 2009 to 2016.20 However, the time and way this
new approach has been implemented holds elements of racism. Political motive sparked from the public investment to assist addicted
individuals to recover, rather than treating them as an enemy of war.
Implicit racism exists within the very inspiration behind this call
to action; when the majority of the affected community was white,
public health efforts were introduced for the first time.
D. Addressing the Issue
When compared to the response to other drug epidemics, the public
health response to the opioid crisis betrays incongruencies pertaining to racial bias. To combat this, I suggest additional legislation
should be written to accompany Executive Order 13784 that (i) promotes research opportunities for all drugs, and (ii) provides healthcare for drug addiction recovery and rehabilitate for all addicts of
illicit drugs.

19

On Thursday October 26, 2017 President Trump officially declared the
opioid crisis a “public health emergency.” President Trump said from the
White House that “This epidemic is a national health emergency.”

20

National Research Council, The Growth of Incarceration in the United
States Exploring Causes and Consequences (2014) at 33.
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II. Presence of Public Health vs. Incarceration
A. Opioids and all Illicit Drugs Alike
Order 13784 explicitly stipulates resources are needed to fight all
drugs, not just the opioid epidemic. The executive order consistently
uses the phrase “drug addiction and the opioid crisis”, implying
that actions should not be limited to the opioid epidemic and should
address all drug addictions. Efforts in response to the law should be
consistent in making room for research, education, and other public
health measures relating to drug addictions and the opioid crisis.
Thus far, efforts to decriminalize drugs have mainly focused on the
opioid epidemic.21 The Department of Justice addressed other illicit
drugs with increased criminal penalties.22
Different legal ramifications for different drugs are expected.
For example, within the past decade states have explored varying
approaches for recreational marijuana usage. Marijuana has a history of being used equally in communities of color and white communities, but only criminalized in communities of color. States are
responding to this incongruency by decriminalizing recreational use
of marijuana. We do not expect to see the same approach with drugs
such as hypnotic depressants, heavy hallucinogens, or instantly
addictive substances. Not all drugs have equal effects on the user,
and reciprocally should not all bare the exact same legal ramifications. However, the attitude in which we approach all illegal drugs
ought to be the same. The wording in this order however, consistently includes all drug addictions and does not specify action to be
only applied to a certain type of drug.23 As the order calls, effort to
21

Julie Netherland, White opioids: Pharmaceutical Race and the War
on Drugs That Wasn’t (2017) at 4, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC5501419/#!po=3.26087.

22

White House, President Donald J. Trump’s Initiative to Stop Opioid
Abuse and Reduce Drug Supply and Demand (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-initiative-stopopioid-abuse-reduce-drug-supply-demand-2/.
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increase funding and rehabilitative treatment for all drug addictions
should increase, not opioids alone.
The steep increase in opioid usage and overdoes warranted political attention and legislation that was specific to opioid related drugs.
Although this order is reactionary to the opioid crisis and could have
been opioid specific legislation, it is not. Instead, the order makes
broad statements consistently referring to, “drug addiction and the
opioid crisis”.24 This is acceptable because the order is not about punishment or sentencing of drug abusers. It attempts to preemptively
avoiding other drug crises by making available the public health
resources that would be allocated to the opioid epidemic. This long
overdue approach to drug addictions is a step in the right direction. It
does not, however, address the historic drug problem in association
with race, or provide the necessary explicit allocation of resources
to do so. Additionally, there still exists a bias of resources towards
opioids in funding regarding treatment, recovery, and prevention.
In Table 1, programs that are funded as a result of this order are
categorized.

24

Id.
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As observed, significantly more money was allocated for only opioids in treatment and recovery programs, and less for other drugs.
On the other hand, more finances are allocated to other drugs for
Criminal Justice and Law enforcement, fueling the criminalization
of these drugs. 41.6% of the Criminal Justice and Law Enforcement funds allocated for opioids and other drugs are for the Office
of National Drug Control Policy—High Intensity Drug Trafficking
Areas (HIDTA).25 HIDTA’s first area of focus for drug trafficking is
the southern border.26 Most opioids sold in the United States are produced by American Companies and are not being trafficked across
any national borders.27 This furthers racial implications encouraging
the incarceration of nonwhites for non-opioid drug crimes. The funds
designated to treatment and recovery favor opioids, while the efforts
that further the incarceration of drug crimes are focused on nonopioid drugs, (and are accompanied with an additional association
of racial bias.) Again, this synchronizes with the consistent trend of
25

Id.

26

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program White House
at 4 (2017) https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/
ONDCP_High-Intensity-Drug-Trafficking-Areas.pdf.
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racial association that has existed since the 1970’s; decriminalizing
white drug use while further criminalizing colored drug use.
B. Nature of Executive Orders
Although the nature of the legitimate legal authority of executive
orders has been disputed, the practice has existed since George
Washington. Throughout the history of the country, these executive
orders have been canonized as law if they are deemed constitutional
and unrevoked. If the order is not constitutional, the Supreme Court,
Congress, and future presidents have the authority to revoke the
order. This happened five times during Harry Truman’s presidency,
more than any president. The most famous of which occurred during
the steel strike of 1952 when Truman issued executive order 10340
seizing control of the American steel industry.28 In the Youngstown
Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Supreme Court overruled Truman’s order and reprivatized the steel industry.29 The opportunity to
revoke a presidential executive order still exists today. The Supreme
Court overrode President Trump’s executive order that banned citizens of seven Muslim countries from entering the United States on
January 28, 2017.
Speaking in general terms, presuming the order is constitutional,
it becomes the President’s responsibility to oversee the implementation of the order. This is rarely an issue as written by the presidential
cabinet, it is in his or her best interest to carry out the order. In 1948,
Truman’s executive order 9981 states that “there shall be equality
of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services
without regard to race, color, religion or national origin.”30 This order
has been executed and enforced by the executive branch and treated
as law since. Article II of the Constitution establishes the executive branch to bear the responsibility to “take Care that the Laws

28

Exec. Order No. 10,340 3 C. F. R. (1952).
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be faithfully executed.” 31 Truman’s executive order 9981 is a prime
example of this responsibility because it has been cited and upheld
by the executive branch up through today.
These cases are unrelated to the Executive Order 13784, rather,
they prove the power of an executive order. This form of legislation is
one of the strongest manifestations of executive power. Order 13784
went without opposition from the Supreme Court or Congress. The
Trump Administration is therefore bound by this unrevoked executive order. Because the of the inclusion of all drug addictions with
the opioid crisis in the wording of the law, the Trump Administration
is expected to see the fulfillment of both parts of the order. Meaning,
it is the President’s responsibility to establish policies supporting
those addicted to opioids and other drugs alike.
C. Opioids: the White Drug
Opioid addictions often start as a medically prescribed pain killer.
Painkillers are shown to be more commonly prescribed to white
patients than to people of color for a variety of reasons.32 While
these reasons provide insight to underlying implicit racial bias, for
the scope of this paper, it is only required to establish that opioids
are in fact more common among white low-income areas. Overdose

31

U. S. Const. art. II.

32

Joseph Friedmen, Assessment of Racial/Ethnic and Income Disparities in the Prescription of Opioids and Other Controlled Medications
in California, April 2019 at 473 (“One foundational study showed that
Hispanic patients were 2 times less likely to receive analgesics following
long bone fractures than white patients, after accounting for other factors.
Similar discrepancies in pain medication prescribing were found for black
patients relative to white patients. Recent studies have found that health
care professionals often underestimate the pain of black patients when
compared with white patients and that such racial/ethnic biases in the
detection of pain are seen among health care professionals who report no
explicit racial/ethnic biases.”)
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deaths in 2017 grew to 47600 making up 67.8% of all drug overdose
the deaths.33 Eighty percent of those opioid users were white.34
Leading up to 2017, there were three times more white opioid users than black opioid users in prison (24% of white prisoners are opioid users while only 7.9% of blacks are opioid users).35
However, blacks are still convicted for drug charges six times more
than whites.36 The opioid users are in the minority of those in prison
for drug use. Rehabilitative and decriminalization efforts associated with this order are primarily helping the minority. Focusing the
implementation of the order on decriminalizing opioid abuse continued the racist tendencies within drug law. Criminalizing the broader
drug use has been an easy way to allow implicit racism to seep
into the US Justice system. Implicit racism has come as a result of
increased attention to opioid recovery, but a limited health approach
to addressing marijuana, crack/cocaine, and other drug crimes.
Between the overdoses and the increase in white drug incarceration rates, the epidemic was a political wakeup call. The Trump
Administration’s response is inseparably connected with the political demographics of his supporters at the time. Many voters who
most supported Trump were hit by the opioid epidemic the hardest.
For example, in West Virginia in 2017 there were over 81 opioid
prescriptions for every 100 people.37 In the 2016 election, West Virginia had the highest support for Trump with 67.9% of the vote in his
33

Opioid Overdose Deaths by Race/Ethnicity, Kaiser Fam. Found., https://
www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/opioid-overdose-deaths-by-raceethnicity
/?currentTimeframe=3&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22
,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D.
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Bureau of Justice Drug Use, Dependence, and Abuse Among State
Prisoners and Jail Inmates 2007-2009 at 6 (U.S. Dept. Just. 2007-2009),
[hereinafter, BJS Drug Use] https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dudaspji0709.pdf.
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Opioid Summaries by State National Institute of Drug Abuse (2019)
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favor.38 This state is particularly white with a 92.1% non-Hispanic
white population as recorded in the 2019 census.39 West Virginia and
other predominantly white states who were hit hard by the opioid
crisis became the face of the epidemic. The Trump Administration
had significant political incentive to please these white low-income
communities by providing this legislation.
Comparatively, the crack cocaine epidemic was also addressed
by appealing to the white population. The imbalance in sentencing
cocaine and coke heavily biased wealthier white communities who
at the time bore significant political power. The 1980 crack cocaine
crisis primarily involved black communities and persons, while the
opioid epidemic is identified as mostly affecting white communities.40 Crack users of the 1980’s, predominantly black, bore the
weight of excessive incarceration, mandatory minimum sentencing,
and outright racism.41 Opioid users, predominantly white, are unmistakably being provided furthered care and attention from the state to
protect and secure their health without the cost of incarceration.42
The opioid epidemic is the first significant drug crisis that is aimed
primarily to influence white communities in the U.S. Correlatedly,
it is the first time the law has reflected protection for drug users, and
yet it is rooted in white privilege.
Action to address the incarceration of opioid users came about
because the opioid epidemic is associated with white populations. As
38

Presidential Election Results: Donald Trump wins, N. Y. Times, (Aug 9,
2017) https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/president.
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Khiara Bridges, Race, Pregnancy, and the Opioid Epidemic, 790 Har.
L. Rev. 133 (2020), https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/770-851_Online.pdf.
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the opioid overdose reversal medication naloxone, while passing Good
Samaritan laws to protect those calling for emergency assistance during an
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prevalence rates of drug addictions increase within black communities, similar legal ramifications do not occur. This begs the question, that had the opioid epidemic been branded as an issue in black
communities, would it have received the same amount of productive
attention, or would it have resulted in furthered incarceration?
D. Combatting Institutionalizing the Bias of Race
As shown in the Table 1 above, Executive Order 13784 called for a
large increase in funding towards addressing the opioid crisis and
an future improvement in addressing non-opioid drug crises. However, because all non-opioid drugs are allocated finances in conjunction with opioid crisis budget, there is no ensured budget for any
non-opioid drug within this order. Research, prevention, treatment
and recovery, and criminal justice improvement measures are only
explicitly provided for opioid related services. Additionally, these
funds exacerbate the difference between races incarcerated for drug
crimes due to the difference in drug use between races. The funding’s heavy favor here adds an economic bias in addition to the legal
bias already established. Together, this order institutionalizes racism.
Furthered legislation can help to address this. Because so many
efforts have already been made for the opioid crisis, expanding the
research, education, and other public health measures will require
less funding than they initially did. This legislation needs to support
research, rehabilitation and reassimilation. Secondly, room within
Medicare should be created for those struggling with drug addictions to be able to get medical help to address the addiction. Looking
through the lens of a public health crisis will allow a perspective
shift to occur for all drugs, and one day the association between racist tendencies and drug law can be eradicated.

III. Conclusion
The opioid crisis is associated with a white demographic. I argue that
because of this association, there has been more funding, legislation,
and political power to provide aid to the epidemic. After a closer look
at the Executive Order 13784, the inequality in treating different drug
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types is correlated with the inequality in treating different races. To
avoid furthered racist associations with this law, measures to combat this racism should be taken. I propose legislation to be written
that establishes healthcare provisions and legal protections for all
drug users without regard to the type of drug. Additionally, healthcare and addiction recovery for all drug users should be prioritized
over incarceration. While previous drug epidemics in communities
of color and low socioeconomic status, have resulted in furthered
incarceration, stigma in the media, etc., this epidemic can set a standard of public health for all future drug addiction crises. By providing services and support to all suffering from drug abuse without
reference to the drug or race of the users, the following three effects
are expected to be seen on society. First, a legally supported priority
on health, accounting for confounding differences in demographics,
resulting in a healthier society. Secondly, those who are incarcerated will have more access to aid resulting in reduced recidivism
and bettered reassimilation coming out of prison or jail. Third, there
will be less implicit racism in the law, and potential future racist
drug associations that have been rampant in the past can be avoided.
We have the potential to create a society that encourages growth,
change, and improvement rather than facilitating recidivism, racism
and increased incarceration.

Disaggregation & Diversity: A Case for Race
Conscious Admissions
Connor Oniki1
Since its founding, people all over the world have looked towards
America as a land of opportunity. Immigrants viewed it as a place
for fresh starts, new beginnings, and equal chances. However, for
centuries, concrete and subtle barriers have slowed the opportunity
for progress for those who are not in the majority. Throughout America’s beginnings, lawmakers legalized segregation and discrimination throughout the country multiple times. The Chinese Exclusion
Act prevented Asian Americans from immigrating to the United
States to pursue opportunities.2 Jim Crow laws enforced racial segregation and ensured that though African Americans were no longer
enslaved, they did not have all the same rights as other citizens.3
Historically, these discriminatory systems prevented individuals
from improving their own lives and contributing to wider society. In
response to these systems, advocates fought to create laws and regulations that would even the playing field. The Voting Rights Act,4 the
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Fair Housing Act,5 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,6 amongst
others, struck down some of the societal barriers to educational and
career success.
As America continues to become more diverse, it has become
increasingly difficult for policymakers to determine who needs help
overcoming the barriers placed in their way because of things out of
their control, such as race, gender, sexuality etc. Within the larger
Asian American community, specifically, members of subgroups
such as Cambodians, Laotians, and Burmese, struggle to find footing in this country, as many of their mass migrations have taken
place later than those of other, more-established races. They lack
the foundation within the United States that many of their Asian
American counterparts have. By comparing them to the more settled
Eastern Asians, policymakers set these Asian Americans up for failure in their education and careers. Members of the aforementioned
subcommunities who have more recently immigrated to the United
States face struggles more similar to African American and Hispanic communities than to the larger Asian American community.
For instance, for every dollar the average white man makes, an Asian
Indian woman makes $1.21, but a Burmese woman makes $.50.7
This disparity is one example among many which shows that lumping together all groups of Asians within America presents a problem.
This paper will focus on federal laws regarding the use of race
in college admissions. We suggest that in order for all Asian Americans to reap the rewards of race-conscious admissions policies without injuring other minority groups, such laws need to be revised to
include language that is more inclusive of all groups and subgroups
of Asian Americans, regardless of socioeconomic status, racial history, or any other factors. By legally requiring states to incorporate the use of Asian American subcategories in higher education
5
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admissions and disaggregating data within Asian American statistics, state legislatures and voters will be able to make more educated
decisions about how their state approaches diversity in higher education. By separating the Asian American subgroups, the revised laws
would achieve greater diversity within higher education.
By calling for more inclusive language in higher education
admissions to be required by law, students can better identify themselves and universities can gain a better understanding of how
diverse these students’ backgrounds actually are. The main way to
accomplish this is by including more Asian American subgroups in
the application process. First, we will explore the historical contexts
of Affirmative Action and the model minority myth. Next, we will
discuss the current state of Asian Americans in higher education.
Finally, we will propose a solution which involves disaggregating
data, and then we will conclude by discussing the implications of
such a proposition.
Many members of the Asian American community struggle to
fight the stereotypes associated with the model minority myth. The
model minority myth portrays all Asian Americans as members of a
hardworking, intelligent group that represent what all minority communities should aspire to. While this may appear flattering, underlying this myth is a belief that all Asian Americans fit this mold and
any who fall short are living below the expectation of what an Asian
American “should” be.

I. Background
Every major case involving Affirmative Action has included mention of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, as those
who feel they have been discriminated against argue that their rights
have been infringed because of their race. Initially, schools struggled with knowing how best to implement the policy of Affirmative
Action, and so many used quotas to fill the spots in their programs
with a diverse blend of students. However, in California v Bakke
(1978) the court held that using race to fill quotas was considered
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unconstitutional.8 The justices did rule that race could be used in
admissions, if its use met the standard of strict scrutiny by serving a compelling governmental interest and being narrowly tailored
to achieving that interest. Later, in Grutter v Bollinger (2003) the
Supreme Court reaffirmed that Affirmative Action itself was constitutional and that using race as a factor among many was allowed
in order to offer schools the greatest diversity possible.9 Affirmative Action was again upheld in Fisher v University of Texas (2016)
wherein a young white woman who claimed to have been discriminated against lost her case.10 Like in the two aforementioned cases,
the Court held that the use of race in admissions was not in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. In another related case, Schuette v.
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action (2014), the Supreme Court
held with the state of Michigan’s voters in saying that amendments
to a state’s constitution that prohibit race- and sex- based admissions
are not in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 11 These cases
demonstrate that America is still learning how to deal with the ramifications surrounding laws regarding race.
Though the Supreme Court has continued to uphold the use of
Affirmative Action, multiple states have followed Michigan’s lead in
attempting to ban its use in college admissions. Texas’ vote to ban
Affirmative Action was overruled by the Supreme Court in Grutter
v Bollinger in 2003. However Affirmative Action has been successfully banned in California in 1996, Washington in 1998, Florida in
1999, Michigan in 2006, Nebraska in 2008, Arizona in 2010, New
Hampshire in 2012, and Oklahoma in 2012.12 Most recently, the
aforementioned 2014 Supreme Court ruling reaffirmed that it is up
to voters, and not the legislature, to make decisions about whether
8
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to allow Affirmative Action in a specific state.13 Because it has been
banned by various states, but still upheld federally, we are interested
in exploring what methods besides traditional Affirmative Action
policies states can use to achieve the goal of a diverse student body.
The ruling in Schuette is a reminder that it is important for voters to
be informed so that they can make judicious decisions regarding the
use of race in college admissions.

II. Current Situation
Amongst Japanese Americans 25 years and older, 46.8% hold a bachelor’s degree, while only 5.3% have not graduated from high school.
53.2% of Korean Americans have attained a bachelor’s degree or
higher, while 7.8% do not hold a high school degree. There is more
disparity amongst Chinese Americans, but still 52% hold a bachelor’s degree or higher and all but 18.4% have a high school degree.
These numbers reflect some truth to the “model minority” myth,
as it shows the Asian American propensity to succeed in higher
education. According to The National Center of Economic Studies,
of all Asian Americans, 50.2% have a bachelor’s degree or higher,
while only 31.4% of Caucasian Americans hold a bachelor’s degree
or higher. This shows the incredible amount of success that Asian
Americans as a broad category tend to have in education. However,
as has been evidenced, this is especially strong amongst Eastern
Asian Americans, especially the Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans.
The statistics for Southeast and Southern Asian American groups is
not as favorable.
The data that distinguishes between ethnic subgroups suggests
that the educational achievements of many Southern and Southeast
Asian American subgroups align more with African Americans and
Latinos, groups typically thought of as underachieving academically. The percentage of Southeast Asian Americans who have not
graduated high school is 26.5%. This figure lies right in between the
13
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percentage of Blacks and Latinos, which are 14.6% and 33% respectively. Multiple Asian Americans groups have even lower rates of
high school graduation, with 55.1% of Bhutanese and 47.5% of Burmese lacking a high school degree. Additionally, although 28.6% of
Southeast Asians hold a bachelor’s degree or higher, which is more
than Blacks (at 20.9%) and Latinos (at 15.3%), their attainment still
lags far behind the statistic of 53.6% for all Asian Americans. Looking closely at the statistics reveals that certain subgroups, such as
the Bhutanese and Cambodians are less likely to attain a bachelor’s
than even Blacks and Latinos. The members of these subgroups with
such degrees lies at 10.2% and 16.4%, respectively. This data clearly
reveals that in terms of educational attainment, many Asian American subgroups line up more with minority groups such as Blacks and
Latinos; they should therefore be afforded the same opportunities as
the members in these groups.
These various statistics demonstrate that we should not view
Asian Americans with a one-size-fits-all perspective. Grouping
Southern and Southeastern Asians with Eastern Asians creates
inequality within the group. If anything, Eastern Asians have educational attainment statistics that currently rank them closer to white
Americans, if not outperforming them, while Southern and Southeastern Asians are performing more closely to African Americans
and Latinx Americans. As Grutter v. Bollinger has affirmed, using
race as a factor in admissions is allowed in order to increase diversity within schools.14 However, though legal segregation is no longer
allowed, social segregation is still prevalent across America. Since
Brown v. Board of Education, America has still fought against its
segregated schools.15 Legally requiring the implementation of more
subgroups in the admissions process will allow schools to get a more
holistic view of their students, and the Asian American students are
a great place to start because of their exceptional differences from
top to bottom.
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III. Path to Implementation
The University of California (UC) System has begun efforts to find
a policy other than Affirmative Action to achieve diversity in public
education and give opportunities to a wider range of Asian Americans. This begin in 2010, over a decade after the state banned Affirmative Action. It has allowed for a more complete view of students
and how their educational achievements may be tied to the challenges they had to overcome to accomplish what they have. These
changes have been lauded throughout the Asian American and
Pacific Islander community and have provided much needed change
in California. A CARE report suggested that disaggregated data
helped the UC system in crucial ways: understanding which student
populations are underrepresented on campus, using resources efficiently, and justifying funding for various programs and services16￼
Some states, like Massachusetts, have also drafted bills that
emphasize greater disaggregation of data from data-collecting state
agencies. The proposed Massachusetts bill focused on data collected
by any agencies related to the state, urging for them to classify Asian
Americans and Pacific Islanders according to census categories. It
also attempted to ensure that “the17 Though the bill ultimately failed,
it provides a template for how lawmakers can address disparities
within the Asian American community.
This paper argues that legal requirements to collect disaggregated data are permissible under the Equal Protection Clause and
should be implemented nationwide, on a state level, and modeled
after the UC system while also being tailored to the specific needs
of different localities. This will not require race-based admissions
but will simply provide schools and voters a better understanding of
their student body. As Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative
Action showed, states have the right to decide how they approach
16

iCount: A Data Quality Movement for Asian Americans and Pacific
Islanders, The Racialized Experience of Asian American and Pacific
Islander Students: An Examination of Campus Racial Climate at the University of California, Los Angeles.

17

H.3361, 2017, 190th Sess. (Mass. 2017).

70

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 34, 2020

race-based admissions. This legal requirement will give states the
information that they need to approach such admissions within their
state.
Knowing specific details about the race of applicants and college
students will not change necessarily change the outcome for each
applicant. However, in states that do support Affirmative Action
policies, it will give admissions offices the knowledge they need to
create a diverse incoming student body. If all public universities are
required to provide options to allow potential students to more accurately identify themselves, they will be able to create a space where
students are judged fairly. Southern Asians and Southeastern Asians
will be compared to each other, instead of being held to the higher
standard that Eastern Asians are setting. If these changes can be
implemented, Asian Americans will be treated in a way more representative of their demographic. Truer diversity will be achieved.
Currently, in the UC System, an important statistic that they
track is the presence of underrepresented minorities (URM’s) in
their schools. The UC System identifies a URM as “A student who
self-identifies as African American, Hispanic/Latino(a), or American Indian.”18 Asian-Americans are not on this list. Because they
are not, the outreach programs that the UC system uses to increase
their diversity are less likely to reach the Southern and Southeastern
Asian communities. If data were to be disaggregated, then members
of Asian American subgroups that are less common at the school
can be brought to light and seen as URM’s as well. On a national
level, this could be implemented on a state-by-state basis, so that
local voters, lawmakers, and admissions officers can have a more
accurate picture of which groups may be underrepresented in their
schools relative to their applicants. Requiring greater disaggregation
by law simply provides transparency from students to schools, and
vice versa, so that everyone can have an equal chance to receive an
education.
In response to the changes made in the UC System and the proposed bill in Massachusetts, there has been backlash, as some com18
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munities have felt that such laws and regulations are racist or overstep
their bounds.19 However, Eastern Asians are often the ones who lead
these arguments. These are the people who have a voice in the Asian
American community. These are the groups that would not be hurt
if data aggregation stayed as it was. The groups that get lost in that
shuffle are those who, should the current systems stay as they are, do
not have a voice and cannot be heard or seen. If racial data in college
admissions were to be disaggregated, these underrepresented communities would legally be given representation and would be able to
stand for themselves as their own demographic. This would achieve
truer diversity, because we would learn more about the needs and
performance of underrepresented communities rather than having
students from the same few countries be over-represented.
This plan will impact many within the United States. Two of
the groups that need to be considered more specifically are Eastern
Asian Americans, as well as the group of historically underprivileged minorities, specifically African American and Latinx Americans. Under our proposed plan, Eastern Asians would be represented
in their own race category. Though some may think that this will
create greater competition within this group and make entering
higher education even harder, because of the ruling in California v.
Bakke, quotas are no longer allowed in university admissions. So,
because universities cannot use race as a determinative factor, it
would simply be used as information that provides universities with
the best idea of who a student is. Race should not define a person in
their entirety. However, the more specific students can be in identifying themselves, the more accurately they are able to represent
how they have been influenced by their ethnicity. For any student,
this proposal allows a more complete version of themselves to be on
display for the schools to which they apply for. Allowing students to
identify themselves as Southern and Southeastern Asian will open
the doors for those minority groups that are facing systemic, socio19
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economic, and legal barriers that hinder their ability to succeed in
higher education.
This holds true for members of the African American and Latinx
communities as well. We recognize that this proposal may create
more competition for African Americans and Latinx students, many
of whom already face difficulties with discrimination and the poverty cycle that make success hard to achieve. It may seem that adding more applicants with systemic challenges because of their race
to the applicant pool may make it increasingly difficult for students
from marginalized backgrounds to compete in higher education, as
there would be more students to compete with. However, we would
argue that legally compelling schools to implement these subgroups
on application materials will highlight the difficulties that students
face when trying to get to college in many communities. Having
more students with economic difficulties who aren’t grouped in with
the “Asian American” group but can self-identify as Southeastern
Asians or as Southern Asians will help universities better understand the demographics of prospective classes. Universities will be
able to be better see where changes need to be made within both
their specific schools and within higher education generally.
Some worry generally regarding Affirmative Action. They fear
that if students have not been able to succeed in high school or in
standardized tests, they certainly will not be able to succeed once
they get to a university. However, this is not what we are arguing
against. Though it is certainly an important and pressing subject,
this paper is not meant to prove that underprivileged students can
accomplish great things and succeed in school. That is what policies
allowing race to be considered as one factor in holistic admissions is
for. It is designed to bring justice for all. This paper argues that for
justice to be granted, subgroups must be in place to help universities to see more clearly who these students are. When they are seen
not just as test scores but as people who have overcome great, systemic barriers that have sought to halt their progression at every turn
because of their situation, they can be treated fairly and exit from the
shadows cast by those who may have not faced similar, even relatable
challenges. Whether not they can succeed is not necessarily up to the
system, but it is not the duty of a system to determine who has an
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opportunity to succeed and who does not. By legally mandating this
disaggregation, we provide a way to find out whether different groups
can succeed. Society can never move forward unless we first learn
where we truly are, and to do this we need to clearly define people’s
needs which are invariably linked to their identity. By disaggregating data, students will be able to clearly explain who they are and
will be able to then truly represent themselves and their ethnicity.
The future of Affirmative Action is uncertain, and therefore we
look towards state level rather than federal level initiatives to increase
diversity. Like in the UC system, states can and should find methods
to increase diversity even if they have race-neutral admissions programs.20 If race was completely removed from the admissions process, there would be disastrous effects on Southern and Southeastern
Asian Americans. As we have proved, their current educational
achievements already lag far behind their ethnic counterparts. They
face various social, economic, and cultural barriers that frequently
hinder them from achieving their entire educational potential. They
need more, rather than less, legal recourse that would help them.
All Asian Americans need greater opportunities to succeed without
being tied down by the model minority myth. True diversity will
not be achieved unless educational achievements increase across the
board. As a country, we need to make legal modifications to the way
race is currently addressed in university admissions to ensure that
the needs of all Asian Americans are addressed under the law.

IV. Conclusion
As we have shown, Affirmative Action in its present form does not
achieve its stated purpose of “attaining a diverse student body.”
The way it is currently applied prevents many Asian Americans
from being represented on college campus and limits diversity to a
select group of high achieving, more historically privileged Asian
Americans. We have proposed that encouraging individual states to
include disaggregated data in the college admissions process will
20
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be one step forward in beginning to address this problem. It better
follows the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment
and thereby allows applicants to be given a fair chance to admission. There are many benefits that will come with adjusting its
implementation so that it helps those it is supposed to. Changing
the way that it is applied will help more Southern and Southeastern
Asian Americans succeed in higher education, which in turn will
help raise the educational standards across the entire country. The
college admissions process will be more just to both applicants and
schools because more accurate information will be used. There will
be greater diversity within higher education because ethnic groups
will not be viewed as monoliths and stereotypes. This is one advantageous course of action that will open the door for other forms of
legal recourse to help all Asian Americans succeed in academia, the
workplace, and every other area of life.

Alimony:
The Taxing Economic Implications of Divorce
Amaia M. Kennedy1 and Jared Mason2
In 2017 alone, over 750,000 American couples chose to divorce3.
Nationally, fifty percent of marriages end in divorce, with each of
these marriages lasting eight years, on average4. Put another way,
a divorce occurs every 13 seconds5, and each of those divorces is
expensive, with an average cost of approximately $15,000 per person6. Expenses usually include a divorce attorney and court fees
but can also include tax advisors, child custody evaluators7, private
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investigators, fees for serving subpoenas, an accountant, as well as
the costs of finding separate living arrangements8. With a median
American household income of just over $60,000, a divorce would
cost a couple (and their children) almost half of their yearly income,
on average, a significant challenge as both individuals look to move
on from the failed relationship. Although already difficult for couples
who can afford divorce, the repercussions can be truly debilitating
for those who earn significantly less than the median, as the proportional cost of divorce would be much higher, and the resources
available more limited.
After 1960, the divorce rate in America more than doubled over
the course of just two decades, increasing from 9.2 divorces per 1,000
married women to 22.6 divorces per 1,000 married women9. American culture has kept up with the increase in divorce rate; divorce
has moved from the edges of society toward the center, becoming
increasingly more common in America.
When a couple chooses to divorce or change their marital status
to “legal separation”, alimony may be awarded based on a mutual
agreement between the divorcing spouses. However, if a mutual
agreement cannot be reached, a decision may be made by the judge
assigned to the case10. Alimony is separate from the division of marital property and is different from child support, legally. Additionally,
alimony within each divorce is considered on a case-by-case basis11.
In terms of tax treatment, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) states,
“Amounts paid to a spouse or former spouse under a divorce or separation instrument (including a divorce decree, a separate maintenance
8
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decree or a written separation agreement) may be alimony for federal tax purposes.”12 Although legal separation and divorce share
many similarities under the law, for the purposes of this article, we
will focus only on alimony as it relates to divorce.
Spousal support, spousal maintenance, and alimony are often
used synonymously, but spousal support and spousal maintenance
must meet certain requirements in order to qualify as alimony. For
tax purposes, the IRS imposes six qualifications for a payment
to be considered alimony: (1) former-spouses must not file a joint
income tax return; (2) payments must be made in cash (including
checks or money orders), and exchanges of items or assets cannot
be considered alimony; (3) the payment must be to or for a formerspouse made under a divorce; (4) former-spouses must not be living
together; (5) the agreement must state that payments end after the
death of the receiver; and (6) the payment is not treated as child support or a property settlement13.
The tax treatment of alimony changed when the President of the
United States signed The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) into law
on December 22, 201714. The TCJA was focused on tax reform and
made many changes to federal tax codes. One of the changes causes
divorcees to pay more in tax, making divorce and life after divorce
more difficult and expensive. These changes are neglectful of the
purpose of alimony—to level the economic playing field by limiting
any unfair economic effects of divorce (by providing supplemental
income for the lower-income-earning spouse)15.
Using previous and existing federal codes, in this article we examine the law in relation to divorce and tax law surrounding alimony.
12
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We argue for the removal of the 2018 revisions to the tax code (in
relation to the treatment of alimony) and a reversion to the previous principles, as the imposed changes do not fulfill the intended
purposes of alimony. The proceeding sections will do the following:
first, provide a detailed explanation of the TCJA changes in relation
to the treatment of alimony; second, address their negative impact on
divorcing Americans; and third, outline a viable solution.
In section one, we will define alimony-related terminology that
we will use in this article and provide a recent history of alimony.
In section two, we will discuss the changes to alimony-related tax,
and thoroughly explore the impact these changes have in the United
States. In section three, we will outline a three-pillared solution and
give our reasoning for proposed changes.

I. Background
Alimony provides an income, after the marriage is dissolved, to
the lower-wage-earning or non-wage-earning spouse16. Alimony is
justified by the cohesive and sacrificial nature inherent in a marriage: spouses may specialize, choosing to forego certain economic
benefits or opportunities in order to better the couple as a unit. For
example, if a spouse chooses not to pursue a career and instead support the family at home—so that the other spouse can focus more on
securing economic benefits—alimony ensures that his or her contributions and sacrifice are not lost in the divorce, and any potential
economic disadvantages of such choices made to benefit both partners are mitigated. In this article, we will refer to the spouse who
makes alimony payments as the payer and refer to the spouse who
receives alimony payments as the receiver.
Each state considers each of the many influencing factors differently when determining how much alimony should be awarded and
for how long, but there are common factors: the recipient’s needs,
the payer’s ability to pay, the length of the marriage, the couples’
16
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previous lifestyle, and the age and health of each spouse17. Alimony cannot be assumed; just because one spouse makes less than
another, it does not guarantee any alimony. It is granted depending
on the individual circumstances of the divorcing couple. Any former
agreements between spouses may not be legally binding and may
not be applicable in future negotiations regarding the terms of any
awarded alimony18. Similarly, if one spouse receives support at the
time of the divorce, they are not guaranteed continued support after
the marriage through alimony. Certain circumstances can end alimony, including but not limited to death, remarriage, a change in the
recipient’s financial status, or a change in the payer’s financial status19. Although states weigh factors differently, federal tax statutes
are consistent; all alimony, regardless of the state it was ordered in,
is treated the same.
A. Pre-TCJA Tax Code Explanation
Prior to January 2019, Sections 62, 71, and 215 of The Internal Revenue Services’ Internal Revenue Code allowed deductions for alimony payers, and tax on those payments were paid by the receivers.
Section 215 outlined deductions relating specifically to alimony,
and stated that for payers, “there shall be allowed as a deduction an
amount equal to the alimony or separate maintenance payments paid
during such individual’s taxable year”20. Section 62, titled “Adjusted
17
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Gross Income Defined”, outlined allowable deductions to adjusted
gross income and referenced Section 215 directly in subsection (a)
paragraph (10): “Alimony. —The deduction allowed by section 215”21.
This deduction was allowable for all payers, but not for receivers.
Section 71, titled “Alimony And Separate Maintenance Payments”,
outlined who held the burden of tax for alimony payments. It stated
“Gross income includes amounts received as alimony or separate
maintenance payments”22.
To understand the significance of the deductions outlined in Section 62, it is necessary to understand the process of calculating taxable income. Taxpayers (1) determine their gross income, (2) calculate
their adjusted gross income, and (3) subtract tax deductions23. In the
second step, “above-the-line” deductions can apply to gross income,
reducing adjusted gross income. After adjusted gross income is
determined, other “below-the-line” deductions can be applied. Thus,
adjusted gross income is the symbolic “line”. Section 62 outlines
above-the-line deductions, and because Section 62 referenced Section 215, alimony was considered an above-the-line deduction. Step
three allows taxpayers to apply one of two deduction options: an
Itemized deduction or the Standard deduction. Itemized deductions
are outlined in Section 63 (outlined in Section 63 of IRC24). Generally, taxpayers should choose to take the Itemized deduction if their
individual deductions exceed the Standard deduction25. The “standard deduction is a specific dollar amount that reduces the amount
21
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of income on which you’re taxed26. The TCJA increased the Standard
deduction from $6,500 to $12,000 for individuals. However, because
alimony was considered an above-the-line deduction, it was irrelevant whether you chose to itemize or take the Standard deduction;
you were always entitled to a deduction if you were making alimony
payment (as they are defined by the IRS).
In short, the Internal Revenue Code made clear that payers were
entitled to a deduction on the amount of alimony they paid in the
payer’s taxable year, and that receivers were to include alimony as
income (as if they had earned the alimony themselves). An important implication exists due to the latter statutory tax law; alimony
was taxed in the marginal tax bracket of the receiver, who almost
certainly made less in income, and was therefore in a lower bracket.
This resulted in a net tax savings for the couple. The payer saw no
personal benefit, could not use the money for themselves, and as
divorcing spouses generally do not desire to give any of their income
to their former spouse unless required to, the IRC allowed a deduction to offset the economic loss that would have been incurred by the
payer. The receiver saw the benefit of the money and had control of
its usage, so they were required to pay the tax. This system provided
more financial optionality for the receiver, who was only awarded
alimony because of the limitations their financial situation imposed
on them.

II. Implications of Tax Changes
The Internal Revenue Service summarized and clarified the implications of the changes: “Beginning Jan. 1, 2019, alimony or separate maintenance payments [were] not deductible from the income
of the payer spouse, or includable in the income of the receiving
spouse, if made under a divorce or separation agreement executed

26
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after Dec. 31, 2018.27” The IRS explicitly stated who the changes
apply to: generally ”alimony or separate maintenance payments are
deductible from the income of the payer spouse and includable in
the income of the receiving spouse, if made under a divorce or separation agreement executed on or before Dec. 31, 2018, even if the
agreement was modified after December 31, 2018, so long as the
modification”28 does not change the terms of alimony or explicitly
state that payments are “not deductible by the payer or includable in
the income of the receiving spouse”29.
A. Deduction Implications
Because the (now outdated) deduction only applied to the payer, they
therefore shoulder the economic losses caused by the amendment to
Section 62 and repeal of Section 215. In the current code, there are
no federal tax statutes to assist payers. Compared to the old code,
payers now lose a larger proportion of their income to taxes, limiting
their financial situation. A payer who makes $100,000 per year and
pays $20,000 in annual alimony would lose over $4,000 in taxes30
under the current IRC when compared with the pre-TCJA IRC.
B. Tax Burden Shift Implications
The receiver is harmed more than the payer by the repeal of Section
71. Income disparity is one of the most important factors for deter-

27

IRS, Clarification: Changes to deduction for certain alimony payments
effective in 2019, IRS (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/
clarification-changes-to-deduction-for-certain-alimony-payments-effective-in-2019.
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mining alimony31; in other words, if each spouse earned an equal
income, it is significantly less likely that alimony would be awarded
at all. If incomes are different, the payer is almost certainly in a
higher tax bracket and must pay the tax at a higher rate on the alimony before giving it to the receiver: this ultimately results in a loss
for the receiver.
The pre-TCJA IRC provided a tax savings for the couple, and
comparatively provided more resources for lower-wage-earning or
non-wage-earning spouses. Thus, the changes to the federal statutory
tax law almost certainly cause divorcees to pay more in taxes, placing a greater economic burden on the couple. This change neglects
and fails to accomplish the purpose of alimony, when compared to
the pre-TCJA IRC.
The United States Congress’ Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that these changes would generate $6.9 billion in tax revenue between 2018 and 2027. $6.9 billion appears substantial, but it
amounts to 0.46 percent of the $1.5 trillion tax cuts provided by the
TCJA32. While proponents of repealing the alimony deduction may
point out that it raises revenue for the federal government, it does so
largely at the expense of people who can least afford to contribute to
the reduction of the deficit by reducing their economic options.
C. IRA Contribution Implications
The IRS mandates that Traditional Individual Retirement Account
(IRA) contributions must meet specific requirements: contributors
(1) “must be under age 70 ½ at the end of the tax year”, and (2) you

31
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“must have taxable compensation”33. They state that taxable alimony
is treated as compensation for IRA purposes, but because Section 71
was repealed and the burden of tax shifting from the receiver to the
payer, alimony is no longer considered taxable to the receiver. This
prevents receivers, who are usually lower-wage-earning individuals,
from contributing money received via alimony to a tax-advantaged
Traditional IRA account, hindering their chance for a financially
secure retirement. The implications continue--contributions to a
Traditional IRA account are tax deductible depending on whether
you are covered by a retirement plan. Those covered are limited in
their deduction amounts34. Conversely, those who are completely
uncovered are entitled to receive the full value of their contributions
as a deduction. Deductions can amount to as much as $6,000 if you
are younger than 50 years old or $7,000 if you are 50 or older, for the
2020 tax year35. The consequences of the repeal of Section 71 extend
beyond the decrease in payment amount due to taxes. In addition
to receiving less money, receivers also face limitations surrounding
retirement planning as it relates to Traditional IRA’s and the deductions associated with those IRA’s.

III. Solution
To combat the negative economic effects of divorce, it is imperative
that federal and state tax codes focus on providing divorcees with
the financial resources they need. With more resources, ex-spouses
have a greater chance of moving past the many non-financial-related
obstacles that accompany divorce. In many ways, the pre-TCJA IRC
better served the needs of divorcees and was more in line with the
purposes of alimony. Three changes to the current code will rectify existing issues with taxes associated with alimony: (1) reinstating Section 71, once again allowing alimony to be includable in the
33
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income of the receiver; (2), reinstating an amended version of Section 215, entitling lower-income payers to receive a deduction for
alimony; and (3) reinstating Section 62(a)(10), making alimony an
above-the-line deduction for payers.
If reinstated, Section 71 will pave the way for many positive
repercussions, most of which will benefit the receiver. Alimony will
again be includable for the receiver and they will have the ability to
use alimony to make contributions to a Traditional IRA, increasing the probability of a financially secure retirement. Additionally,
income will no longer be includable for the payer, thus they would
no longer bear the burden of tax. Instead, the burden will shift back
to the receiver, who is usually in a lower tax bracket. The receiver
would retain a greater proportion of their alimony. In other words,
although the change is seemingly small, it will almost certainly
result in a tax savings for the couple. Furthermore, all of the tax savings will go to the receiver therefore increasing their overall support.
As previously explained, reinstating and amending Section
215 will help the payer retain a greater proportion of their income.
Instead of an exact reinstatement of Section 215, an amended version, that accounts for the need to reduce the deficit, may be most
helpful. Preserving the alimony deduction for all, except the very
highest income earning payers, will ensure all payers receive the
resources they need while maintaining additional tax revenue, which
would contribute to the reduction of the federal deficit. While the
amount contributed to the reduction would be less, it is unjust to
take from alimony-paying individuals who are already experiencing
a tumultuous and expensive lifestyle change. To bring the deduction
above-the-line, reinstating the amendment to Section 62 would be
also necessary.
The losses incurred because of tax burdens shifts and the elimination of the deduction may seem insignificant, but they are more
accurately depicted when considered in the context of divorce. With
a $15,000 average cost of divorce, and the additional cost of supporting two households instead of one, life after divorce can be financially
aggravating, and more expensive. Couples can pay more for housing,
utilities, insurance, vehicles, and many other costs that were previously shared. These additional costs require divorcing individuals to
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make on average 30 percent more if they hope to maintain an equal
standard of living after divorce36.

IV. Conclusion
If the Internal Revenue Codes that pertain to alimony are not
changed, thousands of divorcing Americans will continue to suffer
financially. In the United States, there were over 780,000 divorces
in 2017 alone37With a nationwide divorce rate of approximately 45
percent38, it seems that divorce will continue to affect many. Thus, it
is imperative that federal tax codes adhere more closely in fulfilling
the purposes of alimony, eliminating financial disparities between
payers and receivers. Although the post-TCJA tax code generates
revenue for the federal government, it harms divorcing couples,
making the process more painful and expensive, and making it more
difficult to escape the negative financial repercussions.
This article has used previous and existing federal tax codes
to examine the financially harmful tax treatment of alimony in the
United States of America. We have identified specific issues with the
existing federal tax codes. It seems evident that siphoning resources
from divorcing couples, to provide a minor contribution to the deficit
reduction, is ineffective. For this reason, we call on federal legislatures to reinstate Section 71, reinstate an amended version of Section
215, and reinstate Section 62(a)(10). These changes will bring tax
codes more in line with the purposes of alimony, alleviate alimonyrelated financial issues, and empower divorcees because the laws

36
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will inherently value each spouses’ future as they move beyond the
failed relationship, and on to a new life.

Narrow, Narrower, Narrowest: Appropriate
Force Majeure Specificity
Tayzlie Haack1 and Max Esplin2
Imagine you are the owner of a small construction company and
are contracted to build a large office building. As is customary, you
signed a contract agreeing to complete the building by a specific
deadline for a set amount of money. Included is a brief force majeure
clause, which allows you to be relieved of the contract in the case of
“unforeseeable circumstances” that might prevent completion of the
project. During construction, heavy tariffs affect your main suppliers, exponentially increasing the projected cost of completing the
project. Your company cannot afford the supplies necessary to complete the building, and you wonder if you can void the contract under
the force majeure clause. As it stands, is this perfunctory clause sufficient to excuse you from your contract?
Force majeure protections are inherently broad by nature,
causing them to vary by state, situation, and jurisdiction.3 Thus,
determining what protections can be granted to contracting parties relies heavily upon the specific verbiage and phrasing within
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said clause.4 However, minimalistic or overparticular specific force
majeure clauses may induce more problems than they would otherwise solve. The solution we propose therefore is two-fold: first,
each party must be informed about potential unforeseen events that
could damage said party’s infrastructure, capital, or ability to perform5; then, aware of these potential dangers, parties should apply
the necessary location and industry-specific specificity to their contracts. Instead of cutting and pasting generic force majeure clauses,
we suggest that contracting parties draft explicit, location-specific
force majeure clauses.
We will examine force majeure clauses at three varying levels of
specificity: those contracts with no force majeure clause, an overly
specific clause, or one that is too broad. Both the benefits and dangers of each level of specificity will be assessed, along with and how
price changes or tariffs are managed in each varying case.

I. Background
Force majeure clauses serve as a sort of contractual safeguard. When
written into a contract, they allow one party to “suspend or terminate the performance of its obligations when certain circumstances
beyond their control arise, making performance inadvisable, commercially impracticable, illegal, or impossible.”6 In the ever-changing
world of contract law, unexpected circumstances often arise, making
contracts difficult to fulfill. However, the line between difficult and
impracticable can be blurred. In Restatement 2d, a legal treatise on
contract common law, defines impracticable contract performance

4
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Contracts 38 Ass’n Gen. Contractors of Cal. 15, 15-16 (2008).
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as involving “extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury
or loss to one of the parties.”7
Examples include shortages of supplies due to war, embargo,
local crop failures, and unforeseen shutdowns. Such causes can
natural disasters like earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes; manmade problems like riots, strikes, and government intervention can
also be incorporated.
Because risk varies by region and industry, each party should
be aware of the possible area specific risks that could hinder their
ability to fulfill a contract within differing states. Attorneys Mark
Augenblick & Alison B. Rousseau recognize that “There is no universally accepted definition of the requirements to successfully
invoke force majeure. Different laws and jurisdictions take different
approaches.”8 This is in part what makes force majeure clauses so
difficult to interpret, as the challenge of determining what is impracticable or when a contract becomes void is left to the determination
of the presiding judge. Consequently, each state and jurisdiction lead
to differing results, creating inconsistency and uncertainty when
dealing with contractual parties residing in different states.
To help mitigate this variance, parties will often take two different approaches. Some try to protect against every imaginable catastrophe in the included text, while others take the catch-all approach
with general language, hoping for a generous reading in court.
Which approach is preferable? It depends on the party’s industry
and the region. For example, a housing contractor in Tornado Alley
is much more concerned about defending against tornadoes than a
contractor living on the coast. So, when drafting a contract, the first
contractor will be sure to include defense against tornadoes specifically, rather than some ambiguous line about natural disasters. This
7
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way, the damages are more likely to fall under the scope of force
majeure.
For this reason, contract drafters have the options of including
no force majeure clause, a narrow one, or a broad one. As the following examples show, trained experts still experience difficulties
in determining adequate amounts of risk when drafting industry and
region-specific force majeure clauses.

II. Contracts with No Force Majeure Clause
To avoid the complication inherent with force majeure clauses, some
seek to avoid them entirely. If no force majeure clause is included,
there remains two ways in which the contracting parties may be
excused from their obligations.9 First, the doctrine of “impracticability” relieves a contracting party from carrying out tasks deemed
“impracticable.”10 Nationally, tasks that have been classified as
impracticable are understood to be impossible to carry out or to
complete. The second doctrine that relieves a party from a contract
is “frustration of purpose.” The “frustration of purpose” occurs
when circumstances do not allow for a contract to be carried out due
to unforeseen events.
Leanne Krawchuk, an attorney specializing in mining law,
explains, “the parties should also stipulate the specific [force majeure]
events that they agree neither party should bear the risk of in the context of their particular contract.”11 Of course, the potential pitfalls in
the mining industry are vastly different than the dangers of other
industries. She also explains the need to pay attention to the “specific
circumstances surrounding the contract and its subject matter (such
as the services to be provided, the nature of the product to be
9
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transported, the location of the mining project, the type of equipment and labor used in performing the services).”12 Across a wide
range of industries, firms face a wide range of dangers. A boilerplate
force majeure clause is simply unable to effectively cover all bases.
Mary McCormick, a business attorney at the McCormick international law firm, warns against creating boilerplate force majeure
clauses. She argues that, “A good force majeure clause should be
customized to fit the parties, the industry and type of goods, and the
specific type of contract.”13 Thus, region and industry-specific force
majeure clauses are necessary to account for the individual circumstances of one’s work.

III. Over-specific Force Majeure Clauses
To avoid the problems mentioned in the previous section, it is usually
preferred to include even a standard force majeure clause. Additionally, force majeure provisions should be treated less like shopping
lists of immunity and more like wish lists because simply listing
every imaginable threat does not guarantee protection.14 In some
cases, it may do the opposite. For this reason, listing every possible
danger may result in a catch-22—that is the specific language, while
meant to increase protection, actually narrows the realm of availability. The innate reaction would therefore be to broaden the language as much as possible, but this in and of itself presents its own
set of issues.
One such example is Publicker Industries v. Union Carbide Corp.
Union Carbide Corporation had agreed to sell a specialized type of
ethanol to the plaintiff for a fixed number of years. Within that time,
conflict in the Middle East caused production costs to spike well past
12
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Mary McCormick, Force Majeure Clauses: Buried in Boilerplate But
Important, Martindale (Jun. 15, 2009), https://www.martindale.com/
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that specified in the contract. Notwithstanding the circumstance,
Union Carbide remained locked into the contract, obliged to provide
ethanol at a below-market price. In search of emergency relief, the
Union Carbide invoked protection under the contract’s force majeure
clause, which reads: “Neither party shall be liable for its failure to
perform hereunder if said performance is made impracticable due
to any occurrence beyond its reasonable control, including acts of
God, fires, floods, wars, sabotage, accidents, labor disputes or shortages, governmental laws, ordinances, rules and regulations.”15 They
were hoping to apply the clause specifically under the line “any
occurrence beyond [the parties’] reasonable control.”16 However, the
clause in question then narrows from “any occurrence” to a specific
list of hypotheticals (fires, floods, etc.). This is an example of ejusdem generis, specific language that narrows the broad introductory
language that precedes it.17 Due to this interweaving, the defendant
can no longer claim protection against unlisted events (e.g. price
increases). As a result, the court ruled that Union Carbide could not
find protection in the force majeure clause.18

IV. Overly Broad Force Majeure Clauses
While widening the language may seem optimal, the ambiguity may
actually work to the parties’ disadvantage. For example, it fails to
recognize smaller events that might cause damage to contracting
parties’ contracts. This, again, is due to the fact that broad language
is left to the judge’s interpretation if taken to court.
This can be seen in the case of Perlman vs. Pioneer Ltd. Partnership, where William Perlman (plaintiff), signed an oil and gas
lease agreement with Pioneer Limited Partnership and Kendrick Cattle Company (defendants). The contract contained a force majeure
15
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clause that would excuse Perlman from performance if he was
“prevented or hindered by…inability to obtain governmental
permits.” 19 As Perlman sought to execute the agreement, a Wyoming state commission requested permission to investigate his work.
Instead of complying, Perlman filed for a declaratory judgement to
determine if he could be excused from performance under force
majeure protection, claiming that his work was being hindered by
the government. However, the court found that disruptions from
state regulations were not specifically listed within Perlman’s force
majeure clause. The court ruled that, “Courts should look to the
language that the parties specifically bargained for in the contract
to determine the parties’ intent concerning whether the event complained of excuses performance.”20 Due to the broad nature of the
force majeure clause in question, it was up to the determination of
the judge if new state regulations were sufficient to void the contract.
The court ruled in behalf of the defendants, establishing a statute
stating that courts should not “interject terms that the parties did not
bargain for.”21 Because Perlman did not choose to include state regulations under the force majeure provision, he was denied protection.
Tariffs did not directly affect the Perlman vs. Pioneer Ltd. Partnership, but tariffs have become an increasingly familiar challenge
among modern companies and businesses. Even if Perlman brought
forth force majeure claims under the guise of tariffs, the court would
again rule the same. This being due to the fact that Perlman and Pioneer Ltd. Partnership did not choose to include tariffs as an unforeseen event in their force majeure clause, their contract could not be
void under force majeure provisions. However, under the new precedent, if Perlman had included tariffs in their force majeure clause,
they would have been released from their contract. So, as can be
seen in Perlman, there is simply too much risk to rely on generous
interpretations of open-ended clauses.

19
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V. Proposal
To the untrained eye, the subtle differences between an overly narrow
and an overly broad force majeure clause can be difficult to detect.
Even small differences in language can make a significant difference in a contract’s interpretation. For example, a clause that reads
“included” has vastly different meaning than “included, but not limited to.” In some cases, boilerplate provisions may be sufficient to
mitigate both parties’ risk. In other cases, a customized clause may
be appropriate. Unless a contract drafter is aware of these details, he
or she risks exposure to unexpected liability.
We therefore propose that businesses draft force majeure clauses
with the adequate level of specificity depending on the inherent risk
in a specific industry and the regional issues where the businesses
are located. For many small businesses and inexperienced negotiators, this process may be unclear. We suggest that contract drafters
familiarize themselves with the industry and region-specific language that might be found in similar force majeure contracts. Using
this historical method will allow drafters to assess what should and
should not be included in the final contract. Ultimately, a well-constructed force majeure provision can provide protection against even
the worst of circumstances. In situations between a company’s life
or death, the impact of one force majeure provision cannot be overstated. Our previous examples demonstrate the challenges that even
experienced legal counsel can face when seeking enforcement of
their force majeure clauses.
One alternative solution to this problem is the creation of a standard force majeure provision for universal use in every contract.
Proponents might suggest that this would remove ambiguity in how
much protection a company can expect.22 We disagree, however,
because each contract should represent a unique agreement with
unique region-specific risks. The Lexis Practice Advisor Journal
22
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explains that even a generic force majeure clause, if not drafted carefully, “can leave the parties with fewer protections than they would
have under the law without it.”23As mentioned previously, each state
classifies unforeseeable events differently, so a general “catch-all”
force majeure clause is untenable in practice, due to the varying
interpretations in each jurisdiction. For this reason, we reject proposing standardized force majeure clauses. We also do not suggest
dramatic changes in legislation to force standardization of all force
majeure clauses.

VI. Conclusion
A proper understanding of force majeure clauses gained through historical analysis will allow businesses to apply the necessary specificity to their contracts. By applying too little or too much detail, or
failing to include such a clause at all, businesses may lose protection
against unforeseeable events. However, careful consideration of the
amount of risk that each party is willing to accept make it possible to
determine the level of specificity that each contract requires according to the specific industry and region the party is located. The financial implications could mean the difference between profitability and
bankruptcy.
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The Census, Citizenship, and Improved
Legislation: A Constitutional Compromise
Kaitlyn A. Marquis1
“Taken individually, each step [of government intrusion] may be
of little consequence. But when viewed as a whole, there begins to
emerge a society quite unlike any we have seen—a society in which
government may intrude into the secret regions of man’s life at will.” 2
Justice Douglas [Osborn v. United States]
Why should the census avoid asking a question concerning citizenship? Are there alternatives in providing information to aid government functions while still protecting the rights of residents? In
early 2019, the Trump administration requested that the 2020 census
include an inquiry concerning the citizenship status of residents, for
claimed reasons of better legislation (i.e. the allocation of government funds to the states and the drawing of electoral districts). The
Supreme Court considered this issue in Dept. of Commerce v. New
York. In sum, their opinion was, “not yet.”3 The Supreme Court did
not definitively conclude that it was unconstitutional to inquire about
citizenship. Instead, they determined that the reason provided was
1
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insufficient to justify such an inquiry. Surely there is a better solution that more appropriately fulfills the constitutional demands of
the census, while still satisfying the administration’s claim to certain information.
The decennial census is as old as the Constitution itself, and it
enumerates the purpose of the census: to collect a count for the residents of the United States every ten years. The data collected is used
to help government better meet the needs of residents based on population and region, allocate government funds to the states, and draw
electoral districts. The Constitution gives Congress the authority to
collect statistics through inquiries unrelated to counting residents
can be included if they are lawfully considered as “necessary and
proper for the intelligent exercise of other powers enumerated in the
Constitution.”4 Based on this statement, the intended purpose behind
including an additional inquiry in the census holds more weight than
what the inquiry is. Neither the census nor Congress have claim over
the personal information of residents. A question inquiring about
citizenship tied to individuals and households could have negative
consequences impacting the accuracy of the overall count of people
currently residing in the United States. A question about citizenship
causes the census to fail in its prescribed purpose of acquiring an
accurate count of all residents in the United States. This does not
mean that all government inquiries for certain information are illegal, though it does require that the specific inquiry meets the legal
standards which prioritizes the privacy and security of all United
States residents. Additionally, it shows that specific means by which
the government acquires information are more appropriate than other
potential processes. A government-issued survey, separate from the
decennial census (similar to the American Community Survey, discussed below), collects data anonymously and reports it by region
for the true purpose of better-suited legislation and improved appropriations. This solution is both legal and appropriate, and it does not
interfere with the constitutional purpose of the census.
4

U.S. Census Bureau, Census in the Constitution, https://www.census.gov/
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The summer of 2019 was filled with dialogue about ICE raids,
comparisons between immigration centers and concentration camps,
and few legislative solutions. Many immigrants—both documented
and undocumented—fear deportation and would rather live a life
under the radar than a life returning to the circumstances from
which they fled. The individuals impacted by these raids are the
same individuals that would likely abstain from the census, even if
they are naturalized or legally residing in the United States. Even
though the Census Bureau cannot legally share one’s citizenship status for the purpose of enforcing deportation, the ambiguity behind
why an inquiry of citizenship is necessary continues to strike fear
in the hearts of both documented and undocumented United States
residents. Government certainly has a responsibility to protect
citizens, but there is also a line between what is appropriate legal
enforcement and what is unnecessary and invasive questioning of
individuals. This article offers reasons arguing why the government
should refrain from including a citizenship question on the census.
It prescribes a solution, based on historical and legal evidence, that
satisfies the demands and claims of the Trump administration for
government access to certain information from residents.

I. Background
A historical background of the census, including previous questions
that have appeared on the census, provides context as to why the
census appears as it does today. Additional context is given by explanations about the processes of other government surveys, such as the
American Community Survey, and both the long form and short form
of the decennial census.  This background information includes concerns from states that would suffer greater consequences relating to
a high volume of immigrants, as well as background information for
how the census influences legislation and the legislative processes
that follow the census.
As previously mentioned, an inquiry concerning citizenship
has appeared on the census in previous decades. Censuses between
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1820 and 1830 all featured questions regarding naturalization.5 After
1950, the census was administered in two forms, a long form and a
short form, with only the long form including any questions relating
to citizenship.6 In 2010, the long from was replaced by the American
Community Survey, and the actual census was administered only
in one form consisting of ten questions.7 The census has evolved
through each presidential administration in conjunction to the
changing needs and progression of society. These adjustments are
not justified by a presidential administration’s agenda. Many inquiries and methods used to gather information from the 1800s are irrelevant and would be considered inappropriate today. For example,
enumerators used to go door to door to collect census information.
It was the enumerators who would determine one’s race based on
physical appearance and skin color, rather than actual nationality.8
Just because a method was used in the past does not classify it as
an effective, accurate, or ethical practice. Likewise, many of today’s
needs are not reflected in census questionnaires of the past. It is
essential that the census questionnaire and the methods by which
information is collected evolve and improve over time, in order to
best meet the intended purpose of the census.
Some may argue that there is no reason to separate the citizenship question from the census, as it has previously been included
while the census still fulfilled its purpose. The facts suggest that
historical precedent is not reason enough for something to remain
in effect. The purpose of an adaptable government is to improve and
reform government functions as needed. If the government could not
evolve, no amendments would exist, and blatantly harmful statutes
would still be in law. Thus, the issue at stake is not whether citizenship
can permissibly appear on the census, but rather, whether including
5
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a citizenship question on the census is an improvement. Including
a question about citizenship on the decennial census could have the
side effects of causing a misrepresentation of actual population.9 Mentioning citizenship would “invariably lead to a lower response rate,”10
and the census would fail to fulfill its prescribed purpose.
Misrepresentation is unduly problematic for states with large
immigrant populations, such as California and Texas. Because the
government relies heavily on census data to allocate state funding,
a population undercount in states with a large immigrant population
feasibly leads to under-funding and misappropriation of funding.
There would be less money to support public schools, community
maintenance, and construction projects, which would negatively
affect both citizens and non-citizens alike.
Another concern for those in favor of including the citizenship
question on the census is that the states with large undocumented
immigrant populations would unfairly receive additional Representatives. However, this argument is convincingly refuted by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.11 Under this amendment, the controversial interpretation of the principal “one person, one vote” was ruled to mean that the
total population, not just total voting-eligible population, can be used
to draw electoral districts.12 Nonetheless, it would be constitutional
for the United States government to distribute and require residents
to participate anonymously in a survey for the purpose of gathering data when government-requested inquiries are not appropriate
to include on the census. This is justified so long as the information
is assessed by region rather than household. The Equal Protection
Clause additionally declares that states can “more accurately” draw
their own legislative districts to better reflect the ratio of the actual
9

Evenwel v. Abbott, S. Ct. Docket No. 14-940, 4 (filed September 25,
2015).
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voting population if they so choose.13 Anonymous surveys would
aid in this process for states that are especially concerned about
having a more precise representation of eligible voters in their own
electoral district.
The culmination of the facts supports the idea that the census
should strictly follow constitutional restrictions, as well as strong
support for the legality of an anonymous, regionally-reported survey
for the purpose of satisfying government demands to better legislate
and appropriate. Although there is no blatant violation of the Constitution by inclusion of a citizenship question, the purpose of the
census calls for no additional inquiries beyond that of enumeration.
This article explores the legal precedent surrounding the United
States Census as well as specific doctrines concerning a right to
privacy and a compromise between government demands for information and the protection of citizens. The Constitution states that,
“the actual Enumeration shall be made . . . within every subsequent
Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct.”14
The implications following this constitutional doctrine display few
guidelines as to how far the scope of the census may reach. The
support of additional legal doctrines, such as the right to privacy,
lead to the conclusion that the census does not extend to infringe
upon personal rights of any person in the United States. The Fourteenth Amendment directs that “no state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”15 This last
inclusion, “nor to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws” guarantees equal protection to all persons
within the United States. The constitutional guidelines surrounding the census as well as the right to privacy as stated in the Fourteenth Amendment support each other in a way such that a question
13
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concerning citizenship both diverges from the constitutional purpose
of the census and violates the right to privacy granted to all people.

II. Proof of Claim
The word “privacy” is never explicitly stated in the United States
Constitution, yet by judicial review it is now a legal standard and a
right protected under United States’ law. The right to privacy was
first legally used by the Supreme Court in support of an opinion
in 1965. The case of Griswold v. Connecticut16 introduces the right
to privacy by protecting the right to make personal decisions. Citing Poe v. Ullman, Justice Goldberg concurs in Griswold v. Connecticut with the opinion of the court, stating, the right of privacy is
a fundamental personal right, “[emanating] from the totality of the
constitutional scheme under which we live.”17 Based on the First,
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments there is an implicit right to
privacy. The wording of these amendments as found in the Constitution implies that these protections apply to all “persons,” and not
just “citizens.” Thus, a right to privacy is granted and protected by
law to all persons under the jurisdiction of United States law. The
Fifth Amendment creates “a zone of privacy which government may
not force him to surrender to his detriment.”18 Surely, governmental
force that could potentially result in a violation of rights upon which
an individual or family has built a world can be considered a “surrender to his detriment,” and a violation of “the sanctity of a man’s
home and the privacies of life.”19 Whalen v. Roe20 expands the scope
to which the right to privacy applies by reaffirming the right to not
disclose personal information. While these cases are based on questions of medical relevance, the principles behind a right to privacy
do not change.
16
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In Snyder v. Massachusetts the opinion of the court reaffirmed
judicial authority in the claim that protection of rights “rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people [is] to be ranked
fundamental.”21 The conscience of the people today affirms that fundamental rights include protection and security within one’s home,
and a decennial violation of those personal privacies is not something
that would improve society, regardless of whether or not it is constitutional. The Freedom of Information Act22 and FOIA Improvement
Act of 201623 provide clarification in regard to regulations the Census
Bureau must follow in order to protect these rights.
In defending the proposal to include a citizenship inquiry on
the 2020 Census, the Trump administration claimed: “It is essential
that we have a clear breakdown of the number of citizens and noncitizens that make up the U.S. populations. Imperative. Knowing
this information is vital to formulating sound public policy, whether
the issue is healthcare, education, civil rights, or immigration.”24
While there was great rhetorical weight given to the necessity of this
information, there were not sufficient substantive claims made in
support of this “imperative” need. Claiming a need is not the same
as giving reasons for a need, and this claim by the Trump administration is therefore incomplete and fails to meet the legal standard.
The Supreme Court determined that a question regarding citizenship
on the census was not inherently in violation of the constitutional
sphere of the census,25 but reasonable justification for including the
question is still required. Regardless of both the potential and historical legality to include an inquiry of citizenship on the census,
the Trump administration’s inability to provide proper justification
21
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for such a question is what ultimately resulted in the denial of their
request. The proclaimed motives behind the inclusion of a citizenship question could still be met by introduction of a survey that
follows proper conditions. Thus, by protecting all persons’ right to
privacy and in being separate from the census, the constitutional
design of the census is protected from potential future corruption in
any administration. If the intentions of including the question are as
stated, the proposed survey satisfies the demands of the executive for
maximizing administrating the law, while still protecting a citizen’s
right to privacy and right to not disclose personal information.
Introduction of an additional government-administered survey
that follows these regulations is not beyond constitutional limits, so
long as this survey remains separate from any official census processes. If the government feels certain information is necessary, relevant, and helpful for the performance of prescribed duties, then a
survey administered in addition to, but separate from, the decennial
census is appropriate under certain restrictions. In order to protect a
citizen’s right to privacy as previously mentioned, the survey must
be anonymous. Respondents will not have to provide any personal
information, and all that is required is an anonymous response to
the approved questions. Questions asked are not to infringe upon the
privacy of any respondent and must be justified and relevant to the
listed purposes of the survey. In addition to these requirements, the
reporting of the survey must follow a regional pattern, rather than
reporting following household jurisdiction. By separating these two
questionnaires, resident’s right to privacy is protected while the government is still able to reach the desired goal of meeting the needs
of residents.
With the introduction of a new government survey, multiple
potential concerns arise. Some critiques may protest that the supplemental survey is a violation of privacy. Arguments asserting that
privacy is violated through this action are refuted by the restrictions
the government must follow in administration of the survey. Both
the anonymity and regional reporting required in administration and
reporting of the census protect respondents’ information and right to
privacy, as defined by the Supreme Court.
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In addition to violations of privacy, concerns about the incentive for honest and accurate responses may develop. Just because
something is a law—such as following the speed limit, or a civic
duty, such as voting—does not mean that people will comply to the
government’s ideals. Many arguments against including citizenship
questions on the census follow the logic that respondents may feel
the need to respond dishonestly in order to protect themselves and
their families. If this is an issue for the census, how could different
consequences be expected of another government-issued questionnaire? Furthermore, what would motivate one to respond in the first
place? This issue is not new or unique. It is fairly common for noncompliance by citizens to cause government programs or intentions
to fall short. Because regulation is difficult with national programs,
noncompliance and free riding lead to said programs having results
that differ from the intended ideal. When citizens do not comply with
the directions that are imposed in order to foster ideal functioning of
programs and resources, the potential and purpose of the programs
cannot be met. A government-regulated and administered survey is
no exception to this pattern. While there is no perfect solution, common methods of incentivization, such as monetary rewards and other
government-provided benefits, would increase, though not guarantee, a stronger response rate. In addition to incentives, emphasizing
the purpose and protection behind the questionnaire would motivate
individuals to respond as they understand that results of the survey
are for the ultimate purpose of creating better-suited legislation on
a more localized, regional level. Additionally, granting protection
guarantees—and articulating said guarantees—to all respondents is
a necessary component to the success of the survey. If protections
of respondents are not made clear, response rates will fail to reflect
the surveyed population and the entire purpose of the survey would
not be satisfied. Mentioning literal and realistic outcomes such as
increased funding for city parks, school programs, and infrastructure motivate voters to vote, so similar tactics that create a positive air surrounding the survey would ensure higher and accurate
response rates.
Restrictions placed on the government in creating, distributing, and reporting the survey protect the rights of both citizens and
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residents of the United States, while the administration of the survey still satisfies the claims of the government to gain “imperative”
information for legislative purposes. No new legislation is required
to guarantee protection of respondents’ rights, since adequate protection is already offered under the law.
Most arguments against this prescription for a new survey will
use the right to privacy argument. The right to privacy is not violated
through introduction of this survey. So long as set guidelines are followed, right to privacy is protected and there is no reason for which
a respondent should fear their personal information is not protected
or that their right to privacy is violated.
Arguments may also be made questioning why these two questionnaires are not coupled together for purposes of simpler distribution. The census and the survey could still follow the set legal
guidelines, and the census maintains its strict constitutional purpose
of a decennial enumeration, and the survey comes with it and is still
returned anonymously and reported by region. While this is possible, it defeats the purpose of maintaining strict adherence to constitutional prescriptions for the census. Additionally, when practical
considerations are made for how these two questionnaires would
realistically be returned, the census is distributed and reported by
household and the protections granted in the survey following anonymous and regional restrictions would be weakened.
Aside from practical success of the survey, a much more fundamental question must be addressed: is fostering trust between
government and residents even a requirement of a successful government? That depends on what the ideal government looks like
according to the people under the jurisdiction of the government in
question. While this is a more normative consideration, it is relevant
and necessary to consider in order to guarantee the validity behind
a requirement imposed upon the people by the government. Trust
between a government and its people is not considered necessary
to obtain success for countless regimes throughout the world. In the
United States, this is not the case. Instilling an un-revocable level of
both protection and amiability between the government and its people are the fundamental ideas upon which this country was founded
and built, that ought to be reflected by every government institution.
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Again, the issue is not whether there is protection of privacy in
the census, but whether a citizenship question is relevant to the purpose of the census. The simple answer is that there is no relevance
between a citizenship question and the enumeration of a population.
Additionally, the Census Bureau is limited by the law that protects
privacy, including personal information.
There is an additional argument claiming that the census precedes budget legislation and funding bills appropriately. Similar to
the previously discussed arguments, this interest is irrelevant to the
question at hand. A question on citizenship should have no impact
on the distribution of funds, and excluding such a question would
improve response rates. Offering a more accurate report and analysis
of a population will allow appropriation processes to more appropriately meet the needs of communities nationwide.
Introducing a survey in order to support the strict constitutional
regulations of the census also introduces additional costs, including the literal monetary cost of producing, distributing, and analyzing the survey. Beyond the costs of the government are the costs
to the respondents, which include the additional time and effort of
responding to more government inquiries. The benefits outweigh
these real costs, as the result of response is appropriate government
aid and benefits.

III. Conclusion
The Trump administration and Department of Justice have made
claims about the necessity and relevance of including a citizenship question on the census, but even the arguments made by top
Census Department of Officials in the nation were not sufficient to
justify such inclusion.26 Because “the Census Act obliges everyone
to answer census questions truthfully and requires the Secretary to
keep individual answers confidential, including from other Government agencies,”27 exporting data concerning citizenship would be
illegal. If the Supreme Court cannot be convinced by the arguments
26
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that the Department of Commerce has to offer, there is no reasonable
argument that is reason enough to include the citizenship question
on the census.
A question about citizenship has little to no relevance to the
purpose of the census and including it will have the side effects of
misrepresentation and potential violation of right to privacy. The
administration claims a need to know citizenship, and there exists an
institutionalized constitutional method for obtaining that information that appears to be an opportune means by which to obtain that
end. Regardless, solutions are ideal when they support the fundamental values of society, as well as the protection of rights and defense
of the Constitution. This is only attainable if the bounds to which the
Constitution reaches are not stretched. The basic idea that the census
and inquiries concerning citizenship ought to be kept separate is a
much more complex issue when given more consideration. There are
major implications following whichever course of conduct is pursued. The issue of right to privacy is one more broadly discussed
in cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut,28 Whalen v. Roe,29 Roe v.
Wade,30 and other major cases that establish protection of personal
liberties concerning privacy. This right to privacy protects resident’s
rights and personal information from unduly intrusive inquiries.
A broader consideration of the issue strengthens the fundamental rights that need protection such as privacy rights and information
protection. The consequences of including the question satisfies the
demands of the Trump administration but fails to remain loyal to
the census in its constitutional purpose. By separating the questionnaires, the issues with including a citizenship question are wholly
avoided, and by introducing a survey, the demands of the administration are met without potential violation of constitutional guidelines. This solution preserves the integrity of the Constitution and
protects residents’ rights, while still allowing government processes
that ultimately maximize public benefits.
28

Griswold v. Connecticut, supra note 16.

29

Whalen v. Roe, supra note 20.

30

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

Eliminating Mandatory Minimum Sentences:
Putting Sentencing Power Back in the Hands of
the Judiciary
Hunter Anderson,1 Joseph Dummar2
Ron Miller had been a general manager of a company for twentyfour years with no criminal record when his best friend asked
him to allow a shipment of drugs to be delivered to his company’s
address. Ron reluctantly agreed to help his friend, who was desperate for money. Before the drugs arrived, Ron backed out and asked
his friend not to send the drugs, but by that point the shipment had
already been made. The police tracked the shipment to Ron and
arrested him. Even though Ron never knew the type nor the quantity of drug that was delivered to his company, the judge of Ron’s
trial was required to base Ron’s sentence on mandatory minimum
sentencing laws. Ron was unable to trade information for a lesser
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sentence because he played such a small role in the crime and he
received a ten-year prison sentence.3
The sentencing judge stated the mandatory sentence had created
a “vicious circle” because small crime players, like Ron, were getting long sentences, without any information to trade for a lower sentence because of his minor involvement.4 Thousands of people with
no criminal record and minimal involvement in drug crimes have
been sentenced to extensive time in prison without chance of parole
under mandatory sentencing laws.5 This paper will discuss the history and consequences of mandatory minimum sentences (MMS),
specifically in the realm of non-violent drug offenses. We will discuss the inefficiencies that result from MMS and suggest reform to
addresses these shortcomings.

I. Background
Since their inception, the legislature has often used mandatory minimum sentences as a decisive tool to quell public fear. Congress first
instituted MMS in 17906 in response to the national crisis of piracy.
The second round of federal MMS laws came during the Civil War,
when Congress passed legislation requiring all Confederate spies to
be killed upon conviction.7 It wasn’t until the turn of the 20th century,
that a commission suggested the elimination of most MMS laws and
3
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many were repealed.8 During the 1900s, drug abuse became more
prominent, and widespread outcry grew. Although they had been
inefficient in the past, Congress once again turned to MMS laws in
response to public fears. In 1951 and 1970, legislation was passed
that required certain drug crimes to carry mandatory sentences.9
In 1975, a bill was introduced that would authorize the creation
of a commission purposed with creating sentencing guidelines for
judges. Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act as part of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act (1984), which created the United
States Sentencing Commission (USSC).10 The USSC established
federal sentencing guidelines that take into consideration factors
relating “both to the subjective guilt of the defendant and to the harm
caused by his facts.”11 The USSC cited sentencing disparity, lack
of certainty of punishment and crime control as the judicial shortcomings which merited the creation of the sentencing guidelines.12
Although the guidelines are not strictly mandatory, judges are
required to consider them when issuing sentences. If a judge decides
to increase or decrease the sentence from what the guidelines suggest, they must state in open court what “aggravating or mitigating
circumstances” warranted the departure.13

8
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The creation of the USSC and implementation of federal sentencing guidelines did not solve the growing drug abuse problem.14
In the 1980s, many still feared that drug abuse could affect their
homes, schools, and communities.15 The country was shocked when
Len Bias died from a cocaine overdose in the summer of 1986, only
two days after being drafted by the Boston Celtics.16 Congress, facing immense pressure to address the public fear of drug abuse, acted
as they had in the past and quickly enacted strict legislation.17 While
a typical bill takes one to two years to become law from the time it is
introduced,18 the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 became law just five
months after the death of Bias.19 Years after its passage, the principal
drafting attorney of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act expressed his regret

14
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for being involved in the hasty process, and claimed that the bill
”had been the worst legislation [he’d] ever been involved with.”20
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act created MMS based on drug type and
quantity. An individual convicted of trafficking 100 grams or more
of heroin would face a minimum sentence of five years.21 The trafficking of one kilo or more of heroin would increase the sentence to
a minimum of ten-years.22 The minimum sentences are enhanced if
the trafficker had prior drug felony convictions, or if death or serious
injury resulted from the drug offense.23 Other minimum sentences
were created for crimes involving powder cocaine, crack cocaine,
marijuana, and other drugs.
The safety valve provision was created to allow certain first-time
drug offenders to be exempted from extreme MMS. Individuals who
meet specific criteria may qualify for a sentence below the statutory
minimum. The defendant must have no or a limited criminal history,
the crime must be non-violent, the crime must not result in death
or serious bodily injury, the defendant must not be an organizer in
the offense, and the defendant must cooperate by truthfully providing all known information concerning the crime.24 Although there
are many first-time offenders charged with drug offenses that carry
MMS, very few are eligible for a reduced sentence. In 2015, only
13% of drug offenders qualified for the safety valve provision.25
Near the beginning of the 21st century, critics began to speak in
opposition to MMS. A law professor said: “the weight of the evidence
20

Mary-Jayne McKay, More Than They Deserve Judges Protest Mandatory
Sentencing In Drug Cases, 60 Minuets (Feb. 27, 2020, 1:10 AM), https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/more-than-they-deserve/.

21

Mandatory Minimum Sentencing of Federal Drug Offenses, Every CRS
Report, (Jan. 28, 2020, 6:26pm), https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/
R45074.html#_Ref503372497.
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Federal Sentencing Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1987).
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Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Safety Valves, Families Against
Mandatory Minimums (Feb. 27, 2020, 7:39 PM), https://famm.org/ourwork/u-s-congress/safety-valves/.
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clearly shows that enactment of mandatory penalties has either no
demonstrable marginal deterrent effects or short-term effects that
rapidly waste away.”26 Others that spoke against MMS postulated
that they removed discretionary power from the hands of judges
and created a proportionality disparity between the offender and the
sentence, resulting in low-level offenders often receiving extremely
harsh sentences.27 It wasn’t until 2010 that Congress responded by
passing considerable reformative legislation. The Fair Sentencing
Act made significant changes to MMS.28 The penalty for simple possession of crack cocaine was repealed, and the crack cocaine quantity threshold for five and ten-year MMS was increased. From 1993
to 2013, over 60% of drug offenders were convicted of an offense
carrying a MMS. In 2014, the percentage began to drop. In 2016,
it had fallen to 46.8%.29 It is unclear if the decrease in convictions
carrying MMS can be completely explained by the Fair Sentencing
Act, although the increased quantity thresholds certainly resulted in
a reduction of the federal prison population.30
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Michael Tonry, Mandatory Penalties, in 243, The University of Chicago
Press Journals, (1992).
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Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Mandatory sentencing was once
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Impact of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, The United States Sentencing
Commission (Feb. 27, 2020, 8:10 PM), https://www.ussc.gov/research/
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The First Step Act (2019) is the most recent piece of legislation
that reformed MMS.31 It primarily focused on improving prison
conditions for inmates, increasing their ability to earn time towards
an early release for good behavior, and expanding the safety valve
provision, potentially allowing for more low-level drug offenders to receive reduced sentences. Some MMS were also shortened.
For example, conviction of a felony drug offense that used to carry
a 20-year minimum sentence was reduced to 15 years.32 It additionally created new programs that seek to rehabilitate offenders
through means other than imprisonment.33 In the summer of 2019,
the Department of Justice announced that 3,100 inmates would be
released and 1,691 sentences had been reduced due to the First Step
Act.34 Currently, there is not adequate data available to measure the
extent to which the First Step Act is affecting current prisoners and
new drug offenders. Nonetheless, this reform marks a large step in
the right direction.
The scope of this paper is limited to discussing the MMS laws
for non-violent drug crimes. The remainder of the paper details the
inefficiencies and faults created by the loss of judicial discretion. We
argue that MMS involving drug offenses should be eliminated. We
will show that eliminating them will restore discretionary power to
31

The United States Sentencing Commision, History of Mandatory Minimum Penalties And Statutory Relief Mechanisms, 18 (Feb. 27, 2020),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Chapter_02.pdf.

32

United States Sentencing Commission, First Step Act Signed Into
Law, 2, (2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/
newsletters/2019-special_FIRST-STEP-Act.pdf.
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the judiciary when sentencing. We propose a course of action for the
reformation of the federal sentencing guidelines. Judges will take these
non-binding guidelines into account when determining sentences.

II. Restoring Judicial Discretionary Power
Current reform has not been enough to resolve the problems created by the Anti-Drug Act. MMS restrict judges from exercising
judicial discretion. After defining judicial discretion, the myriad
of resulting problems will be discussed, including sentencing disparity and unduly harsh punishments, the unintentional transfer of
discretionary power from judges to prosecutors, and the damaging
effects of MMS on the US federal prison system. Notwithstanding the arguments that advocates cite to justify MMS, in the case
of non-violent drug offenses, the costs far outweigh the benefits.
Decisions on sentencing should be made by judges and not by legislators or prosecutors.
A. Judicial Discretion
The first substantial effect of MMS that we will address is the loss
of judicial discretion. The other shortcomings and problems that
will be discussed would be resolved by restoring the judiciary’s discretionary power. Judicial discretion is defined as “a judge’s power
to make decisions based on fairness or a weighing of the facts and
circumstances.”35 In other words, judges are able to give more personalized rulings by taking into consideration all available information. It must be well understood what the limits of judicial discretion
are. Chief Justice John Marshall said, “Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge, always
for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the legislature; or, in
other words, to the will of the law.”36 Judges do not have the power
35

Judicial Discretion, Cornell Law School, (Feb. 21, 2020, 11:16 PM),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/judicial_discretion.

36

Thomas A. Zonay, Judicial Discretion: Ten Guidelines for Its Use, The
National Judicial College (Feb. 27, 2020, 8:27 PM), https://www.judges.
org/judicial-discretion-ten-guidelines-for-its-use/.
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to choose to disregard the law, but rather ensure that it is effected
properly.
The practicality of discretion is illustrated by the following
example of a mother with two sons. One is very extroverted and
loves to spend time with his friends. The other child is introverted and
prefers to spend his free time watching TV. Both children skip class,
and the mother finds out. Because the mother knows her children
well, she is aware of the most effective approach to punishing them.
She may restrict her extroverted child from seeing his friends and
keep her introverted child from using the television. A third party, who
does not know the individual children, might suggest that the mother
use the same punishment for both children. Because they are so different, using the same punishment would not effectively discipline
both children. This simple example shows the vital role discretionary power plays when applying punishments to unique individuals.
In the example of the mother, her discretion was used to decide
the best punishment for her children. In our legal system, judicial
discretion is used both in sentencing and interpreting the law. The
degree to which judicial discretion may be exercised when interpreting a law is dependent on the specificity of the relevant statute. Laws
that are strict and narrow leave little room for a judge’s interpretation. Conversely, broad laws that simply prohibit unsafe behavior,
without making further specifications on what practices constitute
unsafe conduct, leave it to the judiciary to determine what actions
are considered breaking the law. For instance, a law that simply
stipulates safe driving gives little to no direction to judges in how
to interpret the law. However, if multiple judges begin to rule that
texting and driving is unsafe, a legal precedent will be established.
The precedent grows stronger or more binding as more judges rule
similarly. Because the judiciary aims for a standard of consistency,
a judge is unlikely to rule in contrary to a precedent that has already
been established by many judges.37
The legislature will often pass clear and specific laws to preserve consistency in the legal system. By doing so, they establish a
37

ISU Law School, The Importance of Precedent, ISU (Mar. 3, 2020, 8:52
PM), https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/map/TheImportanceofPrecedent.html.

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 34, 2020

122

binding precedent to which the judiciary must adhere. Historically,
the legislation defining drug offenses has been quite strict; this was
true even before Congress passed the Anti-Drug Act. There was
not much room for judges to use their discretion when determining
whether or not a certain action was a drug crime.38 However, judges
were still able to exercise their discretion when issuing sentences for
drug offenses before the implementation of MMS.39
B. Sentencing Disparity
By establishing mandatory minimum sentences for non-violent drug
crimes, Congress established control over a significant part of the
judicial process and took away the judiciary’s ability to exercise discretion when sentencing.40 Advocates of MMS argue that one reason
Congress passed the Anti-Drug Act was to eliminate sentencing disparity.41 The principle of sentencing disparity is illustrated by the following example. If all judges punished the criminal offense of arson
with five years in prison, a strong precedent would exist. It would
become common knowledge that anyone convicted of arson would
receive a five-year sentence. However, sentencing disparity would
exist if some judges began to sentence differently for the same crime
of arson. These different sentences could include a ten-year penalty in some instances or a one-year penalty in others. Sentencing
38
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disparity weakens or even eliminates whatever sentencing precedent
may exist. There are many reasons why a judge may use their discretion to order a sentence for an individual that isn’t commensurate
with the precedent. A judge‘s sentence might be influenced by their
own personal belief. Aggravated or mitigated sentences could also
be the result of the characteristics of the offender, such as the presence or lack of a criminal record, age, race, education, etc.
Sentencing disparity often carries a negative connotation. It has
been defined as “unequal treatment [in criminal punishment] that is
often of unexplained cause and is at least incongruous, unfair and
disadvantaging in consequence.”42 Critics of sentencing disparity
claim that it weakens the legal system by creating inconsistency in
how the law is enforced.43 If the public believes judges are taking
advantage of discretionary power, courts may become distrusted and
disrespected.44 Judges may be accused of racism if whites and blacks
receive different sentences after committing the same crime.45 Other
critics point out that judges could misuse their discretion to practically
let some people off the hook for crimes46 while severely punishing
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Volume II, 1983.
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others. 47 Before the Anti-Drug Act was passed, sentencing disparity
in non-violent drug offenses was prominent. By establishing MMS,
the legislature addressed these concerns by reducing sentence disparity from 16% to 8% through the restriction of judicial discretion.48
However, it should be remembered that federal judges are
appointed and voted on before they take office. They are individuals
that have considerable legal experience and are trusted by a majority
of government officials to oversee that the law is appropriately realized. Like other government officials, judges are subject to removal
of office for abusing their power and office. They are not left free to
act however they please. Historically, only fifteen federal judges have
been impeached, and even fewer have been convicted and removed
from office. The reasons for impeachment included bribery, perjury,
intoxication on the bench, and, in two instances, favoritism towards
litigants.49 Although action to remove federal judges is extremely
rare, the existence of a removal process keeps judges accountable to
their oath to interpret the law to the best of their ability.
The implementation of MMS reduced sentencing disparity as
defined before. However, this was achieved at a significant cost:
judges could no longer consider disparities between individual
offenders. This often resulted in the imposition of overly harsh sentences. The stories of Johnny Patillo, Kemba Smith, and Brenda
Valencia illustrate this principle. Johnny Patillo was a 27-year-old
47
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African-American. He had obtained a college education and worked
a steady job. In 1992, he accepted a neighbor’s offer of $500 to deliver
a package containing illegal drugs to Texas. Patillo had no record
of prior criminal activity. The package which Patillo attempted to
deliver contained 681 grams of crack cocaine, which resulted in a
minimum sentence of ten-years without the possibility of parole.50
The sentencing judge called attention to the overwhelming effect
that the type of drug had on the sentence, stating “If the package contained a different narcotic, or a lesser quantity of the same substance,
[the] defendant might have been sentenced to straight probation.”51
While the crime of drug trafficking cannot go unpunished, a tenyear prison sentence for a first-time offender who was minimally
involved is excessive.52
The outcome of Patillo’s trial was not unique. Another individual similarly affected was Kemba Smith. At the age of 19, she fell
in love with Peter Hall, who was eight years older than Smith. After
moving in with Hall, Smith discovered he was an abusive partner.
Unbeknownst to Smith, he was also the leader of a multi-million
crack cocaine ring and was one of the FBI’s 15 most wanted. Smith
50
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made several attempts to leave Hall due to his physical and emotional abuse, but they were all unsuccessful.53 Later, Hall was found
murdered. The courts held Smith accountable for the total amount of
the drugs in his conspiracy charge. Smith testified before the Inter
American Commission on Human Rights in 2006 that, “I did not
traffic in drugs, but I knew my boyfriend did. I knew while living
with him that he did not have a job and we were living off of the
proceeds of his drug crimes. I never claimed total innocence and
this is the reason why I pled guilty.”54 Smith was sentenced to 24
years in prison. The fact that she only delivered the money to Hall’s
associates out of fear of her life, that she was a first-time offender,
that her relationship was abusive, or that she was being charged with
a non-violent crime did not matter. Similarly, Brenda Valencia’s life
was forever changed by MMS. When she was 19-years-old, Valencia drove her roommate’s stepmom to West Palm Beach to pick up
money from a cocaine dealer. The police raided the exchange, and
Brenda was taken into custody with the actual drug dealers.55 Brenda
had no previous record of breaking the law. She was charged with
cocaine conspiracy and received a sentence of 12 years and 7 months
in prison. This sentence is twice as many years as she would have
received if she had been convicted of manslaughter.56
J. Spencer Letts57 declared “Statutory mandatory minimum sentences create injustice because the sentence is determined without

53
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looking at the particular defendant.”58 If MMS were nonexistent,
Judge Letts would have been able to give the sentence that best fit
the defendant based on all the facts and circumstances. In the case
of Johnny Patillo, the sentence could have reflected the fact that he
had no criminal record, was a college graduate, and held a job. Letts

58
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and many other judges59 claim that MMS strip them of their power
to correctly apply the law to unique individuals and situations. The
presiding judge in any given case will hear many facts that pertain
not only to the crime that was committed but also pertaining to the
defendant. Judges have a significant opportunity to better understand
the character, upbringing, and motives of the offender. Clearly, the presiding judge has an advantage in prescribing the correct punishment to
59

Lori Atherton, Federal Judge, Former US Attorney Discuss Mandatory
Minimum Sentences at Michigan Law, Michigan Law (Feb. 22, 2020,
12:49 AM), https://www.law.umich.edu/newsandinfo/features/Pages/Federal-Judge-Former-U.S.-Attorney-Discuss-Mandatory-Minimum-Sentences-at-Michigan-Law_112618.aspx. (‘The most sacred quality that judges
guard most is discretion, which is choice. Mandatory minimums take that
choice away from a judge. You’re obligated to follow the statute, and if
you don’t follow the statute, your decision is going to go to the court of
appeals and get reversed. And judges don’t like to have their decisions reversed.’ Avern Cohn, US District Judge); Rachel Martin, A Federal Judge
Says Mandatory Minimum Sentences Often Don’t Fit The Crime, NPR
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sometimes life mandatory minimum sentences. I think that’s a travesty.‘
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have gone to prison for as long as they did... I think it’s bad policy to take
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the offender. Regardless, the prison time is determined by a group of
congressmen who will never meet the individual defendants nor hear
the distinct circumstances accompanying each case.
Patillo, Smith, and Valencia are just a few of the thousands of
people that have suffered many years in prison for their minimum
involvement in a non-violent drug offense.60 None of these aforementioned defendants had a criminal record. We would expect the
safety valve provision to have applied in each of these cases. Instead,
the defendant’s complete lack of a criminal history in no way
decreased their sentence, illustrating how impersonal mandatory
minimum sentencing laws have made the judicial system. punishments. Although it has been expanded,61 the safety valve provision
is simply not efficient in ensuring low-level offenders are exempted
from long, harsh punishments.62 Only completely repealing MMS
will protect people like Patillo, Smith, and Valencia from spending
years in prison.
Under MMS, judges are unable to consider disparities between
different drug offenders and are forced at times to give the same sentence to first-time offenders and hardened drug dealers alike.63 Furthermore, one of the only reasons a judge can mitigate a MMS is if the
offender cooperates by trading information or aiding in the arrest of
60
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a different individual. Low-level offenders, such as Ron Miller, often
do not have information to trade because they are barely involved.
This results in dealers and high-level offenders often because they
trade information for a lower sentence. A judicial system that may
result in a first-time offender spending a decade or more in prison
while drug kingpins barely see time behind bars is seriously flawed.
Once the drug type and quantity have been identified, the “correct” sentence could be given by any person who can read a chart,
and there no longer exists a need for a judge. This impersonality in
sentencing can lead to excessive amounts of time spent in prison,
particularly for first time offenders. The elimination of MMS is necessary to empower the judiciary to punish criminals while ensuring
the sentence is appropriate for the individual offender.
C. Prosecutorial Discretion
An unintended consequence of mandatory minimum sentences was
the transition of discretionary power from judges to prosecutors.64
The judicial branch was designed to be impartial and unbiased,
ensuring fair trials and a proper interpretation of the law. Conversely, prosecutors have every incentive to see defendants found
guilty and sentenced to serve time in prison. By restricting a judge’s
ability to use discretion in sentencing, their role in a criminal trial
is limited to determining what evidence the jury may hear by ruling
on objections, and sentencing after the jury has ruled. On the other
hand, prosecutors exercise their discretion throughout the proceedings of a criminal trial, including the decision of what charges are
pressed against the defendant. It is true that judicial discretion is not
entirely impartial or unbiased. Similarly, prosecutorial discretion is
not without its own faults. In the late 1970s, a law professor claimed
that prosecutorial discretion is “commonly exercised for the purpose
of obtaining convictions in cases in which guilt could not be proven
at trial,” “usually exercised by people of less experience and less
64
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objectivity than judges,” and “commonly exercised on the basis of
less information than judges possess.”65
The following example exhibits prosecutorial discretion in
action. A man is arrested and charged for two different drug offenses,
respectively carrying a ten and twenty-year MMS. A prosecutor
might cut a deal with the defendant, offering to drop the charges on
the offense carrying a twenty year sentence on the condition that he
plead guilty on the charge carrying a ten-year sentence. If the defendant accepts the deal and pleads guilty the first offense, he will be
sentenced to ten-years in prison without being judged by a jury of
their peers. Because the average sentence for a federal drug defendant who pleads guilty is five years and four months, while defendants that go to trial receive an average sentence of 16 years,66 many
defendants feel they cannot afford the risk of taking their case to
trial. Prosecutors are extremely proficient at obtaining guilty pleas;
currently, only 3% of federal drug defendants go to trial.67 These
conversations between defendants and prosecutors happen behind
closed doors, leaving prosecutors free to use coercive tactics to elicit
guilty pleas from defendants without any oversight.
The lack of transparency when prosecutorial discretion is exercised is very concerning.68 Contrarily, when a judge exercises their
judicial discretion, it is a matter of public record. Every decision a
judge makes during a legal proceeding is made manifest for scrutiny
or praise, resulting in judges being considerably more accountable
65
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when using discretion than are prosecutors. Whatever the reason justifying the restriction of judicial discretion may be, placing
unchecked discretionary power in the hands of those with the most
to gain from a trial resulting in a prison sentence is not the solution. MMS must be repealed before discretionary power can be put
back into the hands of those best equipped to use it objectively and
responsibly, the judges.
D. The Federal Prison Problem
Despite recent reforms, more than half of all prison inmates are convicted under Mandatory Minimum Sentences.69 From 1980 to 2014,
the incarceration rate in the United States grew 220%70, despite the
fact that crime rates fell significantly over this same time period.71
Although MMS are just one element in the increase in incarceration rates, they are an incredibly significant one.72 In contrast, the
primary elements of the incarceration boom were ”changes in the
severity of sentencing and enforcement.73
A primary reason that MMS were put into effect was to act as
a deterrent against crime.74 Since MMS have been enacted, extensive research has been conducted to measure their effectiveness in
69
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stopping crime. It is estimated that a 10% increase in average sentence length corresponds to a zero to 0.5% decrease in arrest rates.75
Additionally, MMS may result in increased recidivism rates. Other
research has found that for every year added to a sentence, the average rate of re-arrest for that crime goes up by 4-7%.76 Currently,
nearly half of all offenders who serve a prison sentence are behind
bars again within eight years.77 As prison populations increase, it
becomes increasingly difficult for the basic health and safety needs
of prisoners to be met. In prisons, rates of human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV) and hepatitis C virus (HCV) are 5–28 times higher
than in the general population, respectively.78 Based on the latest
national figures available from the Bureau of Justice Statistics,
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4,980 prisoners in US correctional facilities died in 2014.79 Additionally, 24,661 inmates were raped in 2015.80
Longer sentences for non-violent drug offenders are excessively
harsh and ineffective punishments. Since the implementation of
MMS, the number of prisoners has risen to a point where the US
now detains nearly 25% of the world’s prisoners.81 This quantity of
prisoners equates to a massive fiscal cost for the United States. The
incarceration expenditures of the criminal justice system82 approach
$80 billion.83 US citizens are forced to finance a flawed prison system that is not deterring future crime. Since poor living conditions
resulting from mass incarceration84 could potentially explain the
failure of prisons to rehabilitate offenders and decrease recidivism
79
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rates, action to reduce inmate overpopulation is necessary. Repealing MMS would dramatically decrease prison populations. With
fewer inmates to accommodate, prison conditions could be drastically improved. Furthermore, the US would save billions of dollars
that could be invested in other reformative programs to deter future
crimes and rehabilitate offenders.

III. Proposal
There is a fear that following the repeal of MMS, the judiciary would
possess virtually unchecked discretionary power. Judges would be
free to rule as they please, sentencing in accordance with their personal preferences. It is true that each judge is unique. Pertinent facts
and circumstances of each case will influence each particular judge’s
sentence differently. Disparity, for better or worse, will certainly
exist when judges may exercise discretion while sentencing. However, we propose a safeguard that could keep judges from exercising judicial discretion to push a personal agenda. We acknowledge
that this is perhaps not a perfect solution. Regardless, alternatives to
MMS need to be put forth and considered.
Federal sentencing guidelines play a key role in our proposal.
However, as they now exist, the guidelines are quite similar to MMS
in the amount of time a convicted offender will spend in prison.
Comprehensive reform of the guidelines is necessary before they will
effectively aid judges in determining the correct sentence for individuals. No suggestions for new guidelines will be discussed in this
paper, but rather a broad reformative process will be briefly outlined.
The current sentencing guidelines should be completely eliminated. The legislature and the USSC have access to an abundance
of data on types of drug offenders, effects of current prison sentences, recidivism rates, the success of non-incarceratory programs,
and more. Using this data, Congress can determine reasonable standards based on the offense, level of involvement, and criminal history of the offender. As the new guidelines are implemented, data
will be gathered indicating whether they are leading to the successful rehabilitation of drug offenders. The results of situations where
judges have departed from the guidelines will also be taken into
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consideration. These new guidelines will ideally be subject to reform
every few years. Over time, Congress would approach guidelines
that suggest sentences with a strong track record of rehabilitating
the offender and deterring future crimes. Since the guidelines are
not mandatory,85 they would give judges a reasonable starting point
when determining a sentence. If a judge makes an extreme departure
from what the guidelines suggest, this could be cause for a prosecutor or defendant to appeal86 the sentence to a higher court.

IV. Looking Forward
Throughout history, Congress has passed mandatory minimum sentences to curb public fears. In 1986, the Anti-Drug Act was enacted
in response to extreme drug abuse. Now, over 30 years later, MMS
have stripped judges of judicial discretion, placed that discretion in
the hands of prosecutors, and significantly inflated the federal prison
population. Under our proposal, reformed federal sentencing guidelines would play a key role in allowing judges to exercise judicial discretion while maintaining the integrity of the judicial system. While
we recognize this is not a perfect solution, action must be taken. Our
reform would put sentencing power back in the hands of the judiciary
and make a necessary step towards mitigating drug offenses.
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Stretching the Law: The Application of Public
Nuisance to the Opioid Epidemic
Lindsay Manning1 and Hannah Thompson2
Opioid use in the United States increased five-fold in the last decade.
Every day ninety Americans die from drug abuse overdose.3 Is it
illegal opioid trafficking, or is it a problem within the medical profession? Recent litigation strategies, like those used in the recent
landmark case of Oklahoma v. Johnson and Johnson, show that opioid production and distribution are being linked to fueling the opioid
epidemic. Oklahoma is just one of the states that have concluded that
Johnson and Johnson, a large pharmaceutical company, is “overstating” the efficiency of opioids and “understating” the harmful effects
of these drugs. Consequently, litigation has begun across the country
charging pharmaceutical companies for causing the opioid crisis.4
This paper will evaluate the legal theories, in particular public nuisance claims, backing the litigation brought against pharmaceutical
companies, as seen in Oklahoma v Johnson and Johnson. However,
it will not attempt to address whether these claims against pharmaceutical companies are right or wrong. Public nuisance is defined differently in each state, a broad definition of public nuisance will be
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applied as stated in the second restatement of torts as “an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.”5 This
paper will show that public nuisance claims were never intended
to apply in a widespread public health crisis affecting society as
a whole equally and are therefore not appropriately applied to the
opioid crisis. First, this paper will address the varying outcomes in
public nuisance lawsuits as they have been applied to public health
crises, including the associated controversy that arises from applying public nuisance law. Second, this article will argue that the rulings found in recent opioid trials have incorrectly applied the law
of public nuisance to the opioid crisis. Finally, this paper will argue
that determinations of liability for public health crises, in particular
the opioid crisis, should be defined using alternative legal remedies,
namely master settlement agreements, legislation, and toxic torts.
Through these proposed remedies, public health crises can be properly litigated.

I. Background
Public nuisance has its origins in property and criminal law. Until
the 1970s, public nuisance claims were exclusive to property nuisance, generally requiring a special injury to the individual beyond
that of the general public. We define property nuisance as an action
taken on a landowner’s own property or the property of another
which affects the health or safety or either an individual or the public
at large. Furthermore, the requirement for special injury asserts the
plaintiff must show the nuisance provided injury to himself beyond
that of the general public. Subsequent precedent set limits to the
vague language surrounding public nuisance, thus providing a way
for judges to assess the validity of public nuisance claims. 6
However, in the 1970s arguments arose for public nuisance
law to be applied to a wider range of environmental and social
problems. Advocates for this change realized the vague language of
5
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the public nuisance law and its possible application to wide-spread
health issues. In the second restatement of torts, written in 1972,
public nuisance was included, being described simply as “an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public …
whether the conduct involves a significant interference with the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort,
or the public convenience.” 7 With this more open interpretation of
public nuisance describing it as a tort, claims arose over the next
four decades seeking damages for social issues such as pollution,
lead paint, asbestos, and tobacco. Over the course of the 80s, 90s,
and 2000s, the majority of public nuisance claims pertaining to public health issues were dismissed by the state court of appeals and
deemed an inappropriate application of the law because of an established precedent requiring a property nuisance and special injury
to an individual beyond that of the general public, thus making the
cases of large public health crises inapplicable.8
However, the recent success in applying public nuisance law
to the nation’s ongoing opioid crisis in Oklahoma v Johnson and
Johnson has revitalized the debate surrounding the interpretation of
public nuisance. Johnson and Johnson were required to pay damages totaling more than 500 million dollars for their involvement in
fueling the nation’s opioid crisis by marketing potentially harmful
drugs. Their actions were viewed as interfering with a right common to the general public and thus a public nuisance.9 Since politicians and commentators are now calling the opioid epidemic the
most prevalent public health crisis of our day, public nuisance claims
are again begin brought to the forefront of opioid litigation. This
is perhaps due to the lack of response from legislative bodies and
the fact that up to this point no regulations have kept pharmaceutical companies from engaging in aggressive marketing tactics. This
paper argues that if the current application of public nuisance law
were to continue, it would become a “catch-all” law for issues not
7
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being addressed fast enough by the legislative bodies or where other
applications have failed. However, as the precedent shows, courts are
generally reluctant to accept this new application. The following sections will address the major public nuisance cases brought in varying public health crises, why they were either dismissed or accepted,
and what remedies would have worked instead. This analysis will
then be applied to the current opioid crisis to evaluate the similarities
and differences between the preceding litigation.

II. Application of Public Nuisance
A. Pollution
In 1971, a California district court litigated one of the first public nuisance claims since the second restatement of torts, Diamond v. General Motors. The plaintiffs, composed of seven million individuals,
accused 293 industrial organizations of committing public nuisance
for emitting and discharging pollution into the air surrounding the
Los Angeles valley. Because the automobiles emitted harmful substances simply from its intended use, the plaintiffs argued that the
organizations willfully and maliciously harmed the environment and
the health of the general public. The defendants were also accused
of being negligent in their manufacturing and sale of automobiles.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs sought billions of dollars in damages,
as well as an injunction restraining the sale and standards of future
automobiles in the Los Angeles County.10
The court dismissed this claim for several reasons. First, the
court rejected the idea that this case was a class action, meaning
seven million individuals is too many for a legitimate lawsuit. Second, the court maintained that a private claim required that the public nuisance cause special injury to himself. This meant that each
of the seven million plaintiffs would have to show special injury
from the pollution. The court cited California Civil Code Section 3493
which provides: “A private person may maintain an action for a public
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nuisance, if it is especially injurious to himself, but not otherwise.”11
Finally, the California state court saw the issue of pollution in the
Los Angeles valley better left to the legislature.
This case showed the evolving view of some that the judiciary
should be allowed to decide on matters of public policy. It also
showed how reluctant courts are to take on this role. In Diamond
v. General Motors the court did not think that it was appropriate to
solve the problem of pollution in the Los Angeles valley. While
some argue that the court should be more responsible for public
policy due to the corruption, lobbying, and ineffectiveness from
legislative bodies, in this situation the court did not think public
nuisance was a valid claim to enact these changes.
Despite the reaction of the California state court to a public nuisance claim for a public health crisis, litigation continued against
companies seen to be polluting the atmosphere and harming individuals. The new wording of public nuisance law seemed to extend
the scope of its application to include all forms of actions hurting
a community’s public health. Although, in most states the courts
rejected these attempts, there are still some cases that have succeeded in using public nuisance law to regulate corporations. In
State v. Schenectady Chemicals, the state of New York charged the
owner of a chemical waste disposal with improperly disposing of
the waste, thus being charged for the subsequent damages done to
the soil and local water supply. The courts proclaimed: “We do not
hesitate in recognizing the seepage of chemical wastes into a public
water supply constitutes a public nuisance . . . the attorney general
is clearly authorized on behalf of the state to commence legal proceedings to abate a public nuisance.” 12
While this appears to be a success for the new definition of
public nuisance, there are some key differences between the decisions made in Schenectady and General Motors is that in New York.
Most importantly is that the courts also cited public policy enacted
by legislature determining the actions of the chemical waste site to
be illegal prior to the action taking place. Alternatively, in General
11
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Motors the existing regulations did not criminalize those actions of
the industrial organizations. The latter is analogous to the current
opioid situation. Legislation concerning the regulation of opioid
drug manufacturers is not as widespread as pollution regulations.
In Johnson and Johnson, the defendants argue that their practices
in marketing, advertising, and selling their opioid medicines were
all in accordance to the national and state regulations at that time.13
Therefore, similar to California pollution nuisance claims, it is
inappropriate for courts to make public policy based on public nuisance claims. Regardless of the actions taken by pharmaceutical
companies, public nuisance cannot become a “catch-all” for perceived wrongs not yet regulated by the government. The federal
and state government have already created laws for companies producing harmful products through the use of toxic torts. Toxic torts
will be discussed in-depth further in this paper, however, they are
the current regulations binding producers. If pharmaceutical companies had violated these laws then litigation would be appropriate.
However, public nuisance cannot fill the gaps of toxic torts.
B. Lead Paint
The ongoing litigation of the toxicity of lead paint has been at the
front of research. Initial litigation failed to hold the paint companies liable in the 1950’s because all regulations that were held by the
FDA were being followed, yet the debate has continued. Recently
decisions by the state courts in California have found several paint
companies liable for public nuisance in the distribution of lead paint
in past years, regardless of failed past attempts to apply public nuisance. The FDA laws now applying to lead paint have been updated,
and the companies are to pay hundreds of millions of dollars into an
“abatement” fund to investigate residential lead paint in the state’s
ten most populous counties and remediate any dangerous conditions
found there. The companies sold the paint legally, because the paint
was following all federal regulations at the time. 14
13
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This application of public nuisance can be misleading because
the companies are not being held liable for the actual manufacturing
or selling of the dangerous products, yet they are being held liable
for the marketing of the paint, despite the fact that the paint was in
accordance with regulations at the time. This can be misleading as
to what we view as harmful to consumers. As seen from the result
of the case marketing and advertising are the issues of safety and
not lead paint. The banning of lead paint was not put into action
until 1978, and the company was following all regulations that they
were aware of prior to this period. “With its ruling, the California Superior Court became the first and only jurisdiction to accept
a product-based public nuisance theory against lead-based paint
manufacturers” 15
This is similar to the ongoing opioid crisis, specifically to the
recent case of Johnson & Johnson v. Oklahoma, where a company
was abiding all FDA regulations. Yet, it was held liable as a public
nuisance due to its “aggressive marketing” (as stated by the New
York Times) to doctors, and for not properly informing consumers of side effects.16 Public nuisance claims should not concern
themselves with consumer use of a product. The Institute of Legal
Reform explains why consumer use is not viable under public nuisance theory; “Allowing what is essentially a claim about a defective product to go forward under a public nuisance theory presents
difficult issues of proof regarding causation and redressability.”17
As they were following all regulations that they were aware of,
toxic torts would be the appropriate application. Toxic torts refer
to the actual harm that the product caused to the consumer, which
would be more applicable than their attempt to use public nuisance
15

Morgan Van Buren, Lead Paint Litigation and the Future of Public Nuisance, Tyson & Mendes: Blog (Jul. 28, 2014), https://www.tysonmendes.
com/blog-lead-paint/.

16

Jan Hoffman, Johnson & Johnson Ordered to Pay $572 Million in Landmark Opioid Trial, The New York Times (Aug. 30, 2019) https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/08/26/health/oklahoma-opioids-johnson-and-johnson.
html.

17

U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, Waking the Litigation Monster:
misuse of public nuisance (2019).

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 34, 2020

144

through their marketing of opioids. Overall, opioids are the root
problem that harms consumers, and which the state is seeking help
and assistance for. By targeting the marketing, the root of the problem is not addressed; whereas, a toxic tort would encompass the opioids and the consumer misuse. This remedy is not used due to the
specificity needed for a toxic tort claim.
C. Tobacco
While litigants continually bring cases against the tobacco industry, few of those are public nuisance claims. Of these claims made
against tobacco companies most were dismissed by the courts due
to pending settlement agreements or inapplicability of the law. The
legal theories surrounding the tobacco litigation are perhaps the most
similar to that of the current opioid litigation due to its significant
stretch from the previous standards of special injury and nuisance to
a property. With pollution, lead paint, and asbestos litigation, there
is a claim for injury to property. However, with the manufacturing of
cigarettes or opioid litigation, there is no claim of a misuse of property
as the common law states is necessary for a public nuisance action.
In the 1997 case Texas v. American Tobacco Company, a count
of public nuisance was brought against the American Tobacco Company. The state claimed, similar to the argument in the opioid litigation Johnson & Johnson v. Oklahoma, that the “defendants have
intentionally interfered with the public’s right to be free from unwarranted injury, disease, and sickness and have caused damage to the
public health, the public safety, and the general welfare of the citizens of the State of Texas.” 18 The courts dismissed this claim outright, citing Texas public nuisance law as “the use of any place for
certain, specific prescribed activities such as gambling, prostitution,
and the manufacture of obscene materials.”19 This definition of public nuisance law is similar to statutes from other states by including
a property nuisance. The defendants argued that since there was no
misuse of property, there could be no claim of public nuisance.
18
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The Texas state court said, “The State has not pled a proper
claim, because it has failed to plead essential allegations under Texas
public nuisance law. Specifically, the State failed to plead that Defendants improperly used their own property, or that the State itself has
been injured in its use or employment of its property.” Therefore,
this specific count of public nuisance was dismissed. The Texas
State Court had one final note in saying, “The overly broad definition of the elements of public nuisance urged by the State is simply
not found in Texas case law and the Court is unwilling to accept the
state’s invitation to expand a claim for public nuisance beyond its
ground in real property.”20 This response is similar to the responses
we have seen in other public health issues: the courts are reluctant to
broaden the definition of public nuisance law.

III. Legal Remedies
A. Master Settlement Agreement
Before public nuisance claims could be brought against tobacco
companies on a large scale, a settlement agreement was reached.
The Master Settlement Agreement, reached in November, 1998,
included forty-six states and five of the largest tobacco manufacturers in the U.S. It included payments of billions of dollars to the states
to mitigate the damage done by tobacco products.21 Furthermore,
injunctions were handed down to limit the extent to which tobacco
companies could advertise, market, and promote their products.
Tobacco companies engaged in the settlement agreement to end
the immense costs of future litigation that could have occurred.
And while sceptics criticized the allocation of the money from this
settlement, claiming that it hadn’t actually been spent on alleviating the health problems caused by tobacco, the Master Settlements
20
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Agreement was successful in ending the large amount of litigation
facing tobacco companies.
The option of a master settlement agreement may be appealing
to the pharmaceutical companies now facing large amounts of litigation for the opioid crisis. As shown in the preceding paragraphs, the
route of public nuisance claims has been unreceptive by the courts. It
is unclear if the opioid litigation will find success in using public nuisance claims against drug manufacturers. Therefore, a master settlement agreement, similar in nature to that of the tobacco settlement,
could be a good course of action for states and pharmaceutical companies wishing to end the litigation and establish liability for the opioid epidemic. A settlement agreeing to a fixed amount of reparations
and injunctions pertaining to the marketing and advertising of these
addictive drugs would be in the best interest of both parties as the
unpredictability of future litigation is not desirable for the companies.
Potential objections to a master settlements agreement could
come from the misallocation of damages received. In the tobacco
settlement, many argue that the funds never reached those whose
health was affected. Similarly, damages received from the opioid
settlement may never be used to fund drug rehabilitation efforts.
Furthermore, A master settlement agreement may seem undesirable to pharmaceutical companies because they believe they are in
the position to win the litigation against them. However, the recent
decision of Oklahoma v. Johnson & Johnson shows that the confusing nature of public nuisance law does not guarantee success in any
state. If the courts continue to pursue and allow public nuisance
claims, it would open the way for each individual court to decide
a new definition of public nuisance despite the standing of special
injury and property. Therefore, we argue that a better course of
action would be to engage in a master settlement agreement.
B. Legislation
Another option would be for legislation to be made creating clearer
and stricter regulations for pharmaceutical companies. The reason
activists are pushing to broaden the definition of public nuisance is
their dissatisfaction with the decisions made by the legislature. For
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example, in the cases against pollution, litigants were dissatisfied
with how relaxed the standards were for emitting pollutants into
the air as well as how slow the legislative branch was at making
changes. Similar complaints will be made about any opioid litigation; however, it would be more beneficial for statutes to be made
setting clear standards of marketing operations, rather than relying
on public nuisance claims. Similar to the case, State v. Schenectady Chemicals, public nuisance claims could be brought within the
bounds of a state or federal statute. The aforementioned case cited
heavily from the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,
and therefore showed that what those companies were doing was
illegal.22 States, however, would probably be reluctant to accept this
legal theory because it would mean a violation of due process if they
attempted to continue the litigation against pharmaceutical companies. Legislation is necessary if clear standards want to be made as to
what practices of opioid drug manufacturers are illegal. Public nuisance will continue to provide only vague and confusing results that
vary significantly across the nation and within states. If the judicial
branch wants to ascertain judgement against pharmaceutical companies, it must be done within the context of a specific statute or law.
C. Toxic Torts
We also propose that these cases (i.e.: lead paint, opioids, etc.) be
tried within the scope of a toxic tort rather than public nuisance.
When the public nuisance attacks the marketing of a product, a toxic
tort brings us back to the original problem, the product. A toxic tort
is “… a legal claim for harm caused by exposure to a dangerous substance—such as a pharmaceutical drug, pesticide, or chemical.”23
However, many people steer away from the application of a toxic
tort because of the additional statement within the law that implies
“In a toxic tort claim, the plaintiff (the person who sues) alleges that

22

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C §6901 (1976).

23

Toxic Tort, Harrell Law Firm, PA, (last visited Feb. 20, 2020) https://www.
hlfpa.com/practice-areas/toxic-tort/.
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exposure to some dangerous substance caused an injury or illness.”24
Many people will avoid this application because a tort is seen as
personal injury, and people find it difficult to sue large companies as
an individual. The workload of addressing every individual involved
within the scope of the respective health crisis is one that simply
cannot be taken on without reform. But, the application of the law,
and the solution will remain in addressing the problem in which we
originally set out to correct.

IV. Current Opioid Litigation
A. Johnson & Johnson v. Oklahoma
The controversy of public nuisance is applicable more than ever due
to the recent case of Johnson & Johnson v. Oklahoma. The pharmaceutical company was originally sued for 17 billion dollars in
order to provide twenty years of rehabilitation funding for victims
of opioid addiction. The State of Oklahoma decided that the company would instead payout 572 million dollars which would cover
approximately one year of rehabilitation for those affected by the
opioid health crisis.25 There are now approximately 2,000 additional
pending cases seeking to employ similar legal strategies. The state
had priority settled with other pharmaceutical companies (Purdue
and Teva.), which resulted in sole responsibility lying on just one
company, Johnson & Johnson. 26
The verdict was determined under a public nuisance law and
was targeted at the marketing of the drug to doctors, without appropriately relaying the side effects of the products to the doctors. This
24

Id.

25

Martha Bebinger, Purdue Pharma Agrees to $270 Million Opioid Settlement with Oklahoma, NPR (Mar. 26, 2019) https://www.npr.org/sections/
health-shots/2019/03/26/706848006/purdue-pharma-agrees-to-270-million-opioid-settlement-with-oklahoma.
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Shannon Van Sant, Teva Pharmaceuticals Agrees to $85 Million Settlement with Oklahoma in Opioid Case, NPR (May 26, 2019) https://www.
npr.org/2019/05/26/727179915/teva-pharmaceuticals-agrees-to-85-million-settlement-with-oklahoma-in-opioid-case.
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interpretation is made off of vague statements within the law pertaining to public nuisance. Aggressive marketing of drugs is not illegal under any FDA regulations of federal statutes as of yet. Johnson
& Johnson was following all FDA regulations with the drugs it was
making. Ultimately, the problem is consumer abuse of opioids not
Johnson & Johnson’s marketing of products. Therefore, claiming
that the companies marketing is a public nuisance does not address
the root problem of opioid addiction. The state of Oklahoma chose to
apply a law that did not alter the actual misuse of opioids, which are
claimed to be addictive and harming to their state population. The
actual public nuisance is the distribution and individual misuse of
opioids, not the initial pharmaceutical market of the product.

V. Conclusion
The opioid crisis is complex, but that cannot be the reason that it continues to go unaddressed. There is a need for better applications to
solve the current epidemic. A public nuisance argument is inappropriate and ineffective in dealing with the seriousness of this nation’s
health crisis. With proposed solutions of applying toxic torts, master
settlement agreements, and legislation to the nation’s health crisis,
we argue the following benefits: safer pharmaceutical products with
more cautious responsibility for providers, standard regulations for
all parties involved of the creating and distribution of products, and
concise laws applying to our nation’s health crisis. This country
should protect health and well-being of its citizens, and if opioids are
a problem, litigation should focus on the individuals and the specific
negative effects of opioids. Public nuisance should only be applied
when it does not have to be contorted to fit an argument and allow all
the laws to uphold the best interest of the public.

Prosecuting Human Trafficking in the Wake of
Epstein: A Proposal for the Implementation of
Aggravated Human Trafficking Statutes
Lynette A. Dalley1 and Katherine F. Erickson2
In June of 2008, Jeffrey Epstein plead guilty in a Florida court on
two counts of felony prostitution for nonconsensual sex acts against
two girls under eighteen. Evidence showed, however, that the true
scope of his crime encompassed dozens of underage girls.3 4 He
was sentenced to eighteen months in jail but ended up only serving thirteen.5 Because of the terms of his prison sentence, Epstein
was allowed to leave the jail during the day for work release. During these releases, he allegedly continued to abuse and traffic other
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young women throughout his shortened sentence.6 Nearly a decade
later, the case was resurrected and turned into a federal sex trafficking investigation.7
Allegations against Epstein began in 1985,8 continuing until the
month of his arrest in 2019.9 To date, over one hundred Jane Does
have come forward to testify of Epstein’s crimes against them.10
There is evidence to suggest that there are hundreds of victims who
have not yet been identified.11 The ineffective human trafficking
laws in Florida at the time allowed Epstein to roam free for decades,
facilitating the perpetuation and aggravation of his crimes.
In a case similar to Epstein’s but with a very different outcome,
the state of Texas convicted Steven Sumlin of continuous human
trafficking in 2018 and sentenced him to fifty-five years in prison.
Much like the Epstein case, Sumlin was accused of abusing and
trafficking a sixteen-year-old girl and a twenty-two-year-old
6
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woman.12 Unlike the Epstein case and due to Texas’s aggravated
human trafficking statute, Sumlin will be off the streets for the rest
of his foreseeable life, unable to traffic any other people.13 The leniency displayed in the Epstein case cannot be allowed to continue.
This paper will argue that an aggravated human trafficking
statute is an effective legislative response to human trafficking on
a state level, and as such, should be adopted by all states. Such a
statute would include a heightened penalty range with a maximum
of life in prison with delayed parole eligibility. This sentence would
be comparable to many states’ sentencing ranges for homicide. An
aggravated human trafficking statute would be applicable for cases
such as the trafficking of a minor, trafficking involving severe bodily
injury, or trafficking involving multiple victims.
Section I of this paper defines human trafficking and provides
context for the argument. Section II examines the current status of
state-level human trafficking laws in the United States. Section III
highlights efficient human trafficking laws in action through a 2018
federal human trafficking case, and extrapolates on that case to consider how state laws impact human trafficking victims and perpetrators. Finally, Section V lays out a proposal for changes to human
trafficking laws at the state level, and Section VI addresses possible
counterarguments.

I. Background
For the purposes of this article, we will use the definition of “human
trafficking” contained in the majority of state and local statutes.
This refers to the act of knowingly subjecting persons to involuntary
12

Gerald Tracy, Converse man sentenced to more than 50 years in sex
trafficking case, Fox San Antonio, (Dec. 6, 2018), https://foxsanantonio.
com/news/local/converse-man-sentenced-to-more-than-50-years-in-sextrafficking-case.

13
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Prison Sentence in Sex Trafficking Case Involving Underage and Adult
Victims, (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/ag-paxtons-office-obtains-conviction-55-year-prison-sentence-sextrafficking-case-involving-underage.
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labor servitude or nonconsensual sexual servitude.14 We will refer
to human trafficking as “trafficking” from this point on. Thus, we
will refer to the affected persons as “trafficking victims.” Although
we do acknowledge that there is much debate regarding which term
for affected persons is preferable, we have chosen “victims” to avoid
the implication of racially-motivated crimes associated with the term
“slave,” and to avoid the questions about consent often associated
with the term “prostitute” or “prostituted person.”
Since 2002, the Counter-Trafficking Data Collaborative has
identified nearly 25,000 cases of human trafficking in the United
States;15 however, this is not representative of the true scope of this
criminal industry. In 2018 alone, the National Human Trafficking
Hotline recorded over 10,000 human trafficking cases.16 For context,
it is estimated that forty million people are trafficked worldwide;17
however, only 91,416 individual cases have been identified and
investigated since 2002.18 Further, there is high financial incentive
for traffickers. Victims are frequently required to meet quotas ranging from $300 to $2,000 per night before they can return home.19
An Urban Institute study of eight major cities in the U.S. found that

14

Ala. Code § 13A-6-152 (2012)

15

The Counter-Trafficking Data Collaborative, https://www.ctdatacollaborative.org/map?type=us-states (last visited Jan. 21st, 2020).

16

National Human Trafficking Hotline, Polaris Project, https://polarisproject.org/2018-us-national-human-trafficking-hotline-statistics/ (last visited
Jan. 21st, 2020).

17

Global Estimates of Modern Slavery: Forced Labour and Forced
Marriage (The International Labor Office, Geneva ed. 2017) at 5. https://
www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/
publication/wcms_575479.pdf.
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traffickers earned $6,000–$50,000 a week.20 With the combination
of high financial reward and low risk of being caught, it comes as
no surprise that government and non-governmental agencies alike
believe human trafficking to be the fastest growing criminal enterprise in the world.21
Nationally, human trafficking victims significantly outnumber
homicide victims. In 2018, there were 23,078 identified trafficking
victims22 and 16,214 homicides in the United States.23 This means
that for every murder victim the public heard about, there was at
least one identified human trafficking victim that the public did not
hear about. Due to the underground nature of human trafficking,
even this is probably a low estimate of the actual number of victims
in the nation.
In 2018, 65.2% of identified human trafficking victims in America were women, and 71.8% of human trafficking cases involved
sexual exploitation.24 Victims are forced every day to perform countless nonconsensual commercial sexual acts. The age breakdown is
equally horrendous: 22.43% of victims are minors, most between
the ages of twelve and seventeen; 46.5% of them are adults, most

20

Meredith Dank, et al., Estimating the Size and Structure of the
Underground Commercial Sex Economy in Eight Major US Cities 30
(2014). https://www.urban.org/research/publication/estimating-size-andstructure-underground-commercial-sex-economy-eight-major-us-cities/
view/full_report.

21

See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Just., U.S. Att’y’s Off., Dist. of R.I., Human
Trafficking, https://www.justice.gov/usao-ri/human-trafficking (last
visited: Jan 21st, 2020). See generally, World Day Against Trafficking in
Persons 2019, Equality Now: A just world for women and girls, (Jul.
30, 2019), https://www.equalitynow.org/wdatp_2019.
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between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine; while the ages of the
other 32.1% of victims are unknown.25

II. The Current Status of Human Trafficking Laws
in the United States
The “tough on crime” initiative and mentality of many state legislatures illustrates the commonly held belief that one of the most
effective methods of crime prevention and deterrence is a strictlyenforced set of penalties for criminal action.26 However, in many
states, this toughness evaporates when dealing with human trafficking. The statistical mean sentence a defendant can receive when convicted of trafficking an adult has a maximum of 27.03 years in prison
and a minimum of 3.08 years in prison, with a maximum standard
deviation of 27.98 and a minimum of 4.33.27 Human traffickers are
believed by some authorities to be among the most violent of criminal
offenders in the United States,28 taking away the life and liberty of
other human beings every day, and yet, in many states, a jury doesn’t
have the tools to legally sentence them to more than a relatively few
years in prison. Within two decades of their conviction, a trafficker
will be back on the streets, with the potential to return to their prior
illegal activities. Studies have found that 60.1% of prisoners released
in 2005, who had been convicted of similar offenses, such as rape or
sexual assault, were arrested again within five years.29
25

2018 Statistics from the National Human Trafficking Hotline, see 20.
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Human Trafficking, Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, https://
www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/initiatives/human-trafficking (last visited
Jan. 25th, 2020).
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In 2003, Washington was the first state to pass legislation criminalizing human trafficking.30 In 2016, Hawaii became the last state
to pass some form of counter-trafficking legislation.31 Some, however, like Kansas, have not adequately defined human trafficking.
While having technically criminalized human trafficking, Kansas
narrowly defines it only as involuntary labor servitude and does
not include nonconsensual commercial sexual servitude in their
definition, thus only covering a small percentage of human trafficking cases as we have defined the term.32 In such states, attorneys
attempting to prosecute traffickers are forced to use less applicable
statutes, such as promoting prostitution.33 However, according to the
codes, prostitution can be consensual, whereas human trafficking
never is. It harms victims of human trafficking when states refuse to
acknowledge trafficking for what it is—a heinous crime that takes
away an individual’s freedom and ability to choose. As will be shown
in the next section through a true story, the states that do acknowledge
this and evidence it in their legislation can more effectively protect
their citizens.

30

Human Trafficking State Laws, National Conference on State Legislatures, https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/humantrafficking-laws.aspx
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III. Efficient Human Trafficking Laws in Action
Lauren (name changed) was seventeen years old and living in Seattle when she logged on to an Internet dating site.34 There she met
Marsya, a movie producer, and they began to build a friendship.
Marsya introduced Lauren to David, Marsya’s partner, who was also
a movie producer and was seeking more young female actors. What
Lauren wouldn’t learn until it was too late was that the only movies
David produced were illegal child pornography films and that he and
Marsya only cared about Lauren as a source of income. After growing to trust the couple and forming a close bond with them, Lauren
moved in with them.
At first, David and Marsya showered Lauren with gifts and
money at every turn. Slowly, they introduced her to the world of
commercial sex. David coerced her into signing a contract stating that she would work for him as a prostitute under the guise of
recording interviews for his documentary. Lauren was trafficked all
over the country and was not allowed to keep any of the money she
received. When she wanted out, David would threaten to sue her for
breach of contract and would blackmail her with the explicit photos
of her that he had.35 Then, he would continue to shower her with love
and gifts, forming what is known as a “trauma bond.”36 Finally, after
six months of this treatment, Lauren was able to escape. However,
Lauren was not David and Marsya’s only victim. The FBI is still
actively searching for more of David’s victims and requesting that

34
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they come forward. 37 In 2018, a U.S. District Court convicted David
of seventeen charges of sex trafficking and child pornography, and
he was sentenced to thirty-three years in jail. Marsya was sentenced
to three years.38
Stories like this one unfold across America every day, but Lauren
is more fortunate than most trafficking victims. The UN estimates
that only 1% of human trafficking victims are rescued.39 Further,
many traffickers beat, rape, and threaten to kill their victims if they
don’t comply. Traffickers often force victims to take drugs. Drug
addiction makes victims even more dependent on their traffickers,
who double as their dealers. Victims are taken all over the country,
never staying in one place long enough to raise suspicions or ask for
help. Their families may be threatened or told that they must pay off
a supposed “debt” to the trafficker before the victim will be released.
No matter how a victim’s story starts, nearly all of them end the
same way: abuse, enslavement, rape, threats, and trauma.
Lauren, living in Washington—a state that has historically led
the nation in counter-trafficking law—and having been trafficked
across state borders, saw her trafficker receive a relatively high
federal sentence of thirty-three years. However, what if the crimes
against Lauren had not been federal? What if they had been restricted
to a single state’s jurisdiction?
If Lauren’s story had taken place in a state that didn’t have such
stringent protection of victims40 —take Minnesota, for example—the
outcome of her case would have been much different. There, David
37
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160

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 34, 2020

would have been charged with and likely convicted of sex trafficking, since he compelled Lauren to stay in the industry against her
will. He could have been sentenced to a maximum of fifteen years
in prison. However, in the state of Minnesota, Lauren likely would
have also been charged with prostitution because she “intentionally”
signed the contract with David and willingly consented to entering
prostitution.41
But what if these crimes had taken place in a stricter state than
Minnesota, such as Utah? Utah already has an aggravated human
trafficking statute that likely would have applied in Lauren’s situation.42 If the trafficking offense involved rape or Lauren being held
against her will for more than thirty days, then this statute would
have applied, and David could have been sentenced to fifteen years
to life. If not for this statute, then David’s maximum sentence would
have been one to fifteen years, with a parole board determining how
much of that he would actually serve in prison.
This was not a one-time criminal offense for David; he is
believed to have victimized many people over a prolonged period,
showing a consistent pattern of trafficking in persons. If he were
only held in prison for fifteen years or less, as would be common in
states without aggravated human trafficking statutes, nothing about
his sentence would stop him from going right back to trafficking
within a decade or two of the original offense.

IV. Proposal
As has been shown through comparing outcomes of previously discussed cases, legislation regarding human trafficking is instrumental in protecting victims, stopping traffickers, and preventing repeat
offenses. Thus, it is imperative that lawmakers strictly examine the
status of state human trafficking legislation. Although all states now
have some form of counter-trafficking legislation in place, the addition of an aggravated trafficking statute would make existing legislation stronger and more effective.
41
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Many states have already enacted valuable, effective legislation to combat human trafficking. For example, a notable few, such
as Oklahoma, have already introduced higher sentencing ranges.43
These states are legislatively acknowledging human trafficking to
be one of the worst crimes, judicially on par with homicide in many
cases. There are five key pieces of legislation that these states have
adopted that help derail the trafficking industry:
1. a human trafficking provision, preferably with specific
mention of both sex and labor trafficking;44
2. a clause allowing for the vacation of sentences for trafficking victims;45
3. a state-wide counter-trafficking task force;46
4. higher sentencing ranges on par with crimes such as
homicide; and,47
5. a maximum sentence of life with delayed parole eligibility for cases involving trafficking of minors, aggravated
trafficking, or continuous trafficking.48
These five pieces of legislation are valuable because they raise awareness, protect victims, and decrease repeat offenses. A state that does
not prioritize these five points is likely not as effective as it could be
in combatting human trafficking. Many states already have items 1
through 3. Items 4 and 5 are much less common, and arguably have
the potential to make human trafficking laws much more effective.
This is what we have been referring to as an aggravated human trafficking statute, and which we propose all states enact immediately.
43

Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 21-748.

44
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47
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The changes to counter-trafficking legislation that we have proposed would elevate the crime of human trafficking to a level judicially similar or equivalent to intentional homicide in many states.
There are many benefits to the higher sentences available under the
aggravated trafficking statute, but it will most significantly contribute to the fight against human trafficking while it is acting as a deterrent, a preventative measure, and a societal statement.
There is very little conclusive evidence to indicate whether
higher sentencing ranges will deter people from committing crimes.
Do criminals actually calculate the exact number of years they could
spend in prison if they committed a specific crime? Almost certainly
not. However, there is some evidence to indicate that longer sentences will deter persons from committing a crime more than if the
penalties aren’t very high; additionally, it will also lower recidivism
in convicted criminals.49
This statute will be most influential on the preventative front:
if someone has created a business and livelihood out of the trafficking of persons for commercial sex, the surest way to stop them is to
take them off the streets. Minor punishments like small fines or a
few years in prison are likely to result only in the traffickers being
more careful about concealing their crimes. The most effective way
to truly prevent trafficking is to keep the perpetrators off the streets,
which is only possible through higher sentencing ranges for those
who have shown a pattern of continuous trafficking.
Further, an aggravated human trafficking statute will help stop
trafficking by changing the way society views the buying and selling
of human beings, as previously mentioned. This legislative action
will become a catalyst for change in our society and will help to stop
the demand for commercial sex.
Again, as lawmakers, law enforcers, and law interpreters, we
must ask ourselves if we are truly doing all we can legislatively
49
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to deter, prevent, and prosecute human trafficking in our society.
If Lauren lived in your state, would she be appropriately protected
by the law, and would her trafficker be prevented from committing
further crimes against her and other people? If not, then perhaps we
need to reevaluate our legislation.

V. Counterarguments
Critics may argue that human trafficking is not morally equivalent
to homicide and should therefore not have the same high degree of
punishments. However, in many ways, human trafficking is morally
equivalent to homicide. Though, fortunately, not all human trafficking cases end in death, all instances of human trafficking involve the
involuntary relinquishment of a person’s capacity to make decisions
for themselves. Human trafficking victims do lose their lives, in the
sense that they are prevented from living freely. They are forced
to submit to the will of other people on a daily basis. A victim of
homicide is not given the right to choose to continue living, just as
a victim of human trafficking is not given the right to choose how
they will live. And, as many trafficking victims would testify, a life
of being trafficked is not much of a life at all. Because of the extraordinarily high degree to which traffickers control and dominate their
victims, it is both appropriate and necessary to elevate the crime of
human trafficking to a higher moral standard.
Some may argue that the changes we have proposed—and even
the prosecution of human trafficking as a whole—are not worth
pursuing because of the difficulty in discerning between voluntary
prostitution and nonconsensual prostitution. Some may even argue
that the best way to combat nonconsensual prostitution is to legalize sex work so that it is more accessible and regulated. First, it is
important to note here that legalizing prostitution would come with
several negative side effects. For example, where prostitution is legal
in Nevada, the Lyon County Sheriff’s Office found that one out of
every three legal brothel workers exhibited symptoms of potential
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human trafficking.50 This is evidence that human trafficking exists
even in places and in industries that allow for commercial sex. Thus,
legalizing prostitution would not eliminate human trafficking, and
perhaps would even make it worse. Furthermore, there will always
be a need to prosecute human trafficking, and to do so distinctly
from prosecuting prostitution. With the rise of the movement to
legalize prostitution, we find ourselves at a dangerous tipping point
in the war against human trafficking. Instances of human trafficking
can be difficult to identify. Law enforcement officers often discover
trafficking cases by investigating reports of prostitution. Therefore,
if anti-prostitution laws are removed from state legislation, we lose
an important safeguard against trafficking. It is vitally important,
now more than ever, that we strengthen our counter-trafficking legislation so that it can stand on its own to protect trafficking victims,
whether they are hidden under the guise of legalized sex work or not.
From 2014 to 2017, Hawaii dealt with this exact issue, in part
because the state did not have a trafficking statute separate from
its prostitution statute. In 2014, a video surfaced of Justin McKinley abusing a young woman. This woman testified that McKinley
had kidnapped, abused, and trafficked her for months.51 Originally, a
jury indicted McKinley on one count of first-degree promoting prostitution, two counts of first-degree sexual assault, and one count of
kidnapping.52 However, the case was thrown out in 2016 on grounds
that the Supreme Court of Hawaii overruled in 2017 when they reinstated the case and sentenced McKinley to fifteen years in prison.53
50

Lyon County Sheriff’s Office, LCSO Internal Audit Report on Brothel
Compliance Requirements (2018).

51

State of Hawai’I, v. Lawrence L. Bruce & Justin McKinley, 411 P.3d 300
(Haw. 2017)

52

2 indicted on charges or raping, forcing woman into prostitution, Star
Advertiser (Jun. 17, 2014), https://www.staradvertiser.com/2014/06/17/
breaking-news/2-indicted-on-charges-of-raping-forcing-woman-intoprostitution/

53

Convictions of 2 accused pimps reinstated after case is thrown out,
Hawaii News Now (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/
story/36558031/convictions-of-2-accused-pimps-reinstated-after-case-isthrown-out/

Prosecuting Human Trafficking in the Wake of Epstein: A Proposal
for the Implementation of Aggravated Human Trafficking Statutes

165

If Hawaii had an aggravated human trafficking law, he likely would
be serving more time and the case would have proceeded more
smoothly.
Some may argue that this is a social issue, not a legislative one.
Although it is certainly true that significant social change is necessary if we are to truly eradicate human trafficking, the legislative
change must lead the way. Approximately 20.6% of all men enter
the sex buying market at least once in their lives.54 In 2014, it was
estimated that 64% of all men had consumed pornography in the last
month,55 with female consumers rising to comparable numbers as
well.56 This normalization of the buying and selling of people desensitizes individuals and the society at large to the sexual exploitation
of men, women, and children. If we are to stop trafficking, we need
to stop normalizing abuse. This social change is only possible if the
laws change first. If human trafficking is legislatively regarded as the
heinous crime it is, the minds of the people will follow suit.

VI. Conclusion
As has been shown, the states are not united regarding how to prosecute human trafficking. But in order to fight this criminal enterprise,
prosecutors and judges across the country must have the proper tools.
It is essential that each state have a statute specifically criminalizing human trafficking, giving these crimes their own legal category.
Then, in order to effectively prevent, deter, and punish these crimes,
all states that already have such a statute must enact an aggravated
human trafficking statute, allowing for penalty ranges up to life in
prison in the more severe human trafficking cases, such as those
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that involve children, severe bodily injury, death, or multiple victims
over a prolonged period.
When legislative bodies treat human trafficking as the serious
crime that it is, law enforcement and community members will take
it more seriously and be more aware of the signs they should be looking for. The higher penalty range may act as a deterrent as well,
and will prevent serial traffickers from reentering the business as
soon as they complete their sentence. It is for these reasons that we
invite lawmakers to reevaluate their counter-trafficking statutes, and
to strengthen or implement an aggravated human trafficking statute.

Realigning Federal Statutes: Contradictions
Between the Federal Arbitration Act and the
National Labor Relations Act
Denise Han1
Christopher Steele and Brendan Leveron were employees at a private
maintenance company named Pinnacle. Both Steele and Leveron
reported that Pinnacle allegedly forced them to work overtime without just compensation—an allegation that, if proven valid, would
violate the Fair Labor Standards Act and California state law. They
also claimed that Pinnacle was guilty of unfair business practices,
retaliation and whistleblowing violations, and a failure to account.
Soon after Steele and Leveron filed these allegations, they discovered that their predicament was not unique across the firm. In 2012,
they decided to represent their fellow employees in a class-action suit
which so that they could share the costs of hiring a lawyer, paying
court fees, and gathering evidence.2 As part of their hiring process,
though, Pinnacle had forced their employees to sign agreements to
binding individual arbitration. Because these contracts were already
in place by the time Steele and Leveron’s case reached the courts,
the court dismissed the case and compelled all Pinnacle employees
to settle their cases in arbitration. Without the opportunity to participate in a class-action suit, each employee would need to provide for
all costs associated with the lawsuit and surrender their fate to the
1
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decision of only one arbitrator or panel with no option of appeal. In
addition to this, they would forfeit their opportunity to represent and
assist hundreds of fellow employees who found themselves without
the means of pursuing litigation.
Similar situations are occurring across the nation as businesses
and large corporations increasingly utilize the Federal Arbitration
Act (the “FAA”)3 to prevent class action suits. Currently, the number of cases directly affected is in the tens of millions.4 The issue
centers on the legal system prioritizing the enforcement of questionable contract provisions over employees’ constitutional right to sue
within their financial ability. Most recently, the Supreme Court of the
United States overturned the Supreme Court of California’s decision
in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis and ruled that class action waivers
were enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act.5 Because this
ruling essentially allows employers to use the Federal Arbitration
Act as a loophole through which they may prevent their employees
from seeking redress, it reveals the more specific ethical and legal
underpinnings of this nation’s jurisprudence.
This article examines the recent decision made by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis regarding the unconscionability of class action waivers in employment law
under the FAA and the NLRA and explores the implications of public policy and business decisions. By weighing these contradictions
in the legal system, this article advances the claim that either the
judicial court system must overturn the recent decision, or the legislature ought to realign the goals of the Federal Arbitration Act with
those of the National Labor Relations Act (the “NLRA”) and enact
an amendment to the FAA, expressly deeming class action waivers
in arbitration agreements as unenforceable.
Section I of this article explains the background and history on
the Federal Arbitration Act. Section II examines the potential conflict
3
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between the purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act and class action
suits in employment law. Section III explores the current discourse
regarding the conflict between the Federal Arbitration Act and the
National Labor Relations Act in the context of the recent court ruling
in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis. Section IV explicates the potential
consequences of this article’s claim.

I. What is the Federal Arbitration Act?6
Essentially, the Federal Arbitration Act provides that contract clauses
requiring arbitration between parties must be upheld. As a method of
dispute resolution, arbitration is a low-cost and time-efficient alternative to judicial litigation that also benefits more parties. The Federal Arbitration Act capitalizes on this benefit.
Section 2 of the FAA provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle
by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole
or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.7

6

Prior to the Industrial Revolution, judges and magistrates in the United
States viewed arbitration with hostility. The forthcoming industrial boom
brought with it an overwhelming quantity of lawsuits, making it difficult
for U. S. courts to address all of the cases in their queues. To streamline
the judicial process, President Calvin Coolidge signed the United States
Arbitration Act (the “Federal Arbitration Act” or “FAA”) into law, which
“declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of
the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the
contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.” Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).

7

See, Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2.

170

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 34, 2020

In 2001, the Federal Arbitration Act’s application to specifically
employment contracts first came under scrutiny. Section 1 of the
FAA provides that:
...“commerce”, as herein defined, means commerce among
the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or
between any such Territory and another, or between any
such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between
the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign
nation, but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts
of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. 8
In 2001, the Supreme Court clarified the application of this section
in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, ruling that employment contracts that included arbitration agreements were not exempt from the
FAA. In the opinion, the Court further interpreted Section 1 of the
FAA to apply more narrowly to employment contracts with seamen,
railroad employees, and other transportation employees. To exclude
all employment contracts from the scope of the FAA would “[fail]
to give independent effects to the statute’s enumeration of the specific
categories of workers which precedes it.”9 Under this reasoning, arbitration agreements in employment contracts that exist outside of the
enumerated industries in Section 1 are now fully enforceable by law.

II. The Federal Arbitration Act v. Class Action Suits
By understanding the historical application of the Federal Arbitration
Act and class action suits in employment law, we can better see that the
two share the same overarching purpose—to streamline the judicial
process and decrease costs of litigation. The only difference between
the two lies in who their primary beneficiaries are—the FAA on the
side of the employer and class action suits on that of the employee.

8
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Before 1995, courts were unsure of how to interpret the phrase
“involving commerce” in Section 2 of the FAA.10 Consequently,
industries pressured the courts to define what implications the
phrase would have in relation to the FAA and its applications. The
FAA was also ambiguous in other areas that have only been clarified
in recent decades. For instance, it was only in 1984 with Southland
Corp. v. Keating that it became clear that the FAA applied in state
courts as well as in federal courts. Previously, the FAA was “by
all accounts intended to be ‘a procedural statute applicable only in
the federal courts.’” 11 In the decades between the enactment of the
FAA and the year 1984, the courts viewed arbitration as an alternative method of dispute resolution between businessmen, not between
other parties involved in commerce such as consumers, employees,
investors, and others unless these parties had agreed to arbitrate.12 In
1967, however, the Court held that the FAA applies in diversity cases
in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., implying that the
FAA creates substantive law instead of regulating mere procedure.13
Finally, in 1995, the Supreme Court held that the phrase “involving commerce” signaled the full exercise of Congress’s power under
the commerce clause.14 In other words, the FAA applies to contracts
affecting all commerce—not only those with interstate connections.
In some instances, state courts and legislatures have attempted
to invalidate or restrict certain mandatory arbitration agreements,
but the Supreme Court has consistently decided that the FAA overrules any state laws or regulations. The reasoning originates from

10
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11
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the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.15 Additionally, as the
Court has noted, the FAA “was designed to overrule the judiciary’s
long-standing refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate.” 16 Section 2
compels courts to place arbitration agreements on equal footing with
all other contracts. States thereby act unlawfully when they single
out arbitration clauses with the purpose of treating them differently
to other contracts. The Federal Arbitration Act itself does not contain an express preemption clause. However, the Court has held that,
pursuant to implied preemption principles, the FAA supersedes state
laws that “undermine the goals and policies of [the Act].” 17
The Court has also determined that the FAA’s “overarching
purpose…is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements
according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.”
18
This way, corporations may seek proper redress or resolve legal
disputes more quickly and easily in an authorized setting. After all,
arbitration takes an average of 475 days to reach a decision, while the
traditional judicial forum might take anywhere from 2 to 3 years to
reach a similar decision. 19
In summary, the Federal Arbitration Act has three overarching
purposes: 1) to grant legitimacy to contract law, 2) to streamline
judicial proceedings, and 3) to offer a low-cost and time-efficient
alternative to litigation for businesses.

15
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A. Class Action Suits in Employment Law
Why then were class action suits originally allowed in employment
disputes? Justice Ginsberg enumerated and implied several reasons
in her dissenting opinion in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis: 20
1. Individual employee claims are small, “scarcely of a
size warranting the expense of seeking redress alone;”
2. Employees can gain effective redress “by joining
together with others similarly circumstanced;”
3. Employees may match the clout of employers in setting
terms and conditions of employment, and
4. Judicial proceedings may be streamlined, lowering cost
and time demands in litigation for individual employees.
Class action suits in employment law, then, were allowed for reasons that mirror those of the Federal Arbitration Act. It seems the
difference is that class action suits serve the needs of the employee
while the FAA protects the interests of the employer. Regardless of
whether Congress meant for this application of the FAA to be biased,
the judicial system is allowing it to take on that exact nature.
Outside of employment law, the Supreme Court ruled on American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, a case regarding class
action suits and the FAA within the context of a violation of antitrust
laws. The class action plaintiffs’ main assertion was that individual
litigation, as required by their contracts with American Express,
would cost employees far more money to prove their case than they
could ever receive in damages. The Court acknowledged that the
class action plaintiffs had no cost-effective remedy to American
Express Company’s alleged violation of the antitrust laws but held
that an arbitration agreement that precluded class-wide proceedings

20
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174

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 34, 2020

was still enforceable. Their reasoning was that the FAA could only
be overridden in the event of a “contrary congressional command.” 21
In recent years, employers have increasingly instituted class
action waivers in their employment contracts to restrict employees’ rights to bring a legal action. 22 Specifically, they have nestled
an individual dispute resolution requirement into their arbitration
clauses to effectively disregard the rights granted to employees in
the National Labor Relations Act (the “NLRA”) and take advantage
of the coverage offered by the FAA. Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act guarantees employees “the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection.” 23 Similarly, Section 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA prohibits employers from interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in their exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7. 24 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has validated employers’
interferences with the right of employees to join in concerted judicial activities. The Court’s recent decisions regarding the FAA—like
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis—suggest that the American judicial
system, when forced to choose between a human being and a corporate entity, will consistently side with the latter.

III. In the Context of Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis
On May 21, 2018, the Supreme Court published a majority decision
regarding the case Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis. This was a consolidated case that also included Ernst & Young v. Morris and National
Labor Relations Board v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc, all of which were
21
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22
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grappling with the discrepancies in the Federal Arbitration Act and
the National Labor Relations Act. 25
Epic Systems Corporation (“Epic”) is a healthcare data management software company based in Wisconsin. Like other companies,
Epic requires all of its employees to sign an arbitration agreement
that effectively waives the employees’ rights to participate in or benefit from any class, collective, or representative proceedings. This
means that any legal dispute between an employee and the company
must be resolved through individual arbitration. 26
In February 2015, Jacob Lewis, a former employee at Epic, sued
the corporation for denial of overtime wages in violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938. The issue was that Lewis, despite having signed the arbitration agreement previously mentioned, filed his
suit in federal court individually and on behalf of a class of employees similarly affected. Epic reacted by citing the waiver clause of
its arbitration agreement as evidence supporting its motion to dismiss Lewis’ suit. The federal district court ruled that the waiver
was unenforceable under Section 7 and Section 8 of the National
Labor Relations Act. With the reasoning that “concerted activities”
included class action suits, the federal district court denied Epic’s
motion to dismiss. However, Epic Systems Corporation appealed.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the decision of the lower court, adding that the class-action waiver in the
arbitration agreement was unenforceable under the saving clause of
the FAA as well. Epic Systems Corporation appealed yet again with
a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari and addressed Epic
Systems Corp. v. Lewis in late 2017. 27
Much of the Epic Systems v. Lewis case dealt with the interpretation of the FAA, being that the act serves as the basis for the absolute enforceability of arbitration agreements. As mentioned before,
the Supreme Court noted in American Express Company v. Italian
25
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26
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Colors Restaurant that a “contrary congressional command” could
override the enforcement of an arbitration agreement pursuant to the
FAA. 28 Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis essentially brought this exception into question and forced the court to decide if class-action suits
were protected under the NLRA and as such were non-waivable
under the FAA. 29
The Supreme Court responded by reversing the lower courts’
decision and upholding the validity of employment contracts that
force employees to give up their right to collective litigation against
their employer. Five justices argued that the express terms of the
FAA should overcome the implied or subjective interpretation of
the rights afforded to employees by the NLRA. 30 Additionally, they
noted that the Supreme Court “had previously allowed for arbitration
of statutory claims even when those other statutes expressly allowed
for collective litigation.” 31
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg analyzed the situation within a historical context and argued that by upholding the validity of classaction waivers in arbitration agreements, the Supreme Court was
essentially prioritizing the FAA in subordination of employee-protective labor legislation such as the NLRA and the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 32 These two pieces of legislation were originally enacted
to “correct power imbalances between employers and employees”
33
. In her review of relevant case law, the FAA, and the NLRA, Justice Ginsburg concluded that nothing merited the dismissal of fundamental protections afforded to employees by the National Labor
Relations Act.
Thus, the ruling on Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis begs the question: is it just to allow arbitration agreements to restrict employees’
28
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statutory rights with the sole purpose of achieving the FAA’s underlying objective to streamline the judicial process?
In past cases, the Court has answered this question with a
resounding “yes,” repeatedly concluding that an arbitration can, in
fact, restrict the enforcement of a right. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., for example, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) came into conflict with the Federal Arbitration
Act, and the Court ruled that the claim alleging a violation of the
ADEA could be subject to compulsory arbitration. 34 The Supreme
Court held that an arbitration agreement could be upheld in a securities application. However, past cases like Gilmer differ from Epic
Systems Corp. v. Lewis in material fact. Whereas Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. dealt with deciding what kinds of contracts were exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act, Epic Systems
prioritized the issue that the consideration in the arbitration agreement eliminates both a judicial and arbitral forum for concerted
activity, a right provided by the NLRA. This should be deemed
illegal consideration. Additionally, without class action suits, these
employees would be deprived of their right to seek redress because
of the additional financial, time, and employment burden it would
place on these plaintiffs.
In order to resolve the legality and ethics of using the Federal
Arbitration Act to waive the right to collective legal action, we must
explore two avenues of reasoning: 1) Do the rights in the Federal
Arbitration Act preclude those of the National Labor Relations Act?
and 2) Does public policy and the legal system mandate the enforceability of arbitration agreements in the context of employment law?
A. Do the rights in the Federal Arbitration Act preclude those of the
National Labor Relations Act?
This question deals specifically with the American Express Company v. Italian Colors Restaurant ruling that allows the enforcement of an arbitration agreement to be overridden by a “contrary

34
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congressional command,” 35 which, in this article, we will narrow to
be the NLRA. The conflict between the FAA and the rights afforded
by the NLRA should push either the judicial system or the legislative
system to act in support of class action rights. As mentioned previously, the NLRA forbids employers from interfering in any way with
their employees’ exercise of rights, individually and collectively, that
are within the scope of the NLRA. According to a majority of the
Supreme Court, the NLRA is not an exception to the FAA on the
basis of a “contrary congressional command.” 36
The principal argument is that the NLRA fails to expressly indicate class action suits as a right included under “concerted activities.”
37
However, precedent indicates that express terms are unnecessary.
In Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, the Court established a test to determine whether any congressional command is
“deducible from…text or legislative history” or from an inherent
conflict between arbitration and the statute’s underlying purposes.38
This well-established test strongly suggests that implied terms in
a congressional command are sufficient to infer the existence of
those terms.
Justice Gorsuch argues that even while examining the implied
rights of the NLRA, he found no evidence that the NLRA evinces
congressional intent to bar application of the FAA. He compared the
NLRA to other statutes with more express rights in favor of class
action suits and “observed that it would be anachronistic to construe
Section 7 to confer class action rights, considering that Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23 did not exist until 30 years after the NLRA
was enacted” 39 (HLR). The majority opinion justifies its ruling
35
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based on a strict, narrow interpretation of law. While a majority
of the Supreme Court deemed this interpretation as legally sound,
a minority dissented. The dissenting opinion evinced a broader
interpretation of the NLRA to uncover its implied meaning. Justice
Ginsburg interpreted the NLRA in its historical context, concluding that its purpose was “to place employers and employees on a
more equal footing.” 40 In order to effectively negotiate the terms of
employment, employees must have the capacity to match the clout
of their employers—something that can only be achieved through
collective means.
The enormous power that employers wield in drafting employment contracts should not excuse them from observing relevant statutes such as the NLRA. The problem of unbalanced power exists in
all legal fields and is one that the courts have anxiously strived to
remedy. For example, courts have historically determined that we, as
people, deserve to be represented in court regardless of our financial
capabilities. Although the scope of this paper falls squarely within
civil law, an example in criminal law may help to illustrate the historical attitude of the legal system. It is clear that an individual would
not have the personal clout to defend him- or herself against the prosecutorial power of the United States of America. As such, the Sixth
Amendment has been interpreted to provide an indicted citizen with
a defense attorney regardless of whether he or she can afford it. This
equality of representation is one of the central premises upon which
our legal system is founded.
In consumer law, we see a similar conflict occurring in arbitration agreements and class action waivers between corporations
and consumers. Because companies generally draft contracts of
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adhesion41 in their favor, they often include individual arbitration
clauses that either escape the consumer’s awareness or force the
consumer to agree to it. After all, these companies understand that
arbitration has “traditionally been more beneficial to the corporate
defendants.” 42 Litigation in a judicial forum can already be especially
costly for the individual plaintiff, but these costs can become even
more onerous when the plaintiff is an individual consumer seeking
redress from a large corporation through arbitration. The high costs
of seeking redress would most certainly outweigh the potential damages or relief to be recovered through legal action. Although these
employment contracts are not necessarily categorized as contracts of
adhesion, the central concern still applies: the costs for an individual
plaintiff in either a judicial forum or arbitration would be onerous,
especially against a large corporation.
If the purpose of the National Labor Relations Act is “to place
employers and employees on a more equal footing,” then corporations have consistently flouted employees’ rights by using the lack
of express terms in their arbitration clauses as their main defense.
43
This loophole in the Federal Arbitration Act, which corporations
have abused time and time again, is a serious threat to the NLRA’s
congressional command.
The Federal Arbitration Act demands that courts subject arbitration agreements to the same laws that govern contract law. If arbitrations are contrary to an existing statute, then the consideration of
41
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the arbitration agreement is illegal and deemed—not only unconscionable as other courts have decided—but void or unenforceable.
Contract law stipulates, “Even where such nullity is not specifically directed by the legislature, public policy is generally thought
to require it, either to punish lawbreakers by withholding societal
assistance from an illegal transaction, or to maintain the integrity of
the judicial process.” 44
As such, if the judicial system fails to reconcile the FAA with the
NLRA for its lack of express rights, the legislative system must then
uphold employees’ judicial rights by express congressional command.
B. Does public policy and the legal system mandate the enforceability
of arbitration agreements in the context of employment law?
Public policy supports the substantive right to class action suits,
so the legal system must support public policy because it affects
nearly all aspects of public and private life. It “importantly shapes
the responses to public risks…which jeopardize the welfare of the
community as a whole. The legal system also shapes the social,
political, and economic environment in which public risks arise and
are responded to.” 45 Several possible risks of deeming individual
arbitration agreements in employment contracts as unenforceable
have been outlined in past case decisions and current legal dialogue.
Courts and legal professionals are concerned that doing so might
undermine contract law, increase court traffic, or encourage more
employee lawsuits.
However, in the matter of this claim undermining contract law,
this article does not support a broad rejection of the Federal Arbitration Act but rather a firm rejection of questionable contract practices.
44
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In Shotts v. OP Winter Haven, Inc., the Supreme Court of Florida
asserts, “With respect to which contract defenses...constitute ‘generally applicable contract defenses’ for purposes of section 2 [of the
FAA], we conclude that public policy clearly is such a defense, for
if an arbitration agreement violates public policy, no valid agreement exists.” 46 Global Travel Marketing, Inc. v. Shea emphasizes
the same principle: “No valid agreement exists if the arbitration
clause is unenforceable on public policy grounds.” 47 The Supreme
Court of the United States itself explained in Doctor’s Associates,
Inc. v. Casarotto that “generally applicable contract defenses, such
as fraud, duress or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate
arbitration agreements without contravening [the Federal Arbitration Act].”48 Considering the purpose of the NLRA, the Court, for
lack of legal contract consideration, cannot possibly enforce arbitration agreements within employment contracts. Upholding their
enforceability would actually be undermining public policy and, as
a result, contract law.
The risk of possible increase in court traffic is valid but not as
threatening as generally believed. Class action suits help fulfill the
main purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, which is “to streamline
judicial proceedings.” 49 The consolidation of these claims into class
action suits allows for efficient class-wide redress in terms of time
and money. Though the allowance of class action suits in employment
law may increase court traffic, lawmakers and judges’ more pressing
concern should be the heavy decrease in legal claims brought against
companies by employees. This decrease does not act as evidence that
companies are improving corporate governance, but rather indicates
that employees are unable to afford the costs of pursuing individual
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arbitration claims, given that such costs far outweigh the potential
rewards that employees could receive from damages.50
Some may argue that the number of legal claims decreased
because most of them were frivolous to begin with. This argument,
though possible in a minority of cases, is overall specious. Indeed,
some corporations worry that if they were to refrain from enforcing arbitration agreements, they would encourage more employees
to bring lawsuits against them. But these corporations must realize
that although class action suits would make judicial proceedings less
costly for the individual, these costs are not insignificant. Enacting
legal claims might even cause conflict and tension within the workplace if plaintiff-employees still work for the employer in violation.
An individual would only feel the need to launch a class-wide complaint if employers actually violated the law, and did so in a fashion
that affected more than a handful of employees. To offset possible
frivolous cases, the corporation is perfectly justified in including an
attorney fee provision clause in their employment contracts.
Additionally, proponents of mandatory arbitration agreements
may reasonably believe that class action suits are an immense
expense and detriment to firm cash flow. However, they are missing
the bigger picture. As legislative acts, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002,51 mandate corporate governance, we see that enacted
laws must be slowly moving towards increasing the responsibility
of businesses and employers. If a firm truly wants long-term cash
flow and high firm value, would it not want to have the foresight to
incorporate this attitude and firm culture of accountability sooner
rather than later? Part of this requirement is providing an avenue
for addressing mistreatment of employees that is equitable to both
parties. In the long run, firm managers and investors will profit from
learning how to better manage and be accountable to employees.
Thus, the risks of upholding the right to collective legal action
over the enforceability of arbitration agreements can be mitigated
by simple measures. On the other hand, the risk of enforcing class
50
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action waivers certainly jeopardizes the welfare of the community.
Already, it has quashed the ability of employees to seek legal redress
for violations of their rights, which in and of itself is a violation of
employees’ ethical rights.
In addition to this, mandatory arbitration clauses have also
prevented employees from seeking redress when they have experienced sexual harassment at their jobs. In a letter sent to the House
of Representatives and the Senate, the attorney generals of every
state, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. territories admonished,
“The secrecy requirements of arbitration clauses…disserve the public interest by keeping both the harassment complaints and any settlements confidential ...This veil of secrecy may then prevent other
persons similarly situated from learning of the harassment claims so
that they, too, might pursue relief.” 52Essentially, these attorney generals called for legislation to exempt sexual harassment victims from
mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts. Silencing
claims of mistreatment is a disservice to not only public interest, but
to business interest as well.
Given the recent decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, the
Supreme Court is unfortunately keener on enforcing imbalance in
favor of corporations rather than reprimanding them for their gross
disregard for public policy and business ethics. Clearly, the financial well-being of a corporation is vital to the lifeblood of a nation.
Corporations are entities that have been and will continue being protected by the judicial system—as they should be. However, these
companies still must adhere to their duties to public policy and ethical behavior. If businesses fail to follow regulations imposed upon
them by labor law, employees must have some method available to
them for seeking equitable redress that is financially feasible.
Since public policy mandates the right of employees to seek judicial redress, either the judicial system or the legislative system must
move forward to uphold this right by either overturning the precedent set by Epic Systems or by passing a legislative act.
52
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As we prepare to take the next step, let us look again at the two
questions we considered earlier: 1) Do the rights in the Federal Arbitration Act preclude those of the National Labor Relations Act? And
2) Does public policy and the legal system mandate the enforceability of arbitration agreements in the context of employment law?
Justice Ginsburg poses a question in her dissenting opinion:
“Does the Federal Arbitration Act permit employers to insist that
their employees, whenever seeking redress for commonly experienced wage loss, go it alone, never mind the right secured to employees by the National Labor Relations Act ‘to engage in…concerted
activities’ for their ‘mutual aid or protection’?” Similar to the answer
to the question posed by Justice Ginsburg, the answers to both of
these questions “should be a resounding ‘No.’” 53

IV. Potential Consequences
It is beyond the scope of this article to predict what the outcome
would have been for Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis had the Court
decided to allow a class action suit to form and press charges against
Epic. However, such a decision would have at least enabled the judicial system to impart a more equitable result for the parties represented in the case.
At the moment, the Supreme Court’s ruling has effectively
silenced employees’ concerns. Empirical evidence shows that only a
fraction of employment claims is actually filed in arbitration.54
Furthermore, Reuters suggests that the effects of the Court’s
decision extend beyond legal implications55 Shareholders value corporate governance; when they invest capital in a firm, they are also
placing trust in that firm’s corporate culture. Mandatory arbitration
53

Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct., 1612 (2018).

54

Estlund, supra note 51, at 689-700.

Alison Frankel, When Corporations Silence Employees Via Arbitration,
Shareholders Lose,
Reuters News, Feb. 18, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-arbitration/when-corporations-silence-employees-via-arbitration-shareholderslose-idUSKCN1FX2TH.
55

186

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 34, 2020

agreements silence employees and prevent investors from obtaining
a crucial source of private information regarding any alleged mistreatment of employees that could be part of that corporate culture.
Information is vital in semi-efficient markets such as those in the
United States, and the lack thereof could not only slow efficiency of
financial markets but also negatively affect shareholder wealth.
It follows, then, that the opposite of enforcing mandatory arbitration agreements— allowing employees the forum of judicial classaction litigation—would actually serve to increase the value of the
firm and maximize shareholder wealth, which is the principal purpose of any firm or manager.56 More employee information enables
investors to more accurately gauge firm value and make necessary
changes. Whether the firm is publicly or privately traded, investors
and managers benefit from this greater exchange of information—
especially if that information will cause a significant adjustment of
expectations.
If employees’ claims are not barred from class action proceedings,
the number of employee claims would not magically increase but the
number formally filed certainly would. Employers would be held more
accountable to responsible and ethical corporate governance.
To be fair, employees do have options other than litigation to
effect change within their employer. They may complain to the
Department of Labor—known as “whistleblowing”—and have those
officials investigate the company. However, this begs the question: is
the judicial system really working at its best if whistleblowing is the
only way to seek proper redress? Another option lies entirely in the
hands of lawmakers; the legislature may pass new bills outlawing
class action waivers to expressly make them contrary to congressional command. In 2017, lawmakers proposed bills doing exactly that
with the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017 and the Restoring Statutory Rights and Interest of the States Act of 2017. Unfortunately,
little progress or movement has been observed since.
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V. Conclusion
The very purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act is subservient—
legally and ethically—to that of the National Labor Relations Act.
Even so, the Supreme Court has upheld arbitration agreements that
have gone as far as violating the implied purpose of congressional
acts that protect the rights of employees—specifically, the right
to seek judicial redress within their financial means. This right is
mandated by both precedent and public policy. Upholding this right
would not only maintain the integrity of the legal system but also
benefit the very corporations that fight against it. Corporate governance would be enforced more heavily, thus maximizing long-term
shareholder wealth. The economy as a whole would become more
efficient from the increase in transparent information if the legislature or judicial system held all corporations to this same standard.
And what if the majority opinion in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis
really is the most legally sound? Then, all the more reason that the
legislature must remedy the loophole that businesses are increasingly abusing to quash the substantive rights of their employees. The
ethical and public policy-related discussions of this article still hold.
We turn back to the legal and governmental system. If the
Supreme Court does not overturn its decision in Epic Systems Corp.
v. Lewis in subsequent cases, the immediate solution to this gross
injustice to the interests and rights of employees is clear. The legislature ought to realign the goals of the Federal Arbitration Act with
those of the National Labor Relations Act and enact an amendment
or a clarifying congressional act to the Federal Arbitration Act,
expressly deeming class action waivers in arbitration agreements as
unenforceable.

